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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes the design and development of algorithms for fault 
tolerant distributed systems. The development of such algorithms requires 
making assumptions about the types of component faults for which toler-
ance is to be provided. Such assumptions must be specified accurately. To 
this end, this thesis develops a classification of faults in systems. This fault 
classification identifies a range of fault types from the most restricted to the 
least restricted. For each fault type, an algorithm for reaching distributed 
agreement in the presence of a bounded number of faulty processors is 
developed, and thus a family of agreement algorithms is presented. The 
influence of the various fault types on the complexities of these algorithms 
is discussed. Early stopping algorithms are also developed for selected fault 
types and the influence of fault types on the early stopping conditions of the 
respective algorithms is analysed. The problem of evaluating the perfor-
mance of distributed replicated systems which will require agreement algo-
rithms is considered next. As a first step in the direction of meeting this 
challenging task, a pipeline triple modular redundant system is considered 
and analytical methods are derived to evaluate the performance of such a 
system. Finally, the accuracy of these methods is examined using computer 
simulations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A system can be considered to be made up of a set of components which 
interact under the control of a design. A component of a system is a system 
by itself and can be considered, where appropriate, to be atomic with the 
implication that any further decomposition of a component is of no interest 
and can be ignored. According to the terminology presented in [Ander8l, 
Lapri85], faults in a system are the (potential or actual) causes of the 
failures of the system. A violation from the specified behaviour of a system 
will be termed a failure. Given the complexity of modern computing sys-
tems, one approach for making them reliable is to accept that despite what-
ever efforts that have been made to avoid or remove faults, systems can 
nevertheless remain potentially faulty and to incorporate provisions to 
enable the system to cope with the faults that remain or develop. This 
approach is termed the fault tolerance approach and is generally considered 
to be necessary for building systems that can be assured of providing a high 
degree of operational reliability to the user(s) of the system. 
A given component can usually fail in many different ways. That is, a 
faulty component can have many failure modes. Thus, in order to be able to 
provide any kind of guarantee of service, the designer of a fault tolerant sys-
tem should specify not only the maximum number of components that he 
presumes might be faulty, but also the types of failures a faulty component 
is presumed to have. In other words, the fault tolerance specification should 
state explicitly the type and number of component failures a system is 
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supposed to tolerate. Then, provided the actual component failures that 
occur do not violate these assumptions and the fault tolerance strategies are 
correctly designed, the overall system will not fail. Putting this another 
way, it is meaningless to claim that a system is fault tolerant, without indi-
cating the assumptions that have been made regarding the number and 
types of component failures that could occur. 
1.1. Fault and failure classification 
A distributed system will be defined as a collection of autonomous pro-
cessors which can communicate with each other, and each of which can pro-
vide one or more services and can cooperate with other processors on a com-
mon goal or task [Enslo78]. By considering processors as components in a 
distributed system, different types of processor failures have been considered 
in the literature. One of the most restricted failure types is an omission 
failure [Mohan83] whereby a faulty processor fails by producing no output 
for a given input that requires an output to be produced by the processor. A 
. fault that causes such a failure will be called an omission fault. When a 
processor's omission failure persists for all such inputs, the processor will be 
said to have failed in a permanent omission manner. With subtle 
differences, a permanent omission failure has been termed in the literature 
as processor crash, halting failure [Birma87], fail-silent failure [PoweI88l, 
and fail-stop failure [Schli83]. Failures of these types are relatively easy to 
tolerate when compared to Byzantine failures. A Byzantine failure is 
caused by a Byzantine fault and is any violation of the specified behaviour. 
A Byzantine faulty processor is customarily considered to be capable of 
being malicious in trying to "sabotage" any fault tolerance provisions in the 
system. Faults that can appear to be of malicious nature were first dis-
cussed in [Daly73, Davie78] and have been considered, for example, in the 
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design of SIFT system [WensI78] and in [Lampo82] where the name 
"Byzantine" was coined. 
A significant advantage to be gained by assuming that processors may 
have Byzantine failures is that the analysis required for justifying the fault 
assumptions made about the processors of systems used in life critical sys-
tems is greatly simplified. In order to consider anything less than Byzantine 
failure behaviour on the part of a processor in the design of a fault tolerant 
system, one must provide a convincing argument (based on knowledge of the 
processor's design, its components, and any provisions that the design con-
siders for faults in these components) of why it can fail only in some res-
tricted manner. Since, in the Byzantine fault model, no assumption needs 
to be made about failure modes of a processor, system analysis is 
simplified. However, attempts to build systems which can tolerate Byzan-
tine failures of processors involve a significant cost in terms of the number 
of redundant processors required in the system, and of message and time 
complexity in providing the system services. For example, when processors 
are considered to suffer only omission failures, only one (redundant) proces-
sor is required in addition to the number of processors that are assumed to 
fail in providing a service; when Byzantine failures are considered, the non-
faulty processors in the system should form a majority if they are to produce 
identical outputs for a given input (as in systems with majority voting 
[Lyons62]), and they should out-number the faulty processors by more than 
three to one [Pease80] if their outputs are unlikely to be identical (such as 
outputting the reading of a local clock [Lampo85]). 
In the design of a reliable, but not life critical systems, provisions for 
tolerance to Byzantine failures may be sacrificed in the interest of economic 
considerations. In such a situation, if omission failures are considered to be 
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too restrictive, then the design of a fault tolerant system requires a realistic 
means of identifying failure types that are more restricted than in the 
Byzantine model and less restricted than in the omission model. In this 
thesis we present, in chapter 2, a fault and failure classification using 
"expected-value" and "timing" as the two properties of a component's 
response. The resulting fault and failure classes are ordered according to 
their relative restrictiveness. Examples are drawn from distributed sys-
tems. We further extend this classification to apply to a particularly impor-
tant type of components that are required to provide replicated responses. 
Our fault and failure classification is an improvement over [Mohan83, 
Crist85], and our earlier classification in [EzhiI86]. An interesting observa-
tion from our classification of faults and failures is that for a given problem 
in distributed computing one can design a family of algorithms - from rela-
tively simple ones tolerating failures of restricted types to increasingly com-
plex ones tolerating failures of less restricted (and unrestricted) types. One 
such fundamental problem considered here will be the agreement problem. 
1.2. The agreement problem and algorithms 
Processors in a distributed system cooperate on a common goal or a 
task. Fundamental to such cooperation is the problem of agreeing on a 
piece of data upon which a computation depends. For example, the data 
managers in a distributed database system need to agree on whether to 
commit or abort a given transaction [Gray79]. In a replicated database sys-
tem, the processors need to agree on an identical sequence of incoming tran-
sactions [Garci86], and might need to agree on where a particular piece of 
data (a file, for example) is supposed to reside [Giffo79, Popek81]. In a flight 
control system for an airplane [Wensl78], the engine control module and the 
flight surface control module need to agree on whether to continue or abort 
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a landing in progress. The key point is not what the processors are agreeing 
on but that they must all come to the same conclusion. 
An obvious approach to achieving agreement is for the processors to 
vote and agree on the majority value. In the absence of faults, this works 
fine, but in a close election, the vote of one faulty processor can swing the 
outcome. Suppose distinct non-faulty processors receive conflicting votes 
from a faulty processor, then they might reach conflicting conclusions and 
hence fail to reach agreement. Thus specific algorithms need to be 
developed to guarantee that non-faulty processors reach agreement by arriv-
ing at the same conclusion. This problem is called the agreement problem 
[Lampo82] or the interactive consistency problem [Pease80] in the litera-
ture and can be briefly described as follows: A processor, called the sender, 
in a distributed system of at least three processors wants to disseminate a 
value to all other processors. The non-faulty processors in the system, 
which are at least two in number, will be said to have reached agreement 
on the sender's value if they all decide on the same value, and on the sent 
value if the sender is non-faulty. Extending a solution to the agreement 
problem mentioned above into a general context where every processor can 
act as a sender is straightforward. 
The agreement problem has been studied under a variety of assump-
tions mainly concerning the synchrony of processors and message communi-
cation and the types of faults processors and communication medium are 
subjected to. (A brief survey is presented in [Fisch83a].) This thesis 
presents, in chapters 3 and 4, deterministic algorithms developed for a dis-
tributed system where relative processing speeds of, and message communi-
cation delays between, processors are assumed to be known and bounded. 
An upper bound on the number of processors that can possibly fail is also 
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assumed. Execution of these algorithms will guarantee agreement in a 
known and bounded time interval. Algorithms are developed in two con-
texts: the sender processor's broadcast time is not known, and is known, to 
other processors a priori. Algorithms designed in the context of unknown 
broadcast time can be developed into broadcast protocols as in [Crist85] 
which can provide agreement and ordering abstractions [Schne86] which are 
essential for constructing systems with replicated processing. In this con-
text, in chapter 3, we develop agreement algorithms, and show them to be 
correct, for faults of each type defined in our classification and thus present 
a family of agreement algorithms illustrating the relative complexity of 
these algori thms. 
Solutions to the agreement problem when the broadcast time of the 
sender is known can be useful in systems such as a distributed database sys-
tem where data managers have a prior knowledge of the time the agree-
ment on commit or abort decision for a given transaction should commence. 
When processors in a distributed system know the sender's broadcast time a 
priori, it may be desirable to have them reach agreement early, when the 
actual number of failed processors is less than the expected. Agreement 
algorithms that guarantee an early agreement in the presence of less-than-
expected number of processor failures are called early stopping algorithms 
[Dolev82a]. In an execution of an early stopping algorithm, non-faulty pro-
cessors may reach agreement at different timing instants; some can be ear-
lier than the others. So, these algorithms are useful in applications where 
processors, following an agreement, carry out actions that need not be time-
coordinated. In distributed transaction commit, for example, non-faulty pro-
cessors need not commit (or abort) a transaction at a coordinated time, so 
long as they all decide to do, and eventually do, the same thing; therefore, a 
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non-faulty processor can commit a transaction and continue processing as 
soon as it has reached a commit decision and thereby knows that all other 
non-faulty processors will eventually commit the transaction. For such 
applications, early stopping algorithms can be used to make the processors 
reach agreement as early as possible. The authors of [Dolev82a] considered 
Byzantine failures for developing an early stopping algorithm. In chapter 4 
of this thesis, we consider a few restricted types of failures and provide early 
stopping algorithms that are faster than the ones reported in the literature 
for these failure types. 
1.3. Performance evaluation 
The agreement algorithms presented in chapters 3 and 4 are useful in 
constructing systems with replicated processing. Replicated processing with 
majority voting - N modular redundant processing - provides a powerful 
means of constructing fault tolerant systems [Mathu70, Carte79]. In N 
modular redundant processing, NMR processing for short, a given computa-
tional task is carried out in N, N ;::: 3, processing modules. These modules 
must not have any common mode of failures so that they can fail indepen-
dently of each other. The results produced by these modules will be subject 
to a majority vote to obtain the final result. A majority vote is possible, and 
the final result will be correct, if (i) at least majority of the processing 
modules are non-faulty and (ii) non-faulty processing modules are to produce 
identical results. Thus, in NMR processing, tolerance can be provided to 
failures of at most less than half the number of modules and the failures 
may even be of Byzantine type. 
Fundamental to the fault tolerance capabilities in NMR processing is 
that non-faulty modules produce identical results for a given computational 
task. Modules may maintain some state information which can affect 
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processing of a computational task and hence the results produced. In the 
case of a deterministic processing model, when non-faulty modules with 
identical state information process a given computational task, they 
undergo identical state transitions and produce identical results. Given 
that processing is deterministic and non-faulty modules have identical ini-
tial state information, it is necessary to guarantee that non-faulty modules 
process the computational tasks in an identical order. When modules can 
receive task messages from multiple sources or from a single source via 
different communication paths, they cannot be expected to receive task mes-
sages in an identical order. This means that non-faulty modules should 
agree on the processing order for every given task message to be processed. 
If it cannot be guaranteed that a source will provide different modules with 
task messages of identical contents, then non-faulty modules should not 
only agree on the processing order for a task message but also on the con-
tents of the task message. The agreement algorithms presented in chapter 
3 can be used to meet these requirements in systems with NMR processing. 
The common form of NMR processing in practical systems is triple 
modular redundant processing, TMR processing for short, where three pro-
cessing modules are used to process the computational tasks concurrently. 
FTMP (Fault tolerant Multiple processor) [Hopki78] achieves fault tolerance 
through TMR processing and is one of the early practical systems developed 
for flight control applications. The cost of fault tolerance in TMR processing 
(NMR processing in general) is mainly the redundant processing modules, 
the majority voters, and the time taken to agree on, and order, the input 
messages and to perform majority voting. This time overhead, among other 
factors, influences the response time for a given computational task - the 
overall time taken for the final (voted) result of a computational task to be 
obtained. 
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Consider a computational task being carried out by a TMR node - a 
triad of processors grouped for TMR processing. The three processors of the 
TMR node need not produce their results exactly at the same time, since 
their processing speeds may be different and they cannot be guaranteed to 
start processing the task exactly at the same time. Consequently, they may 
be producing their results to a voter at different timing instants. A majority 
vote for the final result cannot be carried out until at least two of the three 
processors have produced their results. If anyone of these two processors 
has failed by producing incorrect results, then the results from the third 
processor has to be waited for, before performing a majority vote. Thus, the 
response time of a TMR node not only gets influenced by the time taken to 
carry out majority voting, agreement and ordering (on input messages) but 
also varies depending on whether all three or just two processors in a TMR 
node are non-faulty. This means that an evaluation of response times needs 
to consider the operational status of processors in the node. Thus, perfor-
mance evaluation of a system with replicated processing should take into 
account of a number of factors such as voting times, processor failure modes 
and failure probabilities, processing and message transmission times, etc. 
This is a challenging task. 
In chapter 5 of this thesis, we study the performance of a distributed 
replicated system that is made up of a collection of TMR nodes connected in 
tandem. We present analytical methods to evaluate the performance of such 
a TMR pipeline system. The derivation of these methods involve analytical 
approximations, the accuracy of which is examined by computer simula-
tions. Despite their simplicity and roughness due to approximations, the 
analytical methods presented here can be observed to be quite accurate in 
estimating system performance measures. These methods can serve as alter-
natives to simulation methods, when the latter are considered to be 
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expensive to carry out. We also examine the influence of majority voting 
times and processor failure rates on system performance. It should be men-
tioned here that performance evaluation of distributed replicated systems 
have not (yet) been reported in the literature and our work presented in this 
thesis, to the best of our knowledge, is the first of its kind. 
To summarise the ideas presented in this thesis: A classification of com-
ponent faults and failures is presented. Agreement algorithms are 
developed in the two contexts defined by whether the sender's broadcast 
time is or is not known to other processors in the system a priori. In the 
first context early stopping algorithms are developed for failures of selected 
types. In the second context, algorithms are developed for failures of each 
type defined in our classification - thus a family of algorithms is presented. 
Next we consider the problem of evaluating the performance of distributed 
systems which require agreement protocols. Analytical methods for evaluat-
ing the performance of a pipeline TMR system are derived based on some 
approximations, and the accuracy of these approximations is examined 
using computer simulations. The approximations turn out to estimate per-
formance fairly accurately. 
1.4. Thesis organisation 
In the next chapter, we present a classification of component faults and 
failures using "expected-value" and "timeliness" as the two properties of a 
component's response. We extend this classification to apply to components 
required to produce replicated responses. The different fault types defined 
are ordered in the form of a lattice according to their relative restrictiveness 
and the unrestricted type is shown to be Byzantine. Based on the fault and 
failure classifications for components with replicated and unreplicated 
responses, a fault analysis of composite components made up of potentially 
faulty components is performed. Composite components subject to such a 
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fault analysis are a processor considered to be made up of computational 
unit and digital clock, and a distributed system made up of processors and 
communication subsystem. 
In chapter 3, deterministic agreement algorithms tolerant to processor 
faults are developed in the context of the sender's broadcast time not being 
known a priori. The types of processor faults considered will be the ones 
that are defined in chapter 2. A generic algorithm is presented to collec-
tively represent algorithms tolerant to different types of processor faults. 
Based on the generic algorithm, the influence of processor fault types on 
algorithm complexity is discussed. For processors in a distributed system 
having a prior knowledge of sender's broadcast time, early stopping agree-
ment algorithms are presented in chapter 4. Only selected types of proces-
sor faults are considered. The early stopping capabilities and message 
requirement of algorithms presented in this chapter will reveal the fact that 
each algorithm has been developed making complete use of the distinct 
features that characterise the respective types of faults tolerated. Chapter 5 
presents analytical methods for estimating the performance of a pipeline 
TMR system. Two system models are studied: in the first model faulty pro-
cessors stay faulty until the observation period, and in the second faulty 
processors are repaired after a finite and random delay. The accuracy of 
analytical approximations involved in the derivation of the analytical 
methods is examined by computer simulations. Performance estimates 
obtained by analytical methods are observed to be reasonably close to simu-
lation estimates. The influence of majority voting times and processor 
failure rates on system performance is also observed. Chapter 6 concludes 
the thesis and suggests directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A CLASSIFICATION OF FAULTS IN SYSTEMS 
2.1. Introduction 
A fault tolerant computing system must be capable of providing 
specified services in the presence of a finite number of component failures. 
In order to be able to provide any kind of guarantee of services, the system 
designer must specify what kinds of, and how many, component failures the 
system is intended to tolerate. Suppose a system is constructed out of n com-
ponents, then its fault tolerance specification could be along the lines that if 
there are no more than f component failures (where f < n ) and if each 
failure is of an assumed type, then the system will continue to function as 
specified. That is, the type of component failures a system is supposed to 
tolerate has to be stated explicitly. A given component can usually have 
many failure modes (that is, a failed component can behave in one of many 
different ways) some of which can be relatively easier to tolerate than oth-
ers; at the same time, certain failure modes of a component are likely to 
occur with greater probability than others. Given that the failure data of 
system components, such as, failure modes and their probability of 
occurrences are available, the design of a reliable system will often involve 
making engineering judgements regarding the classes of component failures 
for which tolerance is to be provided. For example, if a particular type of 
component failure is hard to tolerate and if the probability of occurrence of 
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such failures is extremely small, then, in applications that are not life criti-
cal, provisions for tolerating that type of failure may well be sacrificed in 
the interest of economic and performance considerations. An interesting 
observation is that for a given system function (e.g. maintaining consistency 
of replicated data in a distributed system), one can design a family of algo-
rithms - from relatively simple ones tolerating restricted types of failures to 
increasingly complex ones tolerating less restricted (and unrestricted) types 
of failures. 
In this chapter, we present a classification of component failures which 
we believe provides a convenient and realistic means for specifying faulty 
behaviour of components and for designing corresponding fault tolerant 
algorithms. Section 2.2 presents this classification. In section 2.3, we extend 
our classification to apply to a particularly important class of components 
that are required to provide replicated responses. In the following section 
we study the behaviour of systems composed of possibly faulty components. 
Section 2.5 concludes this chapter. 
2.2. Components and Their Behaviour 
A system can be considered to be made up of a set of components which 
interact under the control of a design. A component of a system is a system 
by itself and can be considered to be atomic with the implication that any 
further decomposition of a component is of no interest and can be ignored. A 
component's behaviour in response to an input from the environment will be 
defined by the component's specification prescribing state transitions and a 
real time interval within which the transitions should occur in response to a 
given input. Following the terminology developed elsewhere [Ander81, 
Lapri85], a component fails, when its behaviour deviates from that specified. 
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The term fault will be used to refer to the cause of the failure. Consider an 
input that requires the component to produce an output. A non-faulty com-
ponent, by definition, will produce (i.e. respond with) an output that is in 
accordance with the specification. The response of a faulty component, on 
the other hand, need not be as specified. Following [Kopet85], we will con-
sider the response of a component for a given input to be correct, if not only 
the output value is as expected, but also the output is produced on time. 
Formally, a component's correct response will be defined as follows: 
Definition: Correct Response 
Let a component receive at time ti an input requiring an output from 
the component and as a result respond by producing an output with value v 
at time tj, tj > ti. For that input, the response is correct iff: 
(i) the value is as expected: v = w, where w is the expected value con-
sistent with the specification; and, 
(ii) it is produced on time: tmiD ~ tj - ti ~ tmax, where [ti + tmiD , ti + tmax] is 
the interval during which the specified output is expected to be pro-
duced; and tmin (tmin > 0) and t max (tmlLI > tmin) are constants denoting 
respectively the minimum delay time and maximum delay time for the 
output. A component's correct response for an input requiring an out-
put can be expressed concisely as: 
CR: v = wand tmin ~ tj - ti ~ t max • 
For notational convenience, CR will also be denoted as: 
CR: expected - value and ontime. 
The minimum delay time, tmiD, indicates that the output of a component 
cannot be produced instantaneously but must experience a finite minimum 
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delay of non-zero amount. The maXImum delay time, tmax, indicates the 
upper bound on the output delay. 
The above definition is based on the expected input-output behaviour of 
the component and does not refer to any internal state transitions caused by 
inputs. There can, however, be inputs that may require the component to 
behave by making appropriate changes in its internal state and by produc-
ing no output. The value w, and the quantities tmu , tmin in the above 
definition are meaningful only when output values are expected to be pro-
duced by the component in response to inputs. This also implies that the 
definition is directly applicable to "demand driven" components: components 
that produce outputs in response to having received an input. However, 
there are also autonomous components, such as clocks, which continuously 
produce outputs. A treatment on the behaviour of such components will be 
presented in section 2.4. 
Definition: Incorrect Response 
A response will be said to be incorrect, if either the output value or the 
output timing or both are incorrect. The output value will be termed 
incorrect, if the value of the output produced is not the expected value con-
sistent with the specification, i. e. v ;c w; similarly, the output timing will be 
said to be incorrect, if the output is produced outside the expected interval, 
i.e. either tj - ti < tmin (early) or tj - ti > tmu (late). 
2.2.1. Fault/Failure Classification 
In the following, five classes of faults are presented. This classification 
has been developed by considering failures in the value domain, in the time 
domain, and then in both the domains. Our classification of faults is based 
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on, and an improvement over, earlier work reported in [Mohan83, Crist85, 
Ezhil86l. 
Omission FaultlFailure 
A fault that causes a component not to respond to an input and, 
thereby, fail by not producing the expected output will be termed an omis-
sion fault and the corresponding failure an omission failure. 
A component with an omission fault behaves in a very simple fashion: 
either a correct response is produced or no response is produced. A processor 
that (perhaps momentarily) stops functioning, a sensor that occasionally 
fails to produce output signals, and a communication link which loses mes-
sages are examples of components with omission faults. In the literature, 
many fault tolerant algorithms can be found to have been designed under 
this fault assumption. 
Value Fault/Failure 
A fault that causes a component to respond, for a given input, within 
the correct time interval but with an incorrect value will be termed a value 
fault. The corresponding failure will be called a value failure which, using 
our notation, is defined as: 
VF: v :;e wand tmin :S tj - ti :S t max • 
= not expected - value and ontime. 
A processor producing erroneously computed values on time, a timely 
delivery of a corrupted message by a communication link are examples of 
value failures. 
- 17 -
Timing FaultJFailure 
A timing fault causes a component to respond to a given input with the 
correct value but outside the correct interval (either early or late). The 
corresponding failure will be called a timing failure: 
TF: v = wand (tj - ti < tmin or tj - ti > tmax). 
= expected - value and not ontime. 
For example, an overloaded processor producing correct values with 
excessive delay and a fast timer which sends an early timeout signal, will 
be said to have suffered timing failures. A timing failure in which the 
response is produced late (early) will be called a late timing failure (an 
early timing failure). A late timing failure is also referred to as a perfor-
mance failure [Crist86]. 
Emission Fault/Failure 
A component with an em£sswn fault fails by producing an incorrect 
response to a given input. The corresponding failure is called an emission 
failure. Using our notation, an emission failure is: 
EF = not CR 
= v ~ w or (tj - ti < tmin or tj - ti > tmax). 
= not expected - value or not ontime. 
An emission fault can cause a component to emit a response which can 
be incorrect in the value as well as in the time domains. Emission failures 
are a combination of value and timing failures. An overloaded processor 
that responds too late to a given input with erroneously computed values 
can be said to suffer an emission failure. 
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Note that from the definitions of VF, TF, and EF, we have: 
VF implies EF and TF implies EF. 
Thus, value and timing failures (faults) are special cases of emission 
failures (faults). 
Byzantine (or General) Fault/Failure 
In tbe above four failure classes, a component's failure modes have been 
defined by analysing the properties of an output for a given input. It is also 
possible to consider a faulty component to fail in an "arbitrary" manner, i.e., 
in a manner that cannot be perceived within the framework of the above 
failure classes. For example, a failed component may produce an output 
without a valid input. All such failure modes that cannot be considered to 
be in the above four failure classes will be included in the last general fault 
class: 
A Byzantine fault causes a component to violate the specified input-
output behaviour in any manner and a Byzantine failure will be any viola-
tion of a component's specified input-output behaviour. 
By definition, 
EF implies BF, where BF is a Byzantine failure. 
Note that it is not generally feasible to enumerate all possible failure 
modes of a faulty component. A Byzantine faulty component is customarily 
considered in the literature to be capable of being "malicious" in its 
responses to its environment. The following examples of a faulty processor's 
behaviour in a distributed system can be considered to be malicious: a pro-
cessor Pi masquerading as processor Pj, j :;C i, and Pi altering 
source/destination of a message it is relaying. Faults of malicious nature 
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were first discussed in [Daly73, Davie781 and have been considered in sys-
tem designs such as SIFT [WensI78], and in algorithms for reaching agree-
ment in a distributed system [Lamp082]. 
2.2.2. Fault/Failure Ordering 
A Byzantine fault causes any violation of a component's specified 
input-output behaviour; as such, no restrictions are applicable in the result-
ing faulty behaviour. All other fault types preclude certain types of faulty 
behaviour, the omission fault type being the most restrictive. Thus the 
omission and Byzantine faults represent two ends of the fault classification 
spectrum, with the other fault types placed in between. The relationship 
between the five types of faults can be further developed as follows. 
If an omission failure can be interpreted as equivalent to 'producing a 
null value at some finite time', then it can be defined as follows: 
OF: v = NULL and ti < tj < 00. 
Since v = NULL implies v ~ w, an omission failure as defined above 
can be seen as a special case of an emission failure: OF implies EF. 
OF can also be shown to be a special case of VF, by reasoning as follows: 
In a value failure, the incorrect output value can be a null value. 
Define a proper subset of value failures in which the output values are 
NULL as: 
VFnull: v = NULL and tmin S tj - ti S tmax. 
By definition, VFnull implies VF and also implies OF. A null value pro-
duced on time is the same, for all practical reasons, as a null value produced 
at any time. Therefore, VFnull in which a null value is produced on time can 
be treated to be the same as (v = NULL and ti < tj < (0), and therefore to 
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represent OF itself; so OF implies VF in practice. 
If an omission failure can be interpreted as equivalent to 'producing 
some value at the time of infinity', then, it can be defined also as: 
OF: (v :;c NULL and tj = (0). Since tj = 00 implies tj - ti > t mas: , an omis-
sion failure as defined above can be seen as a special case of an emis-
sion failure: OF implies EF. 
It can also be shown that OF implies TF, by using arguments similar to 
those employed to show that OF implies VF: 
Define a proper subset of timing failures in which tj = 00 as: 
TFnull: {v = wand tj = oo}. 
By definition, TFnuli implies TF and also implies OF. For all practical 
purposes, producing the correct value at time 00 has the same meaning as 
producing any value at time 00, Therefore TFnuli in which the expected value 
is produced at time 00 can be considered to be equivalent to {v :;c NULL and tj 
= oo} and to represent OF itself; thus, OF implies TF in practice. 
Thus, omission faults (failures) can be treated as a special case of, and 
hence a proper subset of, emission, value, and timing faults (failures). From 
their definitions, value and timing faults (failures) can be seen to form a 
proper subset of emission faults (failures). 
The relationship among these five types of faults (failures) can be 
expressed by the ordering diagram shown in figure 2.1, where an arrow 
from A to B, A - B, indicates that fault (failure) of type A is a special case 
of, or a proper subset of, fault (failure) of type B and therefore fault assump-
tions of type B are less restrictive than those of type A. In the figure, the 
two circles in omission type represent VFnull and TFnull which, by definition, 
form proper subsets of omission type and, in practice, become omission type 
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itself. Note that the ordering relation -+ is transitive. From the ordering 
diagram, it can be stated that an algorithm designed to tolerate f, f > 0, 
value (or timing) failures can also tolerate f omission failures; similarly an 
to 
algorithm designed}olerate f emission failures can also tolerate f failures of 
either omission, value, or timing failures, and finally an algorithm designed 
to tolerate f Byzantine failures can tolerate f failures of any type. 
Omission 
Value Timing 
Byzantine 
Figure 2.1. Fault/Failure Ordering Diagram. 
Remarks 
1. Output Sequences 
The above classification is based on the behaviour of a component with 
respect to a single input. When a sequence of inputs over a given time 
interval is considered, the type of fault suffered by a faulty component will 
be the most restrictive (or the least serious) one (as per the ordering 
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diagram in figure 2.1) of which all types of failures occurred during the 
interval can be considered to be special cases. For example, if, over a given 
time interval, value and timing failures have occurred, then the component 
will be said to have suffered emission failures during that interval; if value 
and omission are the types of failures, then the component will have 
suffered value failures. If a given type of faulty behaviour persists for a 
"sufficiently lengthy" sequence of inputs, then the failures can be classified 
as a permanent failure of that type. A permanent omission fault causes the 
component to halt functioning for ever. In the literature, it is called a crash 
failure or a fail-silent failure [PoweI88]. 
2. Outputs with no timing requirements 
There may be situations where a component's responses do not need to 
follow the rigid timing requirements specified here. Under these cir-
cumstances, a timing failure cannot be defined and the component can only 
suffer three types of failures, namely, omission, value, and Byzantine. 
2.2.3. Selfchecking Components 
The fault/failure classification can be applied to understand and specify 
the behaviour of components with builtin redundancy (for selfchecking) 
where the redundancy is employed to minimise the likelihood of the 
occurrences of failures of certain types. For example, consider a component 
with value checks; for valid inputs, such a component is designed to produce 
either "normal values" or "value exceptions" - the expected values when 
failures within the component occur for which a degree of tolerance has 
been provided. A component with dual processors and a comparator that 
compares the output values of both the processors and outputs a value 
exception whenever a disagreement is detected can be such a component. It 
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can suffer only timing failures, provided the comparator is non-faulty and 
no more than one processor fails; given these fault assumptions for the com-
parator and processors, the overall behaviour of this selfchecking component 
is CR or TF: 
(expected - value and ontime) or (expected - value and not ontime), where the 
expected - value is given by: 
normal - value or value - exception. 
That is, such a component produces the normal value or a value excep-
tion either on time or not on time. Another example of a selfchecking com-
ponent will be a processor with a 'watch-dog' timer that is used to prevent 
timing failures by signalling a 'timing-exception' whenever the processor is 
deemed not capable of producing its output on time. Thus the expected 
behaviour of such a processor in the value domain includes generating a 
response indicating a timing exception. The watch-dog timer cannot, how-
ever, detect the processor's value and Byzantine failures. Given that the 
processor does not suffer Byzantine failures and the watch-dog timer is non-
faulty, the overall behaviour of such a processor will be CR or VF: 
(expected-value and ontime) or ( not expected-value and ontime), where the 
expected - value is given by: 
normal- value or timing - exception. 
That is, such a selfchecking processor produces timely responses which 
could be wrong in the value domain. If a processor has been constructed 
with both value and timing checks, then this means that its expected 
behaviour in the value domain is extended to include the production of 
value and timing exceptions (or simply failure exceptions). 
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A fail-stop processor [Schli83] is an example of a component pYopQSed 
with value and timing checks and to raise a failure exception, in case the 
possibility for producing an incorrect response is detected. It is also designed 
to stop responding for ever to input requests after having raised a failure 
exception. 
2.2.4. Selecting Fault Models for Components 
In the fault classification presented here, a Byzantine fault has been 
defined to be a fault which can cause the component to fail in any manner. 
Choosing the Byzantine fault model for components will mean that no res-
trictive assumption need be made regarding the components' failure modes. 
In practice, the type of failures that a component may be assumed to suffer 
should be decided by considering engineering factors such as the failure 
data of the component (Le. failure modes and probability of their 
occurrences), and application specific details such as the task load the com-
ponent is designed for, safety factors, and the consequences of the com-
ponent failing in a manner other than what was assumed. If the failure 
data are not available or if it is judged that it is not safe to predict the 
failure modes given the criticality of the application at hand, it will be 
appropriate to expect the component to fail in Byzantine manner; otherwise, 
faults of appropriate non-Byzantine class can be chosen to model the 
component's faulty behaviour. A choice of value, timing, or emission faults 
can be refined, if necessary, with a set of additional assumptions to precisely 
model the faults of a component. For example, it is common, in a value 
fault model, to restrict the failure modes by assuming that corruption of a 
message by a communication link are limited such that mechanisms such as 
checksums can be utilised for error detection. In [Veris89], value failures of 
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processors and communication links which result In detectable message 
corruption are classified as syntactic failures. 
2.3. Replicated Responses 
In this section the fault classification is extended to a particularly 
important type of systems where components are required to produce repli-
cated responses for a given input. For example, in triple modular redundant 
systems, a processor is required to send its output to three other processors; 
similarly, when processors (considered as components in a distributed sys-
tem) are taking part in some agreement protocol, every processor is required 
to send its output to every other processor in the system. 
Consider a component that is required to produce a replicated response 
containing r individual outputs, where r, r ~ 1, is the specified replication 
level, as a result of receiving an input at time ti. We will use the following 
vector notation to specify the replicated response: 
V = {Vl , v2, ... ,vr}, where uk is the value of the kth, 1 s k S r, indivi-
dual output. 
Tj = {tjl , tj2, ... ,tjr}, where tjk is the time at which the kth indivi-
dual output appeared. 
Definition: Correct Replicated Response 
Let a component receive at time ti an input requiring a replicated 
response. For that input, the replicated response with value V at time Tj is 
correct iff: 
(i) the output value is correct: V = W, where W is the vector of expected 
output values; and 
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(ii) the output timing is correct: t. + tmin S tjk s ti + tmax, for all tjk, 
1 s k S r, in Tj, where tmin, t max are as defined in the definition for 
correct unreplicated responses in section 2.2. 
Note that, by definition, W has the property that WP Wk = w, for all 
p,k, 1 S p,k Sr. 
Remark: The skew interval 
In a correct replicated output, all individual outputs are produced with 
the correct, hence identical, values and on time but not necessarily at 'the 
same time'; thus, for any two of the r individual outputs: 
o S ItiP - tiki S t max - tmin, for all p,k, 1 S p,k S r. 
The interval 0 .. S, where S = tmax - tmin, will be called the skew inter-
val within which all individual outputs are expected to be produced. 
Definition: Incorrect Replicated Response 
An incorrect replicated response is defined first by defining failures in 
value and time domains: 
The output value V will be termed incorrect, if V ;c W, i.e. there exists 
some p, 1 S pS r, such that UP ;c w. 
The response time Tj will be termed incorrect, if there exists some p, 
1 S P S r, such that: 
tjP < ti + tmin (response too early), or 
tjP > ti + tmu (response too late). 
A replicated response will be said to be incorrect, if either V or Ti or 
both are incorrect. 
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Definition: Consistently Incorrect Replicated Responses 
For replicated responses, it is possible to consider a restricted violation 
of the specification by considering the notion of consistent incorrectness 
among individual responses of an incorrect replicated response: 
In a replicated response, the output value V is said to be consistently 
incorrect, if, 
(i) V is incorrect, and 
(ii) for all p,k, 1 :$ p,k :$ r, UP = uk 
That is, all individual output values are identically incorrect. Similarly, 
the response time Tj of a replicated response is said to be consistently 
incorrect, if 
(i) Tj is incorrect, and 
(ii) for all p,k, 1 :$ p,k :$ r, Itjp - tjkl :$ S. 
That is, while the response is not produced on time, all of the individual 
responses are produced within the skew interval. A replicated response is 
said to be consistently incorrect, if: 
(i) V is consistently incorrect and Tj is correct, or 
(ii) V is correct and Tj is consistently incorrect, or 
(iii) both V and TJ are consistently incorrect. 
2.3.1. Fault/Failure Classification 
A given replicated response being consistently incorrect in the value 
domain or in the time domain or in both the domains is a special case of it 
being incorrect respectively in the value domain or in the time domain or in 
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both the domains. As our fault classification is based on the input-output 
behaviour of a component, the definition of consistently incorrect responses 
will give rise to a set of fault types that were not defined for components 
with unreplicated responses. With the definitions of correct, consistently 
incorrect, and incorrect responses, the following nine classes of faults will be 
identified for components with replicated responses. 
Consistent Omission Fault/Failure 
Faults of this type cause a component to fail by not responding to a 
given input and, consequently, by not producing a response when a repli-
cated response is expected. The corresponding failure will be termed a con-
sistent omission failure. A processor that has stopped functioning, a proces-
sor that occasionally fails to broadcast a message are examples of com-
ponents with consistent omission faults. 
Consistent Value FaultlFailure 
A consistent value fault causes a component to respond to a given input 
by producing a replicated output on time but with identically incorrect 
values. That is, in a consistent value failure, V is consistently incorrect and 
Tj is correct. A processor broadcasting an incorrectly computed value is an 
example of a consistent value failure. 
Consistent Timing Fault/Failure 
A consistent timing fault causes a consistent timing failure in which V 
is correct and Tj is consistently incorrect. This fault type causes a com-
ponent to produce correct values either too early or too late, but within the 
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specified skew interval. A processor with too many computational tasks can 
suffer a consistent timing failure, when it produces a replicated output with 
correct values during the interval [t+8, t+8+S] instead of[t, t+S], where 8 
is the excess delay due to processor overloading. 
A consistent timing failure in which outputs are produced late (early) 
will be called a consistently late timing failure (a consistently early timing 
failure). 
Consistent Emission FauIt/Failure 
A consistent emission fault causes a component to produce a con-
sistently incorrect response for a given input. In a consistent emission 
failure, V and/or Tj will be consistently incorrect. An overloaded processor 
that broadcasts erroneously computed values suffers a consistent emission 
failure. 
Omission FaultlFailure 
An omission fault causes an omission failure in which none or some of 
the individual outputs of a replicated response are not produced. A processor 
that occasionally stops functioning while outputting the individual outputs 
of a replicated response is an example of a component suffering an omission 
failure. An omission fault can cause a consistent omission failure and hence 
is more general than a consistent omission fault. 
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Value Fault/Failure 
A value fault causes a component to respond with incorrect values on 
time. In a value failure, V is incorrect and Tj is correct and but any two 
individual outputs of a replicated output need not be identical. F01' an 
example of value failure, consider a processor broadcasting a message to a 
group of processors to which it is connected by point to point links. A broad-
cast will th~n consist of sequentially transmitting a copy of the message 
held in a buffer to each member of the group; Such a processor can suffer a 
value fault if the buffer gets corrupted during a broadcast. Value failures 
(faults) subsume consistent value failures (faults). 
Timing Fault/Failure 
A timing fault causes a component to respond with correct output value 
at incorrect time. In a timing failure, V is correct and Tj is incorrect, and 
any two individual outputs need not appear within the skew interval. 
In the previous example of a value failure, instead of buffer corruption, 
if the processor slows down (due to overloading), then the individual outputs 
may not be produced within the skew interval. Timing failures (faults) sub-
sume consistent timing failures (faults). 
Emission Fault/Failure 
An emission fault causes a component to produce an incorrect response 
for a given input. Both value and timing failures are special cases of an 
emission failure. 
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Byzantine (or General) Fault/Failure 
A Byzantine 'fault, as in the case of unreplicated responses, is defined to 
be the most general fault that can cause the component to deviate from the 
specified input-output behaviour in any manner; the corresponding failure is 
defined to be a Byzantine failure which will include the component produc-
ing arbitrary responses when no input was supplied and producing 
responses with 'malicious' intentions. The behaviour of a "traitorous gen-
eral" in the Byzantine generals problem of [Lampo82] is a classic example of 
how a processor with Byzantine faults can be malicious in its responses to 
other (faulty or non-faulty) processors in a distributed system. 
2.3.2. Fault/Failure Ordering 
When a consistent omission failure is interpreted as a failure of produc-
ing null output values (identically incorrect values) at any time after the 
input was supplied, or as a failure of producing identically correct or 
incorrect output values at time 00, it can be seen to form a special case of 
failures of every other consistent type. By their definitions, consistent omis-
sion, consistent value, consistent timing, and consistent emission types of 
faults/failures are respectively special cases of omission, value, timing, and 
emission types of faults/failures. The ordering diagram shown in figure 2.2 
indicates the 'special case' relationship between various classes of faults and 
failures. As in figure 2.1, an arrow from A to B, A -+ B, in figure 2.2 indi-
cates that faults/failures of type A are a special case of faults/failures of type 
B, and the ordering relation -+ is transitive. 
Cons. 
Value 
Value 
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Consistent Omission 
Emission 
Byzantine 
Cons. 
Timing 
Timing 
Figure 2.2. FaultlFailure Ordering Diagram For Replicated Responses. 
Remark: Output Sequences 
As in the case of components with unreplicated responses, the above 
classification is based on the behaviour of a component with respect to a sin-
gle input; and, when a sequence of replicated responses over a given time 
interval is considered, the type of failure suffered by a faulty component will 
be the most restrictive one (as per the ordering diagram in figure 2.2) of 
which all types of failures occurred during the interval can be considered to 
be special cases. Note that an unreplicated response becomes a special case 
of a replicated response, when r, the degree of replication, is taken to be 1. 
When r becomes 1, a component's omission, value, timing, and emission 
failures can be respectively regarded as: consistent omission, consistent 
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value, consistent timing, and consistent emission failures. Thus, a sequence 
of replicated and 'unreplicated responses over a given time interval can also 
be treated as a sequence of replicated responses and, thereby, the type of 
fault suffered by the component during that interval can be determined 
from the ordering diagram in figure 2.2. For example, if, over a given time 
interval, value and timing failures have occurred for unreplicated responses 
and consistent timing failures for replicated responses, the component will 
be said to have a consistent emission fault during that interval; if value and 
(consistent) omission are the types of failures respectively for unreplicated 
and replicated responses, then the component will have a (consistent) value 
fault; if Byzantine and consistent omission failures occur while producing 
respectively unreplicated and replicated responses, the component becomes 
Byzantine faulty. 
2.4. Composite Components 
Following the classification of faults and failures of a single individual 
component, the behaviour of composite components made up of potentially 
faulty components is investigated. To start with, the behaviour of a proces-
sor is studied by considering a digital clock as one of its components. The 
study is then extended to a distributed system which is considered to be 
made up of processors and communication links. 
2.4.1. Processor with a Clock 
A processor, P, will be considered to be made up of two components: (i) 
computational and communication unit, CCU, that processes computational 
tasks and handles communication with the environment, and (ii) a digital 
clock, CL, that measures the passage of real time and provides the current 
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time. CCU can use CL to read the current time or to measure time inter-
vals. For some sp'ecified p, 0 < P « 1, a correct clock measures the passage 
of one time unit when a real time period between (1 - p) and (1 + p) has 
elapsed [Ellin73]. It is natural to model a digital clock as an autonomous 
component - a component that produces outputs (display of current time) not 
by receiving input requests but simply in response to the passage of real 
time. One such model is developed here. It is nevertheless possible to 
model a digital clock as a demand driven "time server" device that outputs 
current time only for an input request. 
2.4.1.1. Types of Clock Faults 
A clock's display of current time will be its response produced at every 
given timing instant. Such a sequence of responses will start from To 
reflecting the time to when the clock started functioning. Thus, a digital 
clock is an autonomous component which, once turned on, is expected to pro-
duce an infinitely long sequence of responses of monotonically non-
decreasing values such that the output value of every response (i.e. the 
value displayed) at any given timing instant will indicate the clock's meas-
urement of the passage of real time from to to that timing instant. If T is 
the value displayed at real time t, t 2: to, then the response will be said to be 
correct iff: 
CR 1 (measurement of time): 
To + (t - to)/(l + p) s T s To + (t - to)/(l - p) and, 
CR2 (monotonic display): 
T 2: T-, where T- is the display value at t-, t- = t - At, as At - O. 
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While condition CR 1 states the correctness requirement for the meas-
urement of the passage of real time, condition CR 2 ensures that values 
displayed are monotonically non-decreasing. For example, a clock that 
showed Tl and T2 respectively at t- and t such that 
To + (t - to)/(l + p) ::5 T2 < Tl ::5 To + (t - to)/(l - p) can satisfy CR 1, due 
to non-zero p, but will not satisfy CR2. 
It can be seen from CR 1 that the correctness of an output value (T) and 
the instant of time the output value is produced (t) are interdependent and, 
hence, value and timing failures cannot occur independently of each other; 
in other words, an occurrence of a value failure will imply that of a timing 
failure and vice versa. Thus, according to our fault/failure classification, CL 
can have the following three types of faults/failures: omission, emission, 
and Byzantine. 
A clock that occasionally fails to display the current time will be said to 
have an omission fault and a clock that fails to display the current time for 
a "sufficiently long time" will be said to have a permanent omission failure. 
An emission failure is the clock producing an incorrect response, i.e., not 
(CR1 and CR2). A Byzantine faulty clock can fail in any manner and no 
assumption can be considered on its failure modes. For a clock, there is lit-
tle difference between an emission fault and a Byzantine fault. A proper 
subset of emission failures can be identified by considering emission failures 
in which only CR 1 is violated, i.e. ( not CR 1 and CR 2). Such failures will be 
referred to as monotonic emission failures. For example, a fast or slow clock 
or a clock that stops by displaying the same value (running infinitely slow) 
are examples of clocks with monotonic emission faults. In the following 
analysis of P's behaviour, CL is considered to have omission, monotonic 
emission, and Byzantine types of faults/failures. 
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2.4.1.2. Types of Processor Faults 
The faulty behaviour of a processor (P) with a clock, can be studied in 
terms of the types of faults in its components CCU and CL. Suppose that 
CCU is non-faulty and CL is faulty. An omission faulty CL will make P to 
suffer at most omission failures (P's computational results that do not 
involve the use of CL will be correct and be produced on time). Suppose 
that CL has a monotonic emission fault. When CCU uses the CL's display as 
a value in its computation (e.g. to generate a sequence number), P can 
suffer a value failure. If CL is used by CCU to set timeouts, then a fast or 
slow clock can result in P's timing failure. Thus a monotonic emission faulty 
CL can make P emission faulty. A Byzantine failure in CL may result in a 
Byzantine failure in P. When CCU is faulty and CL is non-faulty, P will 
suffer the types of faults in CCU. An interesting observation is that when 
CL becomes unduly faster or slower, P can suffer an emission failure - quite 
a serious type of failure - even when CCU is non-faulty. 
When both CCU and CL are faulty, it is possible for the failures of one 
component to mask or nullify that of the other component. For example, a 
permanent omission failure in CCU will make P also to suffer that type of 
failure, irrespective of the types of faults in CL; similarly, fast computation 
by CCU and a slow CL may nullify failures of each component resulting in 
P producing a timely response. However, the possibilities of components' 
failures nullifying each other cannot be relied upon to happen all the time 
and, therefore, P should be considered to be faulty for all practical purposes. 
Thus, except in the case of the CCU having a permanent omission fault, the 
types of faults in P will be the least serious one which, according to the ord-
ering diagram in figure 2.1, subsumes the types of faults in CCU and CL, 
given that every fault type is considered to subsume itself and that 
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monotonic emission fault of CL is taken to be equivalent to, and represented 
as, emission fault in figure 2.1. For example, when both CCU and CL have 
omission faults, P will suffer failures of omission type; if CCU has timing 
faults and CL monotonic emission faults, failures of P will be of emission 
type. 
2.4.2. Processor Interconnections 
2.4.2.1. Processors with unreplicated responses 
Consider first the behaviour of a component C composed of a processor 
Pl and a link L that connects Pl to a second processor P2 (see figure 2.3). 
The function of L is merely to transmit the outputs of Pl to P2. 
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Figure 2.3. A Three Component System. 
When one component in C is faulty the other one is non-faulty, C will 
suffer the type of faults suffered by its faulty component. Suppose that both 
Pl and L are faulty. A permanent omission failure in L will cause C also to 
have a permanent omission failure, irrespective of the type of fault in PI. If 
it can be assumed that faulty L cannot generate messages on its own accord, 
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then a permanent omission failure in PI will also mean that C as a whole 
has a fault of that type. Excepting the above two cases, the fault type of C 
will be the least serious type which, according to the ordering diagram in 
figure 2.1, will subsume the types of faults suffered by PI and by L. 
2.4.2.2. Composite component with replicated responses 
To analyse the faulty behaviour of a processor-link component produc-
ing replicated responses, consider a distributed system made up of n proces-
sors, Po, PI, ... ,Pn-I, capable of exchanging messages using a communica-
tion medium L. Suppose that a composite component Co is made up of pro-
cessor Po and L. Let L, as shown in figure 2.4, be a bus capable of providing 
a broadcast service. 
--- ........ Co 
..... , 
, 
, 
\ 
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Figure 2.4. Components With Replicated Responses. 
Suppose that Po is faulty and L is non-faulty; then Co will suffer the 
same fault as in Po. Similarly, if Po is non-faulty and L is faulty, then the 
type of fault in L will be the fault type of Co. Since Po is not responsible for 
replicating its outputs, its fault types can only be consistent or Byzantine; 
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but those of L can vary from consistent omission to Byzantine. A fault in L 
can cause the failures of L not to be consistent. If, for example, there is a 
break at the place (x) shown in the figure, L may fail by delivering Po's out-
put to all processors other than Pl. When both Po and L are faulty, the fault 
type of Co can be determined as discussed in the previous subsection. 
It is interesting to observe that if L is assumed to be reliable and if Po 
is faulty, then Co can fail only in consistent or Byzantine manner. Suppose 
the functionality of L is further enhanced such that processors receiving a 
message can authenticate the identity of the sender of the message, then 
faulty Po cannot masquerade as any other processor. The DELTA-4 distri-
buted systemlPowe1881 is such a system where the communication subsys-
tem has been designed to be reliable and with the authentication facility 
thereby considerably reducing the probability of masquerading Byzantine 
failures occurring in the system. Instead of making L reliable, if Po is made 
reliable, then the overall faulty behaviour of Co can still encompass all pos-
sible failure modes. 
Suppose that processors in a distributed system are connected by links 
such that there exists a communication path between any two processors in 
the system. The communication paths will be made up of links and, if neces-
sary, processors which will be expected to relay messages according to some 
routing algorithm. 
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Figure 2.5. Components With Replicated Responses. 
In figure 2.5, LOi represents the logical communication path between Po 
and Pi, i :5 i :5 n -1. If any LOi is faulty, then the fault type will be deter-
mined by the type of faults in processors and in links that make up LOi and 
the fault analysis of Lo, will be similar to that discussed for the unreplicated 
case. Suppose that the composite component Co is made up of Po and com-
munication paths, LOl, L02, "" LO(n -1), incident on Po, and Po produces repli-
cated output by sending a copy of the message through each communication 
path. Then the fault types of Po can vary from consistent omission to 
Byzantine. As before (discounting permanent omission failures in all Lo;'s), 
the fault type of Co will be the least serious one which, according to the ord-
ering diagram in figure 2,2, will subsume the type of faults in all faulty 
components of Co. For example, if Po has consistent value faults and some 
LOi is faulty with omission (emission) faults, then Co will be considered to 
have value (emission) faults. 
A similar fault analysis can be performed for composite components 
Cl, C2, .. " C(n-l) constructed respectively with Pl, P2, .. " P(n-l) and 
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communication paths incident on them. Such a fault analysis of composite 
components in terms of constituent components can provide useful insights 
on the faulty behaviour of the composite components. Given the nature of 
processor interconnections and the type of faults that might be suffered by 
processors and communication links or bus, the behaviour of one processor 
with respect to other processors can be analysed. 
This section has illustrated how the fault classification scheme 
presented here can be applied to develop accurate fault models of composi te 
components. Precise specifications of component faults can be exploited to 
develop efficient fault tolerant algorithms as illustrated in the next two 
chapters. 
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
Using 'timeliness' and 'expected value' as the specified properties of a 
component's response, we have presented five types of faults for components 
with unreplicated responses and extended the classification to nine types of 
faults for components with replicated responses. These classifications 
together with the fault lattices presented represent one of the main contri-
butions of this chapter. We have also discussed how faulty behaviour of a 
component can be determined, given the fault types of its constituent com-
ponents. This was illustrated by constructing fault models of clocks and pro-
cessors in a distributed system. Our fault classification provides a very con-
venient means not only for specifying the faulty behaviour of components 
but also for the construction of increasingly more sophisticated fault 
tolerant algorithms tolerating faults of increasingly more complex types. 
This will be demonstrated by the fault tolerant agreement algorithms 
presented in the following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FAMILY OF AGREEMENT ALGORITHMS 
3.1. Introduction 
Reaching agreement in the presence of faults is a fundamental problem 
in fault tolerant distributed computing. The agreement problem originally 
formulated as the interactive consistency problem [Pease80] and later as the 
Byzantine Agreement problem [Lampo82] can be described as follows: A dis-
tributed system is made up of n, n > 2, processors capable of communicat-
ing with each other only by message passing. Among these n processors in 
the system, one processor is designated as the sender and the other proces-
sors as receiver processors. The sender wants to disseminate some value to 
all receiver processors. The difficulty is that some processors, possibly 
including the sender, may be faulty and that a non-faulty processor cannot 
ascertain which other processors are faulty. When the sender is faulty, it 
cannot be guaranteed that all non-faulty receiver processors receive the 
same value directly from the sender. Thus it is necessary to develop an 
agreement algorithm that can be executed by receiver processors to guaran-
tee that the following conditions will be met in the presence of at most f, f 
< n-l, faulty processors: 
Cl all non-faulty receiver processors decide on the same value, and 
C2 when the sender is non-faulty, all non-faulty receiver processors decide 
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on the value sent. 
By Cl, it is' ensured that all non-faulty receiver processors reach a 
unanimous decision on a value; by C2, it is guaranteed that if the sender is 
non-faulty, then every non-faulty receiver processor reaches a valid decision 
by deciding on the value sent by the sender. When Cl and C2 are met, the 
agreement will be said to have been reached (on the sender's value) by non-
faulty receiver processors. When the sender is non-faulty, C2 implies Cl. 
The agreement problem has been studied under a variety of assump-
tions concerning the synchrony of processors, the types of failures to which 
processors are subject, the properties of communication network, and deter-
ministic versus probabilistic nature of a solution (see [Fisch83a] for a brief 
survey). We solve the agreement problem for a synchronous distributed sys-
tem in which the relative computational speeds of, and message communica-
tion delays between, non-faulty processors are assumed to be bounded. In a 
synchronous system, the agreement problem can be solved by considering 
that the receiver processors know, or do not know, a priori the time at 
which the sender is to send its value. In this chapter, receiver processors are 
considered not to have prior knowledge of the sender's send time. Deter-
ministic agreement algorithms are developed assuming that the communica-
tion medium is fault free and that faults occur only in processors. The types 
of faults that are considered to occur in processors will be the ones that are 
defined in the previous chapter for components with replicated responses. 
The range of fault types considered here thus starts from consistent omis-
sion and ends with emission and Byzantine. For each fault type, an agree-
ment algorithm is presented - thus presenting a family of agreement algo-
rithms. An execution of any of these algorithms presented here will guaran-
tee that the conditions Cl and C2 are met within some known and bounded 
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time interval denoted by tl. Since these algorithms are designed in the con-
text of synchronous and deterministic processors with no prior knowledge of 
sender's send time, they can provide agreement and ordering abstractions 
[Schne86] which are essential for constructing systems with replicated pro-
cessing (e.g. [EzhiI89]). 
In the literature, agreement algorithms have been developed in the 
above-mentioned context under omission, timing and Byzantine types of 
faults. In [Pease80, Dolev83], faulty processors are considered to fail in a 
Byzantine manner. These algorithms, of necessity [Dolev82b], require at 
most (f + 1) rounds of message exchange to be carried out between processors. 
Faster algorithms for Byzantine faults have been developed in [Babao85] 
using redundancy in the communication medium. Omission faults, timing 
faults, and Byzantine faults are the three types of faults considered by Cris-
tian et. al. in solving the agreement problem [Crist85]. 
Agreement algorithms for faults other than omission, timing, and 
Byzantine faults will be developed in this chapter. The complete presenta-
tion of the family of agreement algorithms helps the reader to compare the 
complexities of algorithms for different types of faults and thus illustrates 
the advantages, or lack of them, in assuming a particular type of fault for 
processors. Under consistent timing and consistent emission faults, a specific 
type of timing faults is also considered: processor overloading is considered 
to be the only fault that can cause a processor to suffer (late) timing 
failures. Assumptions are made to restrict the failure modes of overloaded 
processors and they lead to the development of faster agreement algorithms. 
So, for applications where these restrictive assumptions for overloaded pro-
cessors can be considered to be realistic, these algorithms can be used to 
achieve distributed agreement in a fast and cost-effective manner. 
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It should be emphasised that these algorithms are developed with the 
assumption that' the communication medium is fault free and that this 
assumption can be relaxed when processor faults are not considered to be 
consistent. One way to relax this assumption is to identify communication 
failures as processor failures. This may result in an overly pessimistic view 
of the reliability of the system. Alternatively, the communication network 
can be made redundant such that faulty links and faulty processors do not 
disconnect non-faulty processors. 
The rest of this chapter will be organised as follows: In the next section, 
the assumptions made for designing the family of agreement algorithms are 
stated and explained. In sections 3.3 to 3.10, algorithms for different types 
of processor faults - ranging from consistent omission to Byzantine faults -
are respectively presented and proved to be correct, where necessary. The 
algorithms for omission, timing, and Byzantine faults are variants of proto-
cols in [Crist85]. In each of these sections, important observations about the 
respective algorithms have been made. In section 3.11, a generic algorithm 
is developed which collectively represents the entire family of agreement 
algorithms. Based on the generic algorithm, the complexities of the agree-
ment algorithms presented in previous sections are compared and the rela-
tive influence of processor fault types on the complexities of agreement algo-
rithms is presented. Section 3.12 concludes the chapter. 
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3.2. Assumptions 
3.2.1. Clock Synchronism 
The hardware clocks of processors have small differences in their run-
ning rates and their readings tend to drift apart with the passage of real 
time [Ellin73]. Design of agreement algorithms with bounded and known 
execution time will require the processors to observe time within some 
bounded and known difference. In order to meet the requirement, the pro-
cessors have to adjust the readings of their clocks to counter the difference 
that has so far developed. The readings of clocks can be adjusted periodically 
either through the execution of a fault tolerant clock synchronisation algo-
rithm, e.g. [Halpe84, Kopet87, Crist86], or with reference to some external 
and reliable time service. The following is assumed about processor's clocks. 
Assumption AI: 
At any given instant of real time, the observable difference between 
clock readings of any two non-faulty processors will be at most e. 
Remark: 
The term "non-faulty" is not necessary in the above assumption when 
faulty processors are considered to suffer only (consistent) omission or (con-
sistent) value failures, since processors with faults of omission and value 
types do not fail by producing an untimely output. Thus processors with 
faults of above types will be taken to satisfy Al. 
3.2.2. Message Signature and Authentication 
The messages, on being relayed by processors, may get corrupted 
accidentally or deliberately by faulty processors and may, thereby, have 
their contents altered. A corrupted message, on being received, can deliver 
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a value other than what the source processor intended to deliver, if it is not 
detected to have' been corrupted. In an attempt to avoid being "misin-
formed" by corrupted messages, each processor is assumed to have facilities 
to "sign" every message it sends, and to "authenticate" the signature of 
every message it receives in order to detect any apparent attempt to corrupt 
a message. 
In [Rives78], a scheme has been proposed by which processors can gen-
erate message signatures such that the signatures are signer-dependent and 
contents-dependent, and can authenticate signed messages so that any 
attempt to alter the contents will be detected with high probability; it is 
also possible for processors to over sign an already signed message by con-
sidering the signature(s) in the message as yet another piece of data, and to 
authenticate a multiply signed message by recursively authenticating every 
individual signature starting from the one that was last added on, and end-
ing with the first one. Another such scheme is presented in [Okam088]. 
These schemes, when implemented in processors of a distributed system, 
will guarantee the following: 
(i) a non-faulty processor's signature for a given message is highly likely to 
be unique for it to be generated by any other processor, and 
(ii) any attempt to alter the contents of a non-faulty processor's signed mes-
sage is highly likely to be detected. 
Thus, when a non-faulty processor signs and sends its messages, it is 
highly unlikely that contents of its messages can be undetectably altered; 
similarly, when a non-faulty processor authenticates signed messages of 
another non-faulty processor, it is highly likely that an authentic message 
will contain what the sender sent. Assumption A2 is made on processors' 
signature and authentication capabilities. 
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Assumption A2: 
A non-faulty processor's signature for a given message cannot be forged 
by any other processor and any attempt to alter the contents of a message 
signed (or over signed) by a non-faulty processor can be detected. 
Remarks: 
From what is guaranteed by schemes for generating message signatures 
and for message authentication, it can be seen that there exists a non-zero 
probability of (i) a faulty processor being able to generate the same signa-
ture that a non-faulty processor would generate for a given message, and (ii) 
the contents of a message signed by a non-faulty processor being altered, 
accidentally or deliberately, in such a way that the corrupted message can-
not be detected as unauthentic. In A2, this probability is assumed to be 
zero. Such an assumption has often been made in the literature [Dolev83, 
Crist85, Lamp082] for designing (what are called signed message or authen-
ticated) agreement algorithms. So, by A2, a non-faulty processor's signature 
for a given message cannot be undetectably generated by a faulty processor. 
However, a faulty processor can undetectably forge another faulty 
processor's signature for a given message. This means that a faulty proces-
sor can undetectably alter the contents of a message that is signed or over-
signed only by faulty processors. Thus, by A2, only the messages that are 
signed by at least one non-faulty processor are protected against undetect-
able corruption by a faulty processor. 
3.2.3. Bounded Communication Delay 
The processors in the distributed system communicate only by message 
passing via a fully connected communication medium that is assumed to be 
fault free. The next assumption bounds the message transmission delay. 
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Assumption A3: 
If, at time T, an event occurs in a non-faulty processor p and causes a 
message to be formed and broadcast, then any other non-faulty processor q 
can receive the message at time Tr, T S Tr < T + d - where time is meas-
ured according to any non-faulty processor's clock and d > O. 
Remark 1: 
d is fixed by considering the processing time taken when the occurrence 
of an event requires a processor to decide on sending messages, and message 
routing and transmission in the communication medium. 
Remark 2: 
Based on Al and A3, the following can be stated: 
If an event occurs in a non-faulty processor p at time T according to p's 
clock that causes a message to be formed and broadcast, then any other 
non-faulty processor q will receive the message at time T r, T - e S Tr < 
T + d +e, according to q's clock. 
Remark 3: 
The term non-faulty is not necessary in A3 and in remark 2, if proces-
sors are considered to have consistent omission or consistent value faults; 
when omission or value faults are considered, A3 and remark 2 will be true 
without the term non-faulty only for those q's that receive p's message. 
Remark 4: 
When processor faults are not of consistent type, the full connectivity 
and the reliability requirements on the communication medium can be 
relaxed: the number of faults in the communication medium should be such 
that processors remain connected in the system that survives after removing 
the faulty links, faulty processors, and the links incident on faulty proces-
sC!t's.'rlle types of faults in the communication medium should be no more 
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serious than the types of processor faults considered. 
3.2.4. Message Timestamps 
Finally, the sender processor will be required to indicate its time of 
transmission by appending a timestamp (local clock reading at the time of 
transmission) to the message so that messages transmitted at different tim-
ing instants can be distinguished. For the sake of simplicity in handling of 
sender's messages by receiver processors, the following assumption is made 
on the sender processor's timestamps. 
Assumption A4: 
A non-faulty sender processor will not carry out more than one broad-
cast with the same timestamp. 
Remarks: 
If, at the same clock time, two or more distinct values are decided to be 
delivered, then A4 will require the sender processor to transmit all these 
values in a single message with one timestamp. When processors are con-
sidered to suffer only omission or value faults, the term non-faulty is not 
necessary in A4, since faulty processors fail only by sending incorrect values 
and, by Al, have properly synchronised clocks. 
3.2.5. Unanimity and Validity Conditions 
When the sender broadcasts a value with a timestamp, the decision 
made by a receiver processor will be associated with that timestamp. In this 
context, conditions, Cl and C2, for agreement will be modified as unanimity 
and validity conditions respectively: 
When the sender broadcasts a message with timestamp Ts, 
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Unanimity: 
all non-faulty receiver processors either reach the same decision for the 
message with timestamp Ts by their clock time Ts + ~, where ~ (~ > 0) is 
known and bounded, or do not ever take any decision for Ta, and 
Validity: 
when the sender is non-faulty, all non-faulty receiver processors decide 
for Ts by their clock time Ts + a on the value sent by the sender. 
For a given broadcast by the sender, condition C1 requires a non-faulty 
receiver processor to decide on a value; the unanimity condition however 
permits a non-faulty receiver not to make any decision. This modification of 
C1 is necessary because the agreement problem is being solved in a bounded 
and known interval and in the context of the sender's broadcast time not 
being known to receiver processors a priori. When the sender's broadcast 
time is not known a priori, it may not be always possible for a receiver pro-
cessor to reach a decision in a bounded interval for every broadcast carried 
out by a faulty sender. 
In the following, presented are the algorithms tolerant of at most, 
f, fSn-2, distinct processors in the system suffering from faults of a given 
type. For each agreement algorithm designed, ~ will be expressed as a func-
tion of d and e. In fixing the size of ~, it is assumed that a receiver proces-
sor will take no time for executing the instructions of the algorithm (this 
will require an increase on the value of d to accommodate execution time 
overheads). 
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3.3. Consistent Omission Fault 
The agreement problem becomes a non-problem under consistent omis-
sion faults, since a sender with consistent omission faults can fail only by 
not sending its message to any receiver processor. So, either all or none of 
the receiver processors receive a given message from the sender. So no 
agreement protocol is necessary. 
3.3.1. Algorithm ACO - Algorithm (for) Consistent Omission (Faults) 
The messages exchanged between processors are taken to be of the fol-
lowing record structure: 
type M = record 
v:value; Ts:Time; id: string of char 
end; 
A message of type M contains a value in v, a timestamp in Ts, and the 
identifier of the sending processor in id. 
The sender executes the following algorithm: 
sender: 
const own-id = .... ; 
var msg:M; local-value:value; 
begin 
msg.v : = local-value; msg.Tg : = clock. get; 
msg.id : = own-id; send(msg) 
end. 
The sender processor has a unique identifier that is assumed to be 
known to every receiver processor. The constant 'own-id' contains that 
identifier. We assume that the object 'clock' at each processor is responsible 
for maintaining the local clock synchronised with the other clocks in the 
system; its function 'get' returns the current clock reading. The current 
clock reading is given to the message as timestamp and the timestamped 
message is sent to all other receiver processors by executing the "send(msg)" 
primitive. The algorithm executed by a receiver processor will be as follows: 
receiver: 
var msg:M; 
begin 
cycle 
receive(msg) 
decide(msg.v, msg.Ts) 
endcycle 
end. 
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The "receive(msg)" primitive returns a message, if there is one or more 
messages to be received; it blocks itself, otherwise. Upon receiving a mes-
sage with sender's identifier, a receiver processor decides on msg.v for 
msg.Ts by executing "decide(msg.v, msg.Ts)". 
When a non-faulty receiver processor receives a message with times-
tamp, say, T s, its clock will read less than Ts + (d +e) due to assumptions Al 
and A3 (see remark 2 under assumption A3). So a non-faulty receiver pro-
cessor decides for Ts by its clock time less than Ts + (d+e) and, therefore, the 
size of ~ necessary to guarantee agreement is (d +e). 
3.4. Consistent Value Fault 
Under consistent value fault assumptions, a faulty sender can fail only 
by sending messages with identically incorrect value to all receiver proces-
sors. By Al, a faulty sender's messages will have correct timestamp on 
them. Therefore, agreement will be guaranteed when receiver processors 
make their decision with every message they receive from the sender. Thus, 
the algorithm for consistent value faults, ACV, becomes the same as ACO. 
Since a faulty sender does not fail by producing untimely responses, all 
non-faulty receiver processors reach agreement by their clock time Ts + ~, ~ 
=d+e (by Al and A3), on the sender's value sent with timestamp Ts. 
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3.5. Consistent Timing Fault 
A processor with a consistent timing fault fails by producing some or all 
of message replicates either early or late. All the message replicates will 
nevertheless be produced within the specified skew interval that is included 
in message delays bounded by d (A3). Consider a faulty sender suffering 
such a failure in sending its messages with timestamp, say, T.. Let one 
non-faulty receiver processor, say, p, receive the sender's message at its 
clock time Tp. Since the sender's failure is consistent, no other non-faulty 
receiver processor can receive the sender's message earlier than Tp-d and 
later than Tp +d, according to p's clock. If q, q :;c p, is any other non-faulty 
receiver processor and Tq is the time q received the sender's message accord-
ing to its clock, then, by AI, I Tp - Tq I < (d +e). 
Let the sender's failure be such that Tp is between Ts and T. + (d +e) 
and Tq is greater than Ts + (d +e). While p can regard the sender's message 
timely (by assumptions Al and A3) and decide on the value contained 
therein, q cannot do so, because unless late messages are ignored by 
receiver processors, agreement cannot be guaranteed to be reached within a 
bounded amount of time. Therefore, reaching agreement in a bounded 
amount of time and in the presence of consistent timing faults will require 
messages to be exchanged between receiver processors. A receiver processor 
which received a timely message directly from the sender should relay the 
message to every other receiver processor - thus initiating the second round 
of message exchange following the sender's broadcast which is counted as 
the first round. Since there can be at most f faulty processors, an execution 
of agreement algorithm should allow for at most f+l rounds of message 
exchange between processors. 
The messages exchanged between processors during an execution of the 
agreement algorithm, are taken to be of the following record structure: 
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type M = record 
v: value; Ts: Time; ids: sequence of identifiers; 
end; 
Every processor has a unique identifier that is assumed to be known to 
every other processor. The message variable, ids, can have a sequence of 
processors' identifiers. 
Two algorithms will be developed for consistent timing faults. The first 
algorithm is general in nature. A special version of the algorithm will be 
developed for overloaded processors with the following two assumptions: 
overloaded processors have their clocks synchronised with those of non-
faulty processors within the bounded difference of e (AI); secondly, when-
ever an overloaded processor receives and subsequently relays the message, 
the ratio of the delay involved in sending the message to the communication 
medium (as a part of relay operation), to the the delay involved in receiving 
the message from the communication medium is assumed to be bounded by 
a known quantity f). The value of f) is assumed to be known and to bound 
the ratio of the two delays irrespective of the variations in processing loads 
during the period the message is being handled. The second algorithm turns 
out to be faster than the first one, if (f -1) > f). 
3.5.1. Algorithm ACT·1 for Consistent Timing Faults 
The sender sends its message to all receiver processors as before. A 
receiver processor, on receiving a message from the sender, will accept the 
message, if the message has been received at its clock time Tr such that 
Ts-e s; Tr < Ts + (d+e), where Ts is the timestamp in the message. If the 
message is accepted, the receiver processor takes its decision for Ts on the 
value contained in the message, appends its identifier to the message, and 
sends the message to every other receiver processor. 
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When a receiver processor receives a message from another receiver 
processor, it inspects the timestamp, Ts, in that message. If it has not 
decided for the timestamp in the message, it counts the distinct processor 
identifiers in the message (let it be s) and checks the timeliness of the mes-
sage in the following manner: if the message has been received at its clock 
time Tr such that Ts - Se 5 Tr < Ts + s(d +e), it is considered timely; other-
wise, it is considered untimely and is ignored. If the received message is 
found to be timely, a decision for Ts is taken on the value contained in the 
message and, if s 5 f, the processor's identifier is appended and the message 
is sent to receiver processors whose identifiers are not present in the mes-
sage. 
Algorithm ACT-! 
The sender executes the following algorithm. 
sender: 
const own-id = .... ; 
var msg: M; local-value: value; 
begin 
msg. v : = local-value; msg. Ts: = clock.get; 
append-id-and-send(msg); 
end. 
The sender has its identifier stored in 'own-id'. By "append-id-and-
send(msg)", it appends its identifier to the message and sends the message 
to all receiver processors. 
The algorithm executed by a receiver processor accommodates (f + 1) 
rounds of message exchange. The first round allows a receiver processor to 
receive the sender's message directly, and the remaining f rounds are for 
the sender's value to be received through another receiver processor. The 
algorithm for a receiver processor is presented next: 
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const own-id = .... ; maxm-rounds = (f + 1); 
var 
msg: M; ,Tr: Time; s: integer; 
function TC: boolean; 
begin TC:= msg.T, - se S Tr < msg.T, + s(d+e) end; 
function decided(T:Time): boolean; 
begin 
cycle 
begin if a value decided for T then decided: = true else decided: = false 
end; 
1) receive(msg); 
2) T r: = clock.get; 
3) s: = no-of-identifiers(msg); 
4) if not decided(msg.T,) 
5) then ifTC 
then begin 
6) decide(msg.v, msg.T,); 
7) if s < maxm-rounds 
8) then append-id-and-send(msg) 
end 
endcycle 
end. 
Explanation 
The receiver processor's identifier is stored in 'own-id'. The constant, 
maxm-rounds, represents the maximum number of rounds of message 
exchange the algori thm accommodates and is taken to be (f + 1). The 
boolean function, Te, expresses the timeliness condition that a message 
received at time Tr (line 2) with, s processor identifiers (counted in line 3) 
should satisfy to be accepted. The boolean function, decided(T), returns true, 
if a decision has already been taken for timestamp T; returns false, other-
wise. For a message received in line 1, whether a decision has been taken 
for the timestamp in the message is checked in line 4. If not, and if the mes-
sage is timely (line 5), then a decision is taken by executing "decide(msg.v, 
msg.T,)" (line 6). If, in line 7, s is less than (f+1), the message is relayed to 
appropriate receiver processors after the processor's identifier is appended to 
the message variable ids (line 8). 
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Correctness Of Algorithm 
A processor with a consistent timing fault need not maintain its clock 
in bounded synchronism as required by Ai. Therefore, a faulty processor 
may accept and relay a message that would have been considered as 
untimely by a non-faulty processor. Suppose that a non-faulty receiver pro-
cessor, say, p, receives a message with timestamp Ts and s, s > 1, processor 
identifiers, at its clock time Ts - Se. Let q, q:;t;p, be the processor that sent 
the message to p. Either of the following two conditions can be true with q: 
q is faulty and has accepted and relayed an untimely message that should 
have been ignored; or, q is non-faulty with its clock being faster than p's 
clock by e and has received a message with (s-l) processor identifiers at its 
clock time Ts - (s-l)e, and p receives q's message in zero time. The processor 
p cannot ascertain whether q is faulty or non-faulty, and if it ignores q's 
message it may violate the unanimity condition. Similarly, by supposing 
that p receives q's message just before its clock time Ts + s(d +e), two 
scenarios can be constructed such that q is faulty in one scenario and non-
faulty in the other one in which p's clock is faster than q's clock by e and p 
receives q's message in just less than d time. Thus, itT! - Se :::; Tr 
< Ts + s(d +e)" is the necessary timeliness condition. 
Theorem 3.1 
Any execution of the above algorithm meets the unanimity and validity 
conditions for ~ = (f + l)(d +e) in the presence of at most f, f < n -1, distinct 
processors suffering consistent timing faults. 
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Proof 
Under this fault model, no faulty receiver processor will alter the con-
tents of the message it relays. Therefore, any processor that decides during 
the execution of the algorithm, will do so only on the sender's value which 
will be the same for all receiver processors. When the sender is non-faulty, 
all non-faulty receiver processors will find the sender's message with times-
tamp, say, Ts arriving in the specified time interval, due to assumptions Al 
and A3, and will decide by their clock time Ts + (d +e), T. + (d +e) < T. + ~. 
Hence the theorem, for a non-faulty sender. Next, the theorem is proved for 
a faulty sender by showing that it is not possible, at clock time 
Ts + (f + l)(d +e), for one non-faulty receiver processor to decide, and another 
one not to decide, on the sender's value broadcast with timestamp Ts. 
Since faulty processors fail only in timing manner, no receiver processor 
will send, and therefore will receive, a message with more than (f + 1) proces-
sor identifiers during any execution of the algorithm. So, no non-faulty 
receiver processor will decide for Ts no later than its clock time 
Ts + (f+1)(d+e). Let p and q be any two non-faulty receiver processors. Let 
p decide by receiving a message with s, 1 s s S f, processor identifiers. Pro-
cessor p must have received the message at its clock time, say, Tp , 
Ts - Se S Tp < Ts + s(d +e). Since s < (f+1), by Al and A3, q will receive p's 
message at its clock time Tq, T. - (s + l)e S Tq < Ts + (s + l)(d +e). Let p 
decide by receiving a message with s=(f+1). Since there can be at most f 
faulty processors, the processor whose message made p decide for T. must be 
non-faulty and must have sent a message to q not later than q's clock time 
Ts + f(d+e) + e. Therefore, q must receive that message and decide on the 
value contained therein, not later than its clock time Ts + (f+1)(d +e). Hence 
the theorem for ~ = (f+l)(d+e). 
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Observations 
1. Consistency in 'timing failures. 
In the proof, it can be observed that the algorithm has been developed 
without making use of consistency in processors' timing failures; in particu-
lar, the fact that a faulty processor's broadcast is received by all non-faulty 
processors is not utilised. The reasons for this are as follows: 
In the design of any agreement algorithm with a known bound on exe-
cution time, a time interval, I(Ts,s), of known and finite size has to be 
specified as the interval of acceptability for a message with s, l::::s::::f + 1, pro-
cessor identifiers and with timestamp T •. In the execution of the algorithm, 
a message should be accepted, only if it is received within the specified 
interval according to the receiving processor's clock. In ACT-I, I(Ts,s) is 
[T. - Se, T. + s(d +e») and has a size of less than s(d +2e). This size is the 
smallest necessary (as per assumptions Al and A3) to ensure that no mes-
sage sent or relayed by a non-faulty processor gets rejected at non-faulty 
destinations. 
Recall that a faulty processor's clock may not be in specified synchron-
ism with other non-faulty processors' clocks and that a faulty processor may 
suffer an unbounded length of delay in sending or relaying a message. 
Therefore, whatever be the specified interval I(Ts,s), it is always possible for 
a faulty processor's broadcast messages to be received by some non-faulty 
processors within the specified interval and by others outside the interval. 
In other words, for any specified interval of message acceptability, it is pos-
sible for a faulty processor to fail in such a way that its messages, while 
being received by all non-faulty processors, are rejected by some non-faulty 
processors as untimely. So, the above algorithm has to be, and has been, 
developed without making use of the consistent nature of faulty processors' 
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timing failures. For that reason, the above algorithm will also be tolerant 
of timing faults where a faulty processor may fail by not sending its broad-
cast messages to some processors. 
2. Time Optimality. 
During a message broadcast, a faulty processor can respond to different 
processors in different timing manner - timely to some and untimely (either 
late or early) to others. Therefore, consistent failures become as severe as 
timing failures as far as reaching agreement in a bounded and known inter-
val is concerned. Therefore, an agreement algorithm whose every execution 
can be guaranteed to terminate in less than (f + 1) rounds cannot be 
designed. Thus, the above algorithm is optimal with respect to the size of Il 
which is (f+1)(d +e). 
One of the requirements for faulty processors in a distributed system to 
suffer consistent failures with respect to other processors will be to have a 
reliable communication medium with full connectivity. (See the section on 
component interconnections in chapter 2.) It is observed here that any 
attempts at achieving a fully connected reliable medium cannot make an 
agreement algorithm any faster, when processors suffer consistent timing 
failures. 
3.5.2. Algorithm ACT-2 for Overloaded Processors 
Time optimality of ACT-1 implies that a faster agreement algorithm 
cannot be developed, unless specific assumptions are made on failure modes 
of faulty processors. Processor overloading is a timing fault that can cause a 
processor to produce late responses. The second algorithm is developed with 
the only faulty processors in the system being overloaded processors which 
fail by producing consistently late responses. In developing this algorithm, 
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the following two assumptions are made in addition to the ones described in 
section 3.2. 
Assumptions 
assumption al: 
All processors have their clocks synchronised within the known and 
bounded difference of e. 
This assumption requires that the execution of clock synchronisation 
algorithm in processors be carried out at a sufficiently low level and using 
high priority messages so that processing loads at high level have little 
impact on the execution of synchronisation algorithm. It extends Al of sec-
tion 3.2 to clocks of all processors in the system. 
assumption a2: 
If an overloaded processor receives and subsequently relays a message, 
the ratio of the delay the processor suffered in sending the message to 
the communication medium, to the delay it suffered in receiving the 
message delivered to it by the communication medium is bounded by a 
known quantity D. 
In a2, no assumption is made to quantify the delay an overloaded pro-
cessor suffers in sending a message to the communication medium or the 
delay in receiving a message from the communication medium; also, there is 
no assumption to imply that an overloaded processor always receives an 
incoming message or that it always sends back a message to be relayed; 
what is assumed is a known relationship between the message relaying 
delays and message receiving delays. 
Let Wr be the time (which can be measured according to any processor's 
clock, due to al) a received message spends in a receive buffer of a processor 
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before being delivered to the destination process within the processor; let Wp 
be the message processing time and Ws be the time the message spends in an 
output buffer before being sent. Thus a message spends a total of Wr + Wp + Ws 
time after reception and ultimately relayed by a processor. Bya2, 
(Wp + Ws)/Wr < 8 
will be true for any overloaded processor, if Wp, w"~ and Wr are finite. 
The message processing required by the algorithm will be to verify the 
timeliness of the message, so Wp will be very small. The quantities Wr and 
Ws increase with processing loads. Thus, in general, a2 will be satisfied, if 
processing loads do not increase in the interval of length Wp + Wr + Ws 
(which is usually in the order of milliseconds) beyond what was perceived in 
the estimation of 8. 
Algorithm 
This algorithm requires at most two rounds of message exchange to be 
carried out between processors. In the first round, the sender, as in the pre-
vious algorithm, broadcasts its value with a timestamp and its identifier. If 
a receiver processor finds the sender's message timely, it decides and relays 
the message to other receiver processors thus initiating the second and the 
last round. The timeliness check for messages from the sender is the same 
as in ACT-l. 
If the sender is overloaded and if at least one non-faulty receiver pro-
cessor finds the message timely, then all non-faulty receiver processors will 
reach agreement in the second round. If no non-faulty receiver processor 
finds the sender's message timely, then the second round of message 
exchange, if there is to be one, will be initiated only by an overloaded 
receiver processor. Using consistency in overloaded processors' failures and 
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assumptions al and a2, calculated will be an upper bound on the time inter-
val within which all non-faulty receiver processors will receive an over-
loaded processor's relayed message. Given this bound, the failures of over-
loaded receiver processors are effectively reduced to consistent omission 
failures and the agreement is guaranteed at the end of the second round. 
Suppose that the sender is overloaded and that all non-faulty receiver 
processors find the sender's message late in the first round. Since the 
sender's timing failures are consistent, the local clock time at which non-
faulty receiver processors receive the sender's message will be within (d +e) 
of each other. Overloaded receiver processors may suffer unduly long delays 
in receiving the message delivered to it by the communication medium. By 
aI, all processors have their clocks synchronised within e. Therefore, the 
local clock readings at which non-faulty processors receive, and overloaded 
processors can potentially receive, the sender's message will be within (d +e) 
of each other. Let Ts be the message timestamp of the sender. Since no 
non-faulty receiver processor received the sender's message before its clock 
reading Ts + (d +e), an overloaded processor cannot potentially receive the 
sender's message before its clock time T,. While an overloaded receiver pro-
cessor can suffer unduly long delays in receiving a message, it will however 
decide not to relay a message which it has received after its clock reading 
Ts + (d +e). It can be established, based on a2, that if an overloaded proces-
sor receives the sender's message before its clock time Ts + (d +e) and relays 
the message, then its messages will be received by all non-faulty processors 
by their clock time Ts + (d+e) + 8*(d+e) + (d+e). Thus, when Il is taken to 
be (2+8)(d +e), either all or none of the non-faulty receiver processors will 
receive an overloaded receiver processor's relayed message by the end of the 
second round. 
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In the following, the algorithm is presented and its correctness is proved for 
A = (2+8)(d+e). 
The sender executes the following algorithm which is the same as in 
ACT-l. 
sender: 
const own-id = ..... ; 
var msg: M; local-value: value; 
begin 
msg. v : = local-value; msg. Ts: = clock.get; 
append-id-and-ser:d(msg) 
end. 
The algorithm for a receiver processor is: 
const own-id = ... ; maxm-rounds = 2; 
var 
msg: M; T r: Time; 
s: integer; 
function TC: boolean; 
begin TC := (s=2 or msg.T, - e :5 Tr < msg.T, + (d +e» end; 
function decided(T:Time): boolean; 
begin 
cycle 
begin if a value decided for T then decided: = true else decided: = false 
end; 
1) receive(msg); 
2) Tr: = clock.get; 
3) s: = no-of-identifiers(msg); 
4) if not decided(msg.Ts) 
5) then if TC 
then begin 
6) decide(msg.v, msg.Ts); 
7) if s < maxm-rounds 
8) then append-id-and-send(msg) 
endcycle 
end. 
end 
Correctness Of Algorithm 
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Theorem 3.2 
Any execution of the above algorithm meets the unanimity and validity 
conditions for .:\ = (2 + 8)(d +e) in the presence of at most f, f < n -1, over-
loaded processors suffering consistently late timing failures. 
Proof 
Consider an executi.on of the algorithm in which the sender sends its 
message with timestamp Ts. When the sender is non-faulty, all non-faulty 
receiver processors reach agreement by their clock time Ts + (d +e), due to 
assumptions Al and A3. Hence the theorem is true for a non-faulty sender. 
Suppose that the sender is overloaded. The theorem is proved for an 
overloaded sender by showing that either all non-faulty receiver processors 
decide by their clock time Ts +.:\, or none of them ever decides. 
Suppose that a non-faulty receiver processor decides for Ts by receiving 
a timely message directly from the sender. It decides by its clock time 
Ts + (d +e) and, by Al and A3, every other non-faulty receiver processor will 
be able to decide for Ts by its clock time Ts + 2(d+e) < Ts + (2+8)(d+e). 
Suppose that all non-faulty receiver processors find the message from 
the sender late; i.e., they all receive the sender's message at or after their 
clock time Ts + (d +e). Since overloaded processors' failures are consistent, if 
any overloaded receiver processor relays the sender's message, all non-faulty 
receiver processors will receive, and subsequently decide on, the message. 
Thus, either all or none of the non-faulty receiver processors decide for Ts in 
the second round. Let r be such an overloaded receiver processor that relays 
the sender's message. Let p be any non-faulty receiver processor. Since no 
non-faulty receiver processor received the sender's message before its clock 
time Ts + (d +e), r would not have been able to receive the sender's message 
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earlier than Ts + e according to p's clock. When p's clock reads Ts + e, r's 
clock will read T', Ts s T s Ts + 2e, by al. Therefore, r cannot receive the 
sender's message earlier than Ts according to its clock. 
Since r is an overloaded processor, it may suffer an unduly long delay 
in receiving the sender's message delivered to it by the communication 
medium. That delay must be less than (d +e), otherwise it could not have 
received the message before its clock time Ts + (d +e) and would not have 
subsequently decided to relay the message. By a2, the delay r can suffer in 
relaying the message will be less than (J*(d +e). These relayed messages will 
take a transmission time of less than d and will be received by non-faulty 
processors by Ts + (d +e) + (J*(d +e) + d according to r's clock. Thus, every 
non-faulty receiver processor will receive r's message by Ts + (d +e) 
+ (J*(d +e) + d +e according to its clock. Hence the unanimity condition and 
the theorem. 
Observation 
The proof of correctness is based on consistent nature of timing failures 
of overloaded processors. Therefore, ACT -2 will not be tolerant to over-
loaded processors which do not fail in consistent manner. This algorithm is 
faster than ACT-l, if (J < (f-l). 
3.6. Consistent Emission Fault 
Under the consistent emission fault model, the failure modes of a faulty 
processor are a union of consistent value and consistent timing failures. 
Algorithms will be derived from consistent timing fault tolerant algorithms 
by adding necessary measures to cope processor's value failures. Consistent 
timing fault tolerant algorithms involved more than one round of message 
exchange between processors. Under consistent emission fault model, a 
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faulty processor can attempt to alter the contents of the message it relays. 
Therefore, it is necessary for processors to sign every message they send or 
relay, and to authenticate every message they receive. 
When signed messages are exchanged between processors, a faulty pro-
cessor can undetectably forge another faulty processor's signature for a 
given message and can, therefore, undetectably alter the contents of another 
faulty processor's signed message it relays. By assumption A2, only the mes-
sages signed or over signed by a non-faulty processor are guarded against 
undetectable corruption. Therefore, when the sender is faulty, a receiver 
processor may receive, for example, two or more authentic messages con-
taining different values but with the same timestamp. To detect such a 
state, every receiver processor maintains a value bag, denoted as V-bag, in 
which the sender's value and timestamp contained in authentic messages 
will be stored as a two element set. Another bag, called time bag and 
denoted as T-bag, is also maintained to hold only the timestamps of authen-
tic messages. If there is more than one entry in V-bag for a given message 
timestamp stored in T-bag, a default decision will be made for the times-
tamp. 
Two algorithms will be presented. The first algorithm is tolerant of con-
sistent emission faults and the second will be for a special case of overloaded 
processors failing in consistently late emission manner. These algorithms 
will be derived from ACT-l and ACT-2 respectively. The development of the 
second algorithm will require assumptions al and a2 of ACT-2 in the con-
text of overloaded processors suffering consistent emission failures and 
another assumption a3 by which an overloaded processor cannot undetect-
ably forge any other processor's signature for a given message. The follow-
ing message structure will be assumed in the presentation of these two algo-
rithms: 
message structure: 
type M record 
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v: local-value; Ts: Time; signatures: string of char; 
end; 
The message variable 'signatures' will have processors' signatures for the 
contents of the message. A receiver processor, on relaying a signed message, 
will sign the message by appending 'signatures' with its signature for mes-
sage contents which are v, Ts, and the old value of'signatures'. 
3.6.1. Algorithm ACE-I for Consistent Emission Faults 
To cope with consistent timing failures, the algorithm, like algorithm 
ACT-l, allows at most ((+1) rounds of message exchange between proces-
sors, and each message received should be checked for timeliness before 
being accepted. To cope with consistent value failures, messages are signed 
before being sent or relayed, and are authenticated before being accepted. 
The number of processor signatures in a received message, s, will indicate 
the number of processors that have sent or relayed the message. The timeli-
ness check that is carried out on a received message is the same as the one 
in ACT-l. 
Each receiver processor maintains a V-bag and a T-bag. The V-bag is a 
set of two-e~ent sets. The first element of a two-element set will be a value 
and the second a timestamp. The T -bag is a set of timestamps. When a 
receiver processor receives a message during the execution of the algorithm, 
it verifies that the message contains a value and a timestamp not already 
stored as a pair in the V-bag. If so, the message is verified for its authenti-
city and timeliness. If the message is found authentic and timely, the value 
in the message and the message timestamp are entered as a pair into the 
V-bag; message timestamp is also entered into the T-bag, avoiding duplica-
tion; if the number of processor signatures in the message is less than (( + 1), 
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the message is signed and sent to processors whose signatures are not 
present in the message. 
At any time during the execution of the algorithm, a non-faulty 
receiver processor may receive an acceptable message containing a value 
that is different from what it has stored in its V-bag for a given message 
timestamp. Therefore, unlike in ACT-!, a processor should defer its decision 
for a given message timestamp, say, Ta, until its clock time Ta + (f+l)(d+e) 
which marks the end of execution for sender's message with timestamp T •. 
If the V-bag, at that time, contains only one entry-pair for that timestamp, 
then the decision will be made on the value in the entry; otherwise, a 
default decision is made. 
Since a receiver processor should defer its decision for a given message 
timestamp until its clock reads a particular value, its algorithm will be in 
two parts that are to be executed concurrently. In the first part, received 
messages are checked for acceptability and entries into the V-bag and the 
T -bag are made, if necessary; in the second part, a decision for a message 
timestamp in the T-bag is made by referring to corresponding entries in the 
V-bag at appropriate clock times. Concurrent execution of these two parts 
of the algorithm should share the V-bag and the T-bag in a mutually 
exclusive manner. In the following presentation of the algorithm, necessary 
implementation for this mutual exclusion is assumed, and the V-bag and 
the T-bag are shown as shared sets of data: 
sender: 
var msg: M; local-value: value; 
begin 
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msg. v : = local-value; msg.Ts: = clock.get; 
sign-and-send(msg) 
end. 
receiver: 
const A = (f + 1)(d +e); mum-rounds = (f + 1); 
var 
V-bag: shared set of {vI: value, TI: Time}; 
T-bag: shared set of Time; msg: M; 
default, v2: value; Tr, T2: Time; s: integer; 
function TC: boolean; 
begin TC:= (t S s S (f+l) and 
cobegin 
begin 
cycle 
end; 
1) receive(msg); 
2) Tr: = clock.get; 
msg.Ts - se S Tr < msg.Ts + s(d +e» 
3) s: = no-of-signatures(msg); 
4) if ({msg.v, msg.Ts} not in V-bag) 
5) then if authentic(msg) and TC 
then begin 
6) store({msg.v, msg.Ta}, V-bag); 
7) if msg.Ts not in T-bag then store(msg.Ts, T-bag); 
8) if s < mum-rounds 
9) then sign-and-send(msg) 
end 
endcycle; 
end 
II 
begin 
cycle 
10) for any T2 in T-bag 
11) if clock. get = T2 + A 
then begin 
12) if {v2, T2} unique in V-bag 
13) then decide(v2, T2) 
14) else decide(default, T2); 
15) V-bag: = V-bag - { all {v2, T2} in V-bag}; 
16) T-bag: = T-bag - { T2 } 
end 
endcycle 
end 
coend. 
Algorithm ACE-l. 
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Explanation: 
The message variable 'signatures' in the sender's message will be ini-
tially null. The sender signs its message, msg, and sends it to receiver pro-
cessors by executing "sign-and-send(msg)". 
In the algorithm executed by a receiver processor, the constant, 'maxm-
rounds', represents the maximum number of rounds of message exchange 
the algorithm should accommodate and is taken to be ((+1). The operation 
"store({msg.v, msg.Ts}, V-bag)" stores the pair {msg.v, msg.T.} in V-bag; 
similarly, the operation "store(msg.T., T-bag)" stores the message timestamp 
in T-bag. 
The boolean function, Te, contains the boolean condition "1 :5 s 
:5 (f+1)" and the timeliness condition for a received message with s proces-
sor signatures. A faulty processor can undetectably forge another faulty 
processor's signature for a given message and can fail by putting not only 
its signature but also other processors' signatures onto the message it 
relays. Therefore, when messages are exchanged between processors, a 
non-faulty receiver processor may receive authentic messages with more 
than f + 1 distinct processor signatures and for such messages "1 :5 s 
s (f+1)" will not become true. 
The boolean function "authentic(msg)" (in line 5), returns true, if the 
message, msg, has only authentic signatures of distinct processors. If a mes-
sage has unauthentic signatures and/or has more than one signature of the 
same processor, then the function will return false. 
In line 4, a message received (in line 1) at time Tr (noted in line 2) with 
s processor signatures (counted in line 3) is checked whether its value and 
timestamp are already in V-bag. If not, in line 5, it is verified for its 
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authenticity and timeliness. On being found authentic with s, 1 s s S f+1, 
distinct processor signatures and timely, the message is accepted and 
appropriate entries are made in V-bag and T-bag and if s < (f+1) (line 8), it 
is over signed and sent (line 9) to appropriate processors. 
Lines 10 to 16 represent the second part of the algorithm to be executed 
concurrently with the first part (lines 1 to 9). For any entry, T2, in T-bag, 
when the clock reads T2 + A (lines 10, 11), a decision is taken for T2 in 
lines 12 to 14. With T2 as timestamp, if {v2,T2} is the only entry in V-bag 
(identified by "unique" condition in line 12), a decision is taken on v2 for 
timestamp T2; otherwise, a default decision is made. In lines 15 and 16, 
entries corresponding to T2 are removed from V-bag and T-bag. 
In the following, the algorithm is shown to be correct. 
Correctness Of Algorithm 
Theorem 3.3 
Any execution of the above algorithm meets the unanimity and validity 
conditions for A = (f + l)(d +e) in the presence of at most f, f < n -1, distinct 
processors with consistent emission faults. 
Proof 
When the sender is non-faulty, all non-faulty receiver processors will 
obtain only one pair for every message timestamp, due to assumption A2. 
Hence the validity condition. 
Consider now the case where the sender is faulty. We will say that a 
processor "obtains" {V, T.}, when it stores {V, Ts} in its V-bag. As per the 
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conditions in TC, it is not possible for a non-faulty processor to obtain {V, 
Ts} at or after its clock time Ts + (f+l)(d+e). Consider two non-faulty pro-
cessors p and q. The unanimity condition is shown to be met by showing 
that for any {V, Ts}, when p obtains {V,Ts} before its clock time Ts + Il, q 
will also obtain {V, Ts} before its clock time Ts + Il. 
Suppose that p obtains a {V, Ts} by accepting a message with s, 
1 S s S f + 1 distinct processor signatures. The processor p accepts the mes-
sage, only if the message is authentic and is received at its clock time Tp 
such that Ts - se :S Tp < Ts + s(d+e). If SSf, then q will find p's message 
timely, authentic and with distinct processor signatures and can thereby 
obtain {V, Ts} by its clock time Ts + (S+l)(d+e) S Ts + Il. If s=(f+l), since 
there can be at most f faulty processors, it is not possible for q not to have 
obtained {V, Ts} before its clock time Ts + Il. Thus, at their clock time T. + 
Il, P and q will have identical entries for Ts in their V-bag. Hence the unan-
imity condition and the theorem. 
Observation 
Consistency in value failures. 
It can be noted that the correctness of this algorithm, like that of algo-
rithm ACT-I, has been established without making use of consistent nature 
of processors' emission failures. Therefore, this algorithm will also be 
tolerant of emission faults. 
Consistent emission failures are a union of consistent timing failures 
and consistent value failures. It was shown, in the previous section, that an 
agreement algorithm tolerant of consistent timing faults has to be developed 
without making use of consistency in processors' timing failures. Therefore, 
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the development of any consistent emission fault tolerant algorithm cannot 
make use of consistency in timing failures. It is however possible to make 
use of consistency in processors' value failures in designing a consistent 
emission fault tolerant algorithm and such an algorithm will be: 
a message received from the sender is accepted, decided on, signed, and 
relayed, if the message is authentic and timely; it is ignored, if it is unau-
thentic; it is preserved, if it is authentic alld untimely. The preserved mes-
sage is decided on, if a decision message - which is a timely and authentic 
message with s, 2 ::s; s ::s; f+l, distinct processor signatures and with value 
and timestamp same as in preserved message - is received from another 
receiver processor in any of the remaining f rounds; it is ignored, if no deci-
sion message is received until clock time T. + A. If a decision message 
received has been signed by less than (f+l) processors, it is signed and 
relayed. 
In any execution of this algorithm, non-faulty receiver processors will 
be able to decide in less than (f + 1) rounds, if the sender is non-faulty or if 
less than (f-l) receiver processors fail when a faulty sender fails by sending 
an authentic and untimely message. However, the value of A cannot be 
guaranteed to be less than that for ACE-I. 
3.6.2. Algorithm ACE·2 for Overloaded Processors 
Algorithm ACE-2 is developed to reach agreement in the presence of 
overloaded processors whose failures will be a union of consistently late tim-
ing failures (due to processing loads) and consistent value failures. It will be 
derived from ACT-2 which is for overloaded processors that fail only by pro-
ducing consistently late responses. ACT-2 was developed with assumptions 
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al and a2 mentioned in previous section and required two rounds of mes-
sage exchange between processors. 
In ACE-2, the features of ACT-2 will be combined with the use of mes-
sage signature and authentication mechanisms to cope with value failures. 
In addition to al and a2, required will be assumption a3 by which an over-
loaded processor cannot undetectably forge another processor's signature for 
a given message. Due to a3, an overloaded receiver processor cannot 
undetectably alter the contents of a signed message it relays and, therefore, 
it cannot make a non-faulty receiver processor obtain more than one value 
for a given timestamp. This eliminates a receiver processor's need, as in 
ACE-I, to maintain V-bag and T-bag and to defer the decision until partic-
ular clock time. The assumptions aI, a2, and a3 required for ACE-2 are 
stated below. 
Assumptions 
a3: An overloaded processor cannot undetectably forge another processor's 
signature for a given message. 
Assumption a3 does not guarantee that an overloaded processor will not 
attempt to forge another processor's signature nor that it will always detect 
a message with unauthentic signature. It merely ensures that a non-faulty 
processor will be able to detect any forged signature contained in the mes-
sage it receives. The underlying assumption in a3 is that the failures of an 
overloaded processor are not so serious that the signature and authentica-
tion mechanisms used will be effective enough for a3 to be true. 
Assumptions al and a2 of ACT-2 are restated in the context of over-
loaded processors suffering consistently late emission failures: 
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a1: All processors have their clocks synchronised within the known and 
bounded difference of e. 
a2: If an overloaded processor receives and subsequently relays a message, 
the ratio of the delay the processor suffered in sending the message to 
the communication medium, to the delay it suffered in receiving the 
message delivered to it by the communication medium is bounded by a 
known quantity (J. 
The assumptions underlying al are: overloaded processors have non-
faulty clocks; the execution of clock synchronisation algorithm in processors 
is carried out at a sufficiently low level and using high priority messages so 
that processing loads at high level have little impact on the execution of 
synchronisation algorithm; and, value failures do not affect clock adjust-
ments performed during the execution of synchronisation algorithm. 
Assumed in a2 is that processing loads do not increase at a rate that is more 
than what was assumed in the estimation of (J. 
Algorithm 
The sender signs and sends its message to receiver processors. The 
algorithm executed by the sender is the same as that in ACE-l. The two-
round algorithm for receiver processors is presented next. 
const maxm-rounds = 2; 
var 
msg: M; ,Tr: Time; 
s: integer; 
function TC: boolean; 
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begin TC : = (s=2 or msg.Ts - e S Tr < msg.Ta + (d +e» 
end; 
function decided(T): boolean; 
begin if a value decided for T then decided: = true else decided: = false 
end; 
begin 
cycle 
1) receive(msg); 
2) T r : = clock.get; 
3) s: = no-of-signatures(msg); 
4) if not decided(msg.Ta) 
5) then if authentic(msg) and TC 
then begin 
6) decide(msg.v, msg.T.); 
7) if s < maxm-rounds 
8) then sign-and-send(msg) 
endcycle 
end. 
end 
Correctness of Algorithm 
Theorem 3.4 
Any execution of the above algorithm meets the unanimity and validity 
condi tions for ~ = (2 + O)(d + e) in the presence of at most f, f < n -1, over-
loaded processors suffering consistently late emission failures. 
Proof 
When the sender is non-faulty, the theorem is true by theorem 3.3. 
Suppose that the sender is overloaded in an execution of the algorithm. By 
aI, the sender has a properly synchronised clock. Therefore, it will not carry 
out more than one broadcast with the same timestamp. Since its value 
failures are consistent, its replicated messages to all receiver processors will 
be of identical contents. This implies that the sender sends only one value 
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for a given message timestamp. By a3, an overloaded receiver processor, 
while relaying the sender's message, cannot undetectably alter the message 
contents. Therefore, if any non-faulty receiver processor decides for a mes-
sage timestamp, say, Ts, during the execution of the algorithm, it will do so 
only on the value sent by the sender with timestamp Ts. 
Let p and q be any two non-faulty receiver processors. The unanimity 
condition is shown to be met for ~ by showing that, for any message times-
tamp Ts, (i) it is not possible for p to decide and q not to decide; and, (ii) if p 
and q decide, they do so by their clock time Ts + ~. 
A non-faulty processor, during an execution of the algorithm, may 
receive messages with more than two signatures. This can happen, if a 
faulty processor has attempted to put other processors' signatures onto the 
message it relays or sends. A non-faulty processor, by a3, will find such 
messages unauthentic and will ignore them. Thus, it reaches a decision 
only by receiving an authentic message that is either signed once by the 
sender or doubly signed. 
Suppose that p decides for Ts by accepting a message that was signed 
only once (s = 1). The processor p accepts the message, only if the message is 
authentic and received at its clock time Tp such that Ts - e:5 Tp 
< Ts + (d +e). Processor q will find p's doubly signed message authentic and 
will decide for Ts by its clock time Ts + 2(d+e) < Ts + ~. 
Suppose that p decides for Ts by receiving a doubly signed message. By 
theorem 3.2, p will receive the message before its clock time Ts + ~; and it is 
not possible for q not to have received the message p received, before its 
clock time Ts + ~. Since value failures of an overloaded receiver processor 
are consistent, the messages received by p and q will have identical con-
tents. Since p decided on the message, q will also find the message authentic 
- 80 -
and decide for T,. Hence the unanimity condition and the theorem for 
t::. = (2+0)(d +e). 
Observations 
1. Assumption a3 and two rounds. 
Consider an execution of ACE-2 without assumption a3. Suppose that 
the sender sends its message such that the message is timely to a non-faulty 
processor, say, p, and also to an overloaded processor, say, r and that the 
message is late to another non-faulty processor, say, q. If processor r relays 
the sender's message with contents undetectably altered, processor q will 
receive, in the second round, two authentic messages of different contents 
and cannot decide which of the two messages is original. If ACE-2 had 
accommodated at most f + 1 rounds, then q could use the subsequent rounds 
to send p the message relayed by r and thereby reach agreement. There-
fore, the two-round algorithm ACE-2 will not be correct without a3. 
2. Consistency in failures. 
Theorem 3.2 requires overloaded processors' timing failures to be con-
sistent. Correctness of ACE-2 requires overloaded processors' value failures 
to be consistent and theorem 3.2. Therefore, ACE-2 will not be tolerant of 
emission faults in processors. 
3.7. Omission Fault 
The omission fault tolerant algorithm presented here is a variant of 
atomic broadcast protocol developed in [Crist85] under omission fault 
assumptions. Hence, it is briefly mentioned here to enable the reader to 
compare it with agreement algorithms developed under other fault models. 
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3.7.1. Algorithm AO for Omission Faults 
Since processors with omission faults fail only by not producing 
expected outputs, the algorithm does not require the use of message signa-
ture and message authentication facilities, and of timeliness checks that are 
to be carried out before accepting a message. An omission faulty processor, 
while producing a replicated output, can however fail by not sending it3 
messages to some of the concerned processors. Therefore, the algorithm 
should allow for at most (f + 1) rounds of message exchange so that the unan-
imity condition can be guaranteed, when the sender is faulty. 
In the following presentation of the algorithm, the messages exchanged 
between processors are taken to be of the record structure that is same as 
the one used in consistent timing fault tolerant algorithms. 
type M record 
v: value; Ts: Time; ids: sequence of identifier 
end; 
Every processor IS assumed to have a unique identifier that is known to 
every other processor. The message variable ids contains the identifiers of 
processors which have seen the message contents. 
Algorithm 
The sender sends all receiver processors its message which contains its 
value, a timestamp and its identifier. The execution of the agreement algo-
rithm will require every receiver processor to behave in the following 
manner: On receiving a message containing sender's value, a receiver pro-
cessor checks if it has decided for the timestamp in that message. If so, the 
message is ignored; otherwise, the message is accepted and a decision is 
taken. If the number of distinct processor identifiers present in an accepted 
message is less than (f + 1), then the receiver processor appends its identifier 
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to the message and relays the modified message to those processors whose 
identifiers are not in the message. 
The algorithms executed by the sender and a receiver processor are 
given below. An explanation is omitted, as it follows from the explanation 
for ACT-l. 
sender: 
const ownid = ..... ; 
var msg: M; local-value: value; 
begin 
msg.v:= local-value; msg.Ts:= clock. get; 
append-id-and-send(msg) 
end. 
receiver: 
const ownid = ... ; maxm-rounds = (f + 1); 
var msg: M; s: integer; 
function decided(T:Time): boolean; 
begin if a value decided for T then decided: = true else decided: = false 
end; 
begin 
cycle 
1) receive(msg); 
2) s: = no-of-identifiers(msg); 
3) if not decided(msg.Ts) 
then begin 
4) decide(msg.v, msg.Ts); 
5) if s < maxm-rounds 
6) then append-id-and-send(msg) 
end 
endcycle 
end. 
Algorithm AO. 
Any execution of the algorithm will guarantee that all non-faulty 
receiver processors reach agreement by their clock time 
Ts + ~,~ = (f+1)d+e. We refer the reader to [Crist85] for the correctness of 
the algorithm. To intuitively show that the size of ~ used here is necessary; 
since there can be at most f faulty processors, any execution of the algo-
rithm should allow at least (f + 1) distinct inter-processor communication 
rounds to take place so that the unanimity condition is guaranteed, when 
the sender is faulty. Considering also the clock difference, ~ cannot have a 
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value less than (f+l)d+e. 
Observation 
The above algorithm can be modified to be faster, if it is given that a 
bounded number of omission faulty processors in the system fail only in con-
sistent manner and that all processors are reliably connected by the com-
munication network. Let a, a>l, be the maximum number of faulty proces-
sors that fail only in consistent omission manner. Thus at most (f-a) faulty 
processors can fail in a manner that is not consistent. In such a system, an 
execution of AO with maxm-rounds=f-a+l, will guarantee agreement. To 
intuitively show this: consider an execution in which the sender is faulty 
and a non-faulty receiver processor receives a message with f-a+l proces-
sor identifiers. Since no more than f-a processors fail in a manner that is 
not consistent, at least one of those processors that have sent or relayed the 
message must be either non-faulty or with consistent omission faults. There-
fore, every other non-faulty receiver processor must have received, and 
decided on, the sender's value. 
3.8. Value Fault 
Value faults subsume omission faults. This implies that the value fault 
tolerant algorithm should allow for at most (f+l) rounds of message 
exchange so that the unanimity condition can be guaranteed to be met, 
when the sender processor is faulty. A processor with value faults, in addi-
tion to suffering omission failures, may attempt to alter the contents of a 
message it relays and, while producing a replicated output, may send mes-
sages of different contents to different processors. Therefore, the messages 
exchanged between processors during the execution of the algorithm should 
be signed before being sent and be authenticated before being accepted; and, 
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as m the algorithm for consistent emission faults, each processor should 
maintain V-bag and T-bag shared data structures and should defer its deci-
sion on sender's value until a particular time on its clock. 
Under this fault model, faulty processors do not fail by producing 
untimely messages. Therefore, messages received during the execution need 
not be checked for timeliness. A faulty processor can undetectably forge 
another faulty processor's signature for a given message. It can fail by put-
ting not only its signature but also other processors' signatures onto the 
message it relays. Therefore, when messages are exchanged between pro-
cessors, a non-faulty receiver processor may receive authentic messages with 
more than f + 1 distinct processor signatures and such messages should be 
ignored. So, the value fault tolerant algorithm becomes the same as the 
algorithm for consistent emission faults with (f+l) rounds, ACE-I, except 
for the absence of timeliness condition on received messages and for a 
different value of ~. 
3.8.1. Algorithm AV for Value Faults 
With the type of messages exchanged and the algorithm executed by 
the sender being the same as ACE-I, only the algorithm executed by 
receiver processors is given below. An explanation is omitted, as it follows 
from the explanation for ACE-l. 
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const ~ = (f + l)d +e; maxm-rounds = (f + 1); 
var 
V-bag: shared set of {vI: value, T1: Time}; 
T-bag: shared set of Time; msg: M; 
default, v2: value; T2: Time; s: integer; 
function TC: boolean; 
begin TC := ( 1 ~ s ~ (f+1» end; 
cobegin 
begin 
cycle 
1) receive(msg); 
2) s: = no-of-signatures(msg); 
3) if ({msg.v, msg.Ts} not in V-bag) 
4) then if authentic(msg) and TC 
5) then begin 
6) store({msg.v, msg.T.}, V-bag); 
7) if msg.Ts not in T-bag then store(msg.Ts, T-bag); 
8) if s < maxm-rounds 
9) then sign-and-send(msg) 
endcycle 
end 
II 
begin 
cycle 
end 
10) for any T2 in T-bag 
11) if clock. get = T2 + ~ 
then begin 
12) if {v2, T2} unique in V-bag 
13) then decide(v2, T2) 
14) else decide(default, T2); 
15) V-bag: = V -bag - {all {v2, T2} in V -bag} 
16) T-bag: = T -bag - {T2} 
end 
endcycle 
end 
coend. 
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Correctness Of Algorithm A V 
Theorem 3.5 
Any execution of the above algorithm meets the unanimity and validity 
conditions for a = (f+l)d+e in the presence of at most f, f«n-l), distinct 
processors suffering value faults. 
Proof 
When the sender is non-faulty, the theorem is true by assumptions Al, 
A2, and A3. Suppose that the sender is faulty. As in theorem 3.3, we will 
say that a processor "obtains" {V,Ts}, when it stores {V,Ts} in its V-bag. A 
non-faulty receiver processor obtains {V, Ts} by receiving an authentic mes-
sage with timestamp Ts and with s, 1 $ s $f+l distinct processor signa-
tures. The unanimity condition is shown to be met by showing that for any 
{V,Ts}, it is not possible for one non-faulty receiver processor to obtain {V,Ts} 
before its clock time Ts + a and another non-faulty receiver processor not to 
obtain {V,Ts} before its clock time Ts + a. 
Let p and q be any two non-faulty receiver processors. Suppose that p 
obtains a {V,Te} by receiving a message with s, 1 $ S $ f+l, processor signa-
tures and that q does not receive the message and does not contain {V,Ts} in 
its V-bag. Since faulty processors do not fail by producing untimely 
responses, processor p must have received the message not later than Ts + 
sd according to sender's clock (due to A3) and not later than Ts + sd +e 
according to any receiver processor's clock (due to AI). If s $ t, q will obtain 
{V, Ts} through the message signed and relayed by p before its clock time Ts 
+ (s+l)d+e $ Ts + a. If s=(f+l), since there can be at most f faulty pro-
cessors, the processor from which p received the message must be non-
faulty. Therefore, it is not possible for q not to have obtained {V,T5} before 
its clock time Ts + a. 
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Thus, for any message timestamp, say, Ts stored in T-bag, all non-faulty 
recei ver processors will have identical entries in V -bag at their clock time 
Ts + ~. Hence the unanimity condition and the theorem. 
3.9. Timing Fault and Emission Fault 
In sections 3.5 and 3.6, it was observed that the algorithms tolerant of 
consistent timing faults and consistent emission faults have been designed 
without making use of consistency in processors' timing and emission 
failures respectively. Therefore, the algorithm for timing faults, AT, 
becomes the algorithm tolerant of consistent timing faults in processors, 
ACT-I; and, the algorithm for emission faults, AE, becomes that for con-
sistent emission faults ACE-I. 
3.10. Byzantine Fault 
Faults of any type will form a proper subset of Byzantine faults that 
can cause a processor to fail in any manner. The Byzantine fault tolerant 
algorithm presented below as algorithm AB is a variant of Byzantine fault 
tolerant protocol presented in [Crist85]. It requires (f + 1) rounds of message 
exchange between processors. In each round, messages to be sent are signed 
or over signed and messages received are verified for authenticity and timel-
iness. Each receiver processor maintains V-bag and T-bag which are, as 
before, shared by two concurrent processes in a mutually exclusive manner. 
With ~ being (f+l)(d +e), at clock time Ts + ~ a receiver processor inspects 
its V-bag for the value or values stored for timestamp Ts that has been 
stored in the T-bag. If only one value is present, decision is taken on that 
value; otherwise, default decision will be made. 
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3.10.1. Algorithm AB for Byzantine Faults 
The type of messages exchanged between processors and the algorithm 
executed by the sender are the same as ACE-l. The algorithm executed by a 
receiver processor is given below. 
receiver: 
const ~ = (f+l)(d+e); mum-rounds = (f+l); 
var 
V-bag: shared set of {vI: value, Tl: Time}; 
T-bag: shared set of Time; msg: M; 
default, v2: value; Tr, T2: Time; s: integer; 
function TC: boolean; 
begin TC : = ( 1 :::; s :::; f + 1 and 
cobegin 
begin 
cycle 
end; 
1) receive(msg); 
2) Tr : = clock.get; 
msg.Ts - se :::; Tr < msg.Ts + s(d +e)) 
3) s: = no-of-signatures(msg); 
4) if ({msg.v, msg.Ts} not in V-bag) 
5) then if authentic(msg) and TC 
then begin 
6) store({msg.v, msg.Ts}, V-bag); 
7) if msg.Ts not in T -bag then store(msg.Ts, T-bag); 
8) if s < maxm-rounds 
9) then sign-and-send(msg) 
endcycle 
end 
II 
begin 
cycle 
end 
10) for any T2 in T-bag 
11) if clock.get = T2 + ~ 
then begin 
12) if {v2, T2} unique in V-bag 
13) then decide(v2, T2) 
14) else decide(default, T2); 
15) V-bag:= V-bag - {all {v2, T2} in V-bag}; 
16) T-bag:= T-bag - {T2 } 
end 
endcycle 
end 
coend. 
This algorithm is no different from algorithm ACE-l that is tolerant of 
consistent emission and emission faults in processors. A Byzantine failure 
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that is not included in emission failures is a failure in which arbitrary mes-
sages are produced by faulty processors. So, Byzantine faulty processors can 
generate arbitrary messages during the execution of the algorithm and 
thereby can increase the message traffic between processors. An implemen-
tation of AB should take this increased message traffic into consideration 
by, for example, fixing a larger value of d in assumption A3 than the one 
chosen for implementing ACE-I. An increase in the value d will increase 
the value of e, if clock synchronisation is achieved without using any time 
service external to the system. For given values of d and e which are chosen 
to meet assumptions Al and A3 in the presence of Byzantine faulty proces-
sors, algorithm AB can be proved to be correct using the approach developed 
for ACE-l (see also [Crist85] for a proof). 
3.11. The Generic Algorithm 
In this section, we present the generic algorithm from which any of the 
algorithm developed in previous sections can be derived by substituting cer-
tain variables with appropriate parameters which are tabulated following 
the presentation of the algorithm. The variables to be replaced are tc, 
maxm-rounds, and a; The variable tc represents the conditions in the 
boolean function TC of an agreement algorithm. These three variables take 
different values for different algorithms and are indexed by a which will 
represent the name of the algorithm that is to be derived from the generic 
algorithm. For example, the generic algorithm will represent agreement 
algorithm for value faults, when the variables tc(a), maxm-rounds(a), and 
A(a) in the generic algorithm are substituted by respective expressions pro-
vided in the table for a = A V. The generic algorithm and the table will 
help the reader to compare the requirements of agreement algorithms 
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developed in previous sections. 
In algorithms for consistent timing, timing, and omission faults and for 
overloaded processors, it is possible for a non-faulty processor to be able to 
decide on a message with timestamp Ts before its clock time Ts + ~. An 
agreement reached will be said to be eventual, if one non-faulty processor 
can decide in round i and another one in round j, such that i:;c j. In some 
executions of these algorithms, c.greement reached can be eventual. It can 
be observed that in these algorithms, the types of faults considered do not 
involve value faults, or, if value faults are involved, a faulty processor is 
assumed not to be able to undetectably forge another processor's signature 
for a given message; and that a receiver processor is not required to main-
tain V-bag and T-bag. In algorithms where V-bag and T-bag are main-
tained by receiver processors, the decision for Ts will be taken at clock time 
Ts + ~ and the agreement reached will be called immediate agreement in 
which all receiver processors decide at the same round. For detailed descrip-
tions of eventual and immediate agreements, we refer the reader to 
[Dolev82al. 
In developing the generic algorithm, the possibilities of a receiver pro-
cessor being able to reach eventual agreement in certain algorithms have 
been ignored to achieve uniformity between all algorithms. For algorithms 
where early decision is possible, the generic algorithm will indicate the 
worst case time duration necessary to reach agreement. 
The type of messages exchanged between processors is taken to be of 
the following record structure: 
message structure: 
type M record 
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v: value; Ts: Time; signatures: string of char 
end; 
The message variable 'signatures' is taken to represent message signa-
tures of either of the following two types: (i) RSA type of message signatures 
which are generated and authenticated using schemes such as RSA scheme 
(Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman scheme) in [Rives78]; signatures of this type 
are signer dependent and contents dependent; (ii) ID type of signatures 
which are only signer dependent and are taken to be processors' identifiers. 
A processor's identifier, as in omission fault tolerant, and timing fault 
tolerant algorithms, will be unique and be known to every other processor 
in the system. When message signatures of ID type are used, the instruction 
"sign-and-send(msg)" will imply that the message, msg, is sent, after the 
sending processor's identifier is appended to the variable 'signatures' of the 
message; and, the boolean function "authentic(msg)" will always return 
true. The algorithm executed by the sender and a receiver processor are as 
follows: 
sender: 
var msg: M; local-value: value; 
begin 
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msg.v : = local-value; msg.T8:= clock. get; 
sign-and-send(msg) 
end. 
receiver(a: algm-name); 
var 
V-bag: shared set of {v1: value, T1: Time}; T-bag: shared set of Time; 
msg: M; default, v2: value; Tr, T2: Time; s: integer; 
function TC: boolean; 
begin with msg do TC:= tc(a) end; 
cobegin 
begin 
cycle 
1) receive(msg); 
2) Tr: = clock.get; 
3) s: = no-of-signatures(msg); 
4) if ({msg.v, msg.Ts} not in V-bag) 
5) then if authentic(msg) and TC 
then begin 
6) store({msg.v, msg.Ts}, V-bag); 
7) if msg.Ts not in T-bag then store(msg.Ts , T-bag); 
8) if s < maxm-rounds(a) 
9) then sign-and-send(msg) 
endcycle 
end 
II 
begin 
cycle 
end 
10) for any T2 in T-bag 
11) if clock. get = T2 + Ll(a) 
then begin 
12) if {v2, T2} unique in V-bag 
13) then decide(v2, T2) 
14) else decide(default, T2); 
15) V-bag: = V-bag - { all {v2,T2} in V-bag}; 
16) T-bag: = T-bag - { T2 } 
end 
endcycle 
end 
coend. 
The Generic Algorithm. 
The table showing the expressions for tc(a), maxm-rounds(a), Ll(a), and 
the type of message signatures for various agreement algorithms is 
presented next. 
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a tc(a) maxm- .:l(a) type of 
rounds(a) message 
signature 
ACO 
(consistent true 1 (d +e) ID 
omission) 
ACV 
(consistent true 1 (d+e) ID 
value) 
ACT-1 
(consistent (T. - se :5 Tr < T.+s(d+e» (f+1) (f + l)(d +e) ID 
timing) 
ACT-2 
(processor (s=2 or T.-se:5Tr<TB+s(d+e» 2 (2+8)(d +e) ID 
over loading) 
ACE-1 
(consistent (1:5s:5(f+1) and T B-se:5Tr<TB+s(d+e» (f+1) (f+1)(d+e) RSA 
emission) 
ACE-2 
(processor (s=2 or T.-se:5Tr<TB+s(d+e» 2 (2+8)(d +e) RSA 
overloading) 
AO 
(omission) true (f+1) (f+1)d +e ID 
AV 
(value) 1 :5 s :5 (f+1) (f+1) (f+1)d+e RSA 
AT 
(timing) (TB - se :5 Tr < Ts + sed +e» (f+1) (f + l)(d +e) ID 
AE (1 :5s :5 (f+1» and 
(emission) (TB - se:5 Tr < Ts +s(d+e» (f+1) (f + l)(d +e) RSA 
AB (1 S s :5 (f+1» and 
(Byzantine) (T. - se :5 Tr < TB + sed +e» (f+1) (f+l)(d+e) RSA 
Table 3.1. Expressions For The Family Of Algorithms. 
3.11.1. Discussions 
Complexities of Algorithms 
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Complexities of agreement algorithms for faults of related types 
(related by "proper subset of' relation defined in chapter 2) can be compared 
by considering the following factors in the algorithms: the requirement for 
the use of message signatures and authentication, requirement to verify the 
timeliness of a received message (by referring to a clock), and the maximum 
number of rounds of message exchanges between processors required to 
guarantee agreement. Among the algorithms developed for each fault type, 
algorithms ACO and ACV, respectively tolerant of consistent omission 
faults and consistent value faults, stand out to be the simplest of all for the 
following reasons: the sender need not sign the messages it sends; no 
receiver processor will be required to authenticate, or to verify the timeli-
ness of, the messages it receives; any execution of the algorithm guarantees 
agreement by time interval A which is as small as (d +e) and involves just 
one round of message exchange between processors in which only the sender 
sends its messages. Under these fault models, a faulty sender does not 
respond to different processors in different manner. Therefore a simple 
broadcast by the sender, which is necessary in any agreement algorithm, is 
sufficient to guarantee agreement. 
Under consistent timing and consistent emission fault models, a faulty 
processor was seen to respond to different processors in different (timing) 
manner - timely for some and untimely for others. Therefore, algorithms 
ACT-I and ACE-I required (f+l) rounds of message exchange between pro-
cessors. ACE-I is more complex than ACT-I, since it requires the use of 
signed messages. ACT-2 and ACE-2 are developed for overloaded processors 
- 95 -
and by making assumptions which restrict an overloaded processor's ability 
to respond in different timing manner to different processors. They turn out 
to be two round algorithms and are more complex than ACO and ACV 
which are one round algorithms. ACT-2 and ACE-2 will be faster than 
ACT-l and ACE-l respectively, if O«f -1). Under consistent fault models, it 
can be observed that if faults of type A are a proper subset of faults of type 
B, then the algorithm tolerant of type A faults is less complex than that 
tolerant of type B faults, except when A is consistent omission and B is con-
sistent value. 
ACT-l and ACE-l have been developed without making use of con-
sistency in processor's failures and therefore become AT and AE respec-
tively. The omission fault tolerant algorithm, AO, is less complex than AT 
and AE and is more complex than ACO, since it requires at most (f + 1) 
rounds of message exchange and does not involve signed messages and 
timeliness checks. A V is more complex than AO and less complex than AE. 
Though the Byzantine fault tolerant algorithm, AB, is the same as AE, 
it was observed that a heavier message traffic may result during an execu-
tion of AB due to a Byzantine faulty processor's ability to generate arbitrary 
messages. In fact, it is not appropriate to compare the fastness of any two 
given algorithms only by considering the respective expressions for A, since 
message receiving and processing time varies depending on message traffic 
and on whether a given message is signed and/or is to be verified for timeli-
ness. Due to the possibility of increased message traffic in the presence of 
Byzantine faulty processors, the value of d in assumption A3 may well be 
large and, therefore, AB may be slower than AE. 
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From these discussions, it can be observed that when faults of type A 
are a proper subset of faults of type B, then the algorithm tolerant of type A 
faults will be less complex than that for type B faults, except if A is con-
sistent omission, consistent timing, consistent emission, and emission, when 
B is consistent value, timing, emission, and Byzantine respectively. In each 
of these four exceptional cases, type A fault tolerant algorithm is as complex 
as the algorithm tolerant of type B faults. These exceptional cases illustrate 
that an agreement algorithm does not necessarily become less complex, just 
because fault types considered are restricted to relatively "less severe" 
types. 
Processors and Knowledge of Membership 
The specification of the agreement problem "assumes" that every pro-
cessor has identical knowledge of processors involved in reaching agree-
ment. By this assumption, a processor was able to authenticate another 
processor's signed message, when signatures of RSA type are used; and, 
when signatures of ID type are used, a processor was considered to have a 
unique identifier that was known to every other processor involved in reach-
ing agreement. Realising this assumption is easy in systems with a fixed 
configuration such as [Ezhil89] in which three processors are assigned to 
form a triple modular redundant (TMR) node until the end of the mission 
period. It becomes relatively difficult in systems where membership can 
change with respect to time as processors leave or join the system. In such 
systems, it should be ensured, following the occurrence of an event which 
affects the system membership, that all non-faulty processors have correct 
and consistent knowledge of the change in system membership in a bounded 
and known time interval. This problem is referred to as the group member-
ship problem in [Crist88]. 
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Given that non-faulty processors in a system have consistent knowledge 
of current system membership and can detect occurrences of events that 
affect system membership, group membership problem can be solved using a 
solution to the agreement problem. Using agreement protocols, three proto-
cols are proposed in [Crist88] to solve membership problem in the presence 
of late timing faults in processors and communication medium. 
3.12. Concluding Remarks 
Agreement algorithms have been developed and presented for a range 
of processor fault types. When a given fault type is considered to be realis-
tic for processors in a distributed system, the respective algorithm can be 
used to reach agreement. The algorithms presented here have been 
designed with one processor among n processors being designated as the 
sender. Extending these algorithms into agreement protocols where every 
processor can be a sender is a straightforward task. 
In practical systems, a processor may be designed to have well-defined 
failure modes. For example, a fail-stop processor in [Schne84], is designed to 
restrict the failures to omission failures that are permanent and consistent. 
In designing processors with well-defined failure modes, the family of algo-
rithms presented here illustrates any advantages, or lack of them, in choos-
ing one particular failure type against another. For example, a choice of 
consistent timing failure type against timing failure type renders no 
simplification in the task of reaching agreement. However, the algorithms 
for overloaded processors indicate that agreement can be reached in a less 
complex manner (in at most two rounds, irrespective of f), if it can be 
guaranteed that processor overloading is the only consistent timing fault 
that can occur and that assumptions al and a2 can be realised. 
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Solving the agreement problem under different fault conditions, illus-
trating the relative complexities of various algorithms, and developing a 
generic algorithm are thus the main contributions of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EARLY STOPPING AGREEMENT ALGORITHMS UNDER 
OMISSION AND TIMING FAULT TYPES 
4.1. Introduction 
The agreement algorithms presented in the previous chapter were 
developed in the context of sender's broadcast time not known to receiver 
processors a priori. Algorithms tolerant of timing faults and omission faults 
require at most f + 1 rounds of message exchange between processors to 
tolerate at most f faulty processors. In some executions of these algorithms, 
a non-faulty receiver processor was observed to be able to decide on the 
sender's value in less than f+1 rounds of message exchange between proces-
sors. During an execution, all non-faulty receiver processors decide on the 
sender's value in the first round when the sender is non-faulty, and decide 
before the (f + l)th round when the sender and fewer than (f -1) receiver pro-
cessors fail. 
Dolev, Reischuk, and Strong [Dolev82al were the first ones to investi-
gate agreement algorithms whose execution can terminate taking fewer 
than the maximum number of rounds of message exchange required by the 
algorithms. They came up with two types of agreement that can be reached: 
immediate and eventual. This classification led the authors to the following 
definition of early stopping: an agreement algorithm tolerant of at most f 
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distinct processor failures is said to exhibit early stopping if all non-faulty 
processors are guaranteed to reach agreement in strictly less than the max-
imum number of rounds accommodated by the algorithm in all executions in 
which m, m < f, distinct processors fail. That is, every execution of an early 
stopping algorithm will guarantee early agreement, if the number of actu-
ally failed processors is less than the maximum expected. 
In this chapter, we develop early stopping agreement algorithms under 
omission and timing fault types and in the context of sender's broadcast 
time being known to receiver processors a priori. When receiver processors 
know the sender's broadcast time beforehand, non-faulty receiver processors 
will be required to reach some decision, even when the sender fails to carry 
out the broadcast. Therefore, in the context of sender's broadcast time 
already being known to receiver processors, the omission fault tolerant, and 
timing fault tolerant algorithms of chapter 3 cannot guarantee agreement 
in less than (f+1) rounds, when the actual number of faulty processors, m, is 
less than f. (Consider an execution in which the sender that is to send its 
value at some known time fails by sending no message to any processor. 
Non-faulty receiver processors will come to know that the sender did not 
broadcast its message, only at the end of the (f+1)th round, even if no 
receiver processor is faulty.) The problem of reaching agreement in the 
chosen context is described below: 
A distributed system is considered to be made up of n, n > 1, poten-
tially faulty processors that are capable of communicating with each other 
only by message passing. It is assumed that the communication medium is 
fault free and that faults occur only in processors. At most f, f~n -2, pro-
cessors can be faulty. Any non-faulty processor cannot, however, ascertain 
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which other processors are faulty. Among these n processors in the system, 
one processor is designated as the sender and the others as receiver proces-
sors. The sender is to choose a value from many potential values and send it 
to all receiver processors at some time that is already known to all proces-
sors in the system. Agreement on the sender's value will be said to have 
reached, if 
C1: all non-faulty receiver processors decide on the same value (unanimity); 
and, 
C2: if the sender is non-faulty, all non-faulty receiver processors agree on 
the value the sender chose to send (validity). 
In [Dolev82a], early stopping algorithms have been developed for 
Byzantine faulty processors capable of exhibiting arbitrary behaviour. In 
this chapter, we develop and present early stopping algorithms for omission 
and timing types of faults in processors. Under omission fault types, we will 
consider permanent omission faults (which cause a processor to stop func-
tioning) and omission faults. Under timing fault types, we will consider 
timing faults and a particular case where overloaded processors fail in a 
consistently late timing manner. As in chapter 3, a known bound on mes-
sage communication delays will be assumed and non-faulty receiver proces-
sors will reach agreement in a known and bounded time interval. Our per-
manent omission fault tolerant, and omission fault tolerant algorithms are 
found to be faster than those presented in [Hadzi84, Lampo84]. The timing 
fault tolerant algorithm and the consistently late timing fault tolerant algo-
rithm are revised versions of algorithms presented in [Ezhil87, Ezhil86]. 
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The algorithms presented here are developed with one processor being 
designated as the sender and other processors as receiver processors. Modi-
fying these algorithms to the general context of every processor in the sys-
tem being a sender and sending a value to all other processors is straight-
forward. An area of application for early stopping agreement algorithms 
will be distributed transaction commit where non-faulty processes on 
different sites have to agree unaniml)usly on a commit or abort decision on 
the results of a transaction. These algorithms will enable the processes to 
reach agreement as quickly as possible with each non-faulty process know-
ing the time by which all other non-faulty ones will have reached the deci-
sion it has reached. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: The next section 
explains the assumptions involved in the design of the algorithms and the 
notations used in the presentation. Sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 respec-
tively describe, and establish the correctness of, the permanent omission 
fault tolerant, the omission fault tolerant, the timing fault tolerant, and the 
consistently late timing fault tolerant algorithms. In each of these four sec-
tions, important observations about the respective algorithm are presented. 
In the development of consistently late timing fault tolerant algorithm, the 
assumptions presented in section 4.2 are weakened and the modified ver-
sions are stated before presenting the algorithm. Section 4.7 concludes the 
chapter. 
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4.2. Assumptions and Notations 
We make two major assumptions m the design of our algorithms. 
These assumptions are identical to assumptions A1 and A3 of chapter 3 and 
are restated here for the sake of completeness. 
Assumption AI: 
At any given instant of real time, the observable difference between 
clock readings of any two non-faulty processors will be at most e. 
A1 can be satisfied, when processors periodically execute some clock 
synchronisation algorithm such as [Crist86]. The term non-faulty in A1 is 
not necessary, when permanent omission faults and omission faults are con-
sidered for processors, since under these fault models, a processor fails only 
by not producing an expected response. 
Assumption A2: 
If, at time T, an event occurs in a non-faulty processor p and causes a 
message to be formed and sent to another non-faulty processor q, then that 
message will be received in q at time Tr, T S Tr < T + d, for some d, d > 
0, where time is measured according to either processor's clock. 
The assumptions underlying A2 are: non-faulty processors are reliably 
connected; d is fixed by considering the processing time taken when the 
occurrence of an event requires a processor to decide on sending messages, 
message routing and transmission in the communication medium. 
Based on A1 and A2, the following can be stated: 
If an event occurs in a non-faulty processor p at time T according to p's 
clock and causes a message to be formed and sent by p to another non-faulty 
processor q, then the message will be received in q at time Tr, T - e S Tr < 
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T + d +e, according to q's clock. 
When processors are considered to have only permanent omission faults 
or omission faults, the term non-faulty is not necessary in A2. However, 
these assumptions need not be true for processors with consistent timing or 
timing faults. Under consistent timing fault assumptions, A1 will be 
extended to include even faulty (overloaded) processors. The assumptions in 
the design of consistently late timing fault tolerant algorithm are similar to, 
but weaker than, A1 and A2, and will be presented in section 4.6. 
Without assumptions A1 and A2, a processor cannot decide whether a 
message has not been sent at all, or is yet to be sent by another processor. 
With processors not being able to solve this ambiguity, deterministic agree-
ment algorithms cannot be designed [Fisch83b]. 
We explain a few notations that are frequently used in latter sections. 
The sender processor is denoted by s and its value to be broadcast to all 
receiver processors will be denoted by V. To is the clock time when the 
sender has to broadcast its value, V. (To is known to all receiver processors.) 
A processor denotes the set of all other processors in the system by P. N, F and 
S are any three subsets of P. 
The messages exchanged by processors during an execution of an agree-
ment algorithm are denoted by 'msg(v,i)' explicitly expressing two important 
items of their contents: v, the value a given message intends to deliver to a 
processor that receives it and i, an integer, is used to identify a given mes-
sage to group it with other relevant messages. 
In all the four types of faults concerned, a faulty sender does not fail by 
broadcasting different non-null values to different receiver processors and a 
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faulty receiver processor does not fail by trying to alter the contents of the 
message it relays. Hence the receiver processors, in any execution of the 
algorithms, have to decide either to agree on V or to conclude that the 
sender has failed to broadcast its value. We call the latter situation decid-
ing on the 'default' value as the sender's value. 
In presenting, and proving the correctness of, the algorithms, we make 
the following assumptions: a receiver processor has a "receive-buffer" that 
contains the messages received from other processors, and an object "clock" 
that represents its synchronised clock; a clock function 'get' will return the 
current clock value. A receiver processor is assumed to be able to establish 
the identity of the processor that sent the message it receives. It is also 
assumed to execute the statements of an algorithm in zero time. The last 
assumption will require an increase on the value of d to incorporate execu-
tion time overheads. 
4.3. Permanent Omission Fault Tolerant Algorithm 
A description of the early stopping algorithm tolerant of permanent 
omission faults is as follows. 
In any execution of the algorithm, the sender processor, at its clock 
time To, is to broadcast its message msg(V,O) containing value V to all 
receiver processors. Each receiver processor waits for a message that con-
tains a value to be decided on - i.e. either for a message msg(v=V,i) for 
some i, 0 sis f, or msg(v=default, i) for some i, 3 sis f. (The reason for 
the lower bound of 3 will soon become obvious.) On receiving such a mes-
sage it decides on the value contained in the message and stops after 
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broadcasting msg(v,i + 1) to other processors, if i < f. When such a message 
is not received, the processor continues to wait; while waiting, it executes 
the following steps: 
81 When the clock reads To + id +e for i ~ 1, it broadcasts to all other 
receiver processors a message msg('?',i) meaning "are you decided?" 
The set F" for any i, i ~ 1, will contain processors that have been 
observed, at time To +id+e, to have failed. For i = 1 or 2, the set F, 
will be formed to contain only the sender. 
82 Whenever it receives a message msg('?', j), for some positive integer j, it 
replies to the sender of msg('?', j) by sending a message msg('X', j + 1) 
meaning "I have not yet decided". 
83 When its clock reads To + id +e, for i, i ~ 3, it collects those receiver 
processors that replied by sending msg('X',(i-1)) in response to its mes-
sage msg('?',(i-2)) into a set N and computes the set Fi = P-N. 
84 If IFd s i-2 or IFd = IF(i-2)1, it decides on the default value and stops 
after broadcasting msg(v = default, i) to all receiver processors. (The 
smallest value of i in a msg(default, i) is 3.) 
If a processor cannot decide either by receiving a message containing 
another processor's decision or by computing appropriate F's until its clock 
reads To + (f+l)d+e, it decides on the default value and stops the execu-
tion. 
The different steps executed by a receiver processor are effectively com-
bined in the following presentation of the algorithm in figure 4.1. 
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sender: 
begin 
wait clock.get = To; 
broadcast(msg(V ,0» 
end. 
recei ver-processor: 
i, j:integer; 
begin 
1a) 
1b) 
2a) 
2b) 
3a) 
3b) 
i: = 1; 
wait clock.get = To -e; 
flush receive-buffer; 
cycle 
while clock.get < To + i(d +e) 
do 
if (msg(v = V or default, j) in receive-buffer) then 
begin decide(v); if (j < f) then broadcast(msg(v,(j + 1»; stop 
end; 
if (msg('?', j) in receive-buffer) then 
reply(msg('X',(j + 1», msg('?', j» 
od; 
if (3 :s; i:s; f) then 
begin N: = {processors whose msg('X',(i-1» in receive-buffer}; 
Fi:= P-N; 
if ( IFd :s; (i-2) or IFd = IF(i-2)1 ) then 
begin decide(default); 
broadcast(msg(default,i); stop 
end 
end; 
if (i :s; 2 and i :s; (f-2) then F, = {s}; 
ifi = (f+l) then 
begin decide(default); stop 
end; 
if i :s; (f - 2) then broadcast(msg('?' ,i»; 
i := i+1 
endcycle 
end. 
Figure 4.1. The Permanent Omission Fault Tolerant Algorithm. 
- 108 -
Explanation 
By executing the algorithm, the sender broadcasts its value to all 
receiver processors at its clock time To and each receiver processor, after ini-
tialising the variable i and emptying the receive-buffer, starts receiving 
messages msg(v, j ;:::0) at its clock time To-e. In the first block of statements 
[from 1a to 1b], if a received message has v=V or v=default, decision is 
made on v; the execution is terminated by executing the "stop" statement 
after broadcasting msg(v, (j + 1», if j < f. Note that j = f (j > f) would mean 
that the value of the message received has been relayed by (at least) f pro-
cessors apart from the sender. Therefore, such a message need not be, and 
is not, relayed any further. If a received message is msg(v='?', j), then the 
statement "reply(msg('X', (j + 1», msg('?', j»" is executed to send a reply mes-
sage, msg('X', (j + 1», to the processor from which msg('?', j) has been 
received. Appropriate mechanisms are assumed to have been implemented 
to avoid replying to the same processor more than once for a given value of j 
in msg('?', j). 
In the second block of statements [from 2a to 2b], attempts are made at 
early stopping the execution for i, 3 :s i :S f. The set Fi, for i = 1 or 2, is 
formed to contain only the sender, if i:s (f - 2) i.e., (i + 2) :S f. An early stop-
ping of the execution is not possible at clock time To + id +e, for i = 1 or 2, 
and the Fi's formed at these clock time instants will not be needed at 
To + (i + 2)d +e, if (i + 2) > f, since the execution is going to be terminated at 
clock time To + (f+l)d+e. The third block of statements [from 3a to 3b] 
leads to termination of the execution in the worst case of the execution not 
having been terminated either by reception of a message with v = V or 
default or by computing appropriate Fi's. 
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If a receiver processor, following its activities at its clock time 
To + id+e, 3 sis f, has not decided, it broadcasts msg('?', i), if i s (f-2), 
and continues the execution by incrementing the value of i. For i > (f - 2), 
msg('?', i) need not be broadcast, since the corresponding reply messages, if 
any, can only be guaranteed to be received after clock time To + fd +e at 
which time any attempt for early stopping would be of little use. 
4.3.1. Correctness of the Algorithm 
The algorithm is shown to be correct by establishing a series of lemmas. 
From here on, Ti is used to denote To + id + e, for i, i ~ 1. 
Lemma 4.1 
Let p be an undecided non-faulty processor that computes F" for some i, 
i~3, at its clock time Ti. Any processor that is an element of Fi must have 
halted functioning at some time T, T < T(i-l), according to p's clock. 
Proof 
Throughout this proof, we measure time according to p's clock. The F, 
of p contains the sender processor which has obviously halted at some time 
T, T s To + e < T" i~1. For every i, i~3, the undecided non-faulty proces-
sor p broadcasts a message, msg('?',(i-2)), to all receiver processors at time 
T(i-2). By assumption A2, p's message msg('?',(i-2)) can be received by any 
other receiver processor at some time Tr, Tr < T(i-l) and the reply message 
msg('X',(i-l)), if sent, must be received by p before Ti. If any receiver proces-
sor in Fi had decided and stopped the execution without any failure by Tr, 
then p must have decided by Ti. But P is undecided. So, every processor in F, 
must have failed and halted by Tr. Hence the lemma. 
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Lemma 4.2 
Let p be an undecided non-faulty processor that computes Fi at its clock 
time Ti, L:::3. Any processor that is not in p's Fi must have remained unde-
cided at time T, TST(i-2), according to p's clock. 
Proof 
The lemma is obviously true for p which will not be in its Fi. Any other 
receiver processor that is not in p's Fi would have replied to p's message 
msg('?',(i-2)), only if it has been undecided at the time p's message was 
received. The p's message can be received by any other receiver processor, 
due to A2, at time Tr, T(i-2) :5 Tr < T(i-l), according to p's clock. Hence the 
lemma. 
Remark 
The proof of this lemma makes use of two facts: a processor does not 
suffer any undue delay in replying to msg('?', j;::: 1) and does not produce 
messages containing incorrect information (such as indicating undecided-
ness when it is indeed decided). So, the above lemma will also hold true 
under omission fault assumptions. 
Lemma 4.3 
If an undecided non-faulty processor p finds \Fd = \F(t-2)1 at time Ti, 
according to its clock, for some i, i;:::3, then no non-faulty processor could 
have decided, and can ever decide, on V. 
- 111 -
Proof 
Throughout this proof, it is supposed that p's clock will be used to meas-
ure time. Under permanent omission fault assumptions, a processor, on fail-
ing, halts for ever. Therefore, any Fi will be a subset of Fj for j, j > i ~ 1 
and if IFd = IFjl, then F, = FJ • According to the algorithm, p will have Fl = 
F2 = {s}. The condition that IF31 = IFtl would imply that F3 = {s}. This 
would mean that all receiver processors had, by lemma 4.2, remained unde-
cided, when p's clock read Tl. Hence the sender must not have sent its mes-
sage (by assumptions Al and A2). Hence the lemma is true for i = 3. With 
similar reasoning, the lemma can be shown to be true for i = 4, though this 
situation can never occur, since the execution would be stopped for i = 3 
itself. 
We prove the lemma for i, i~5, by first showing that any processor, say 
q, that is in F(i-21 could not have sent a decision message containing either 
V or the default value to any processor, say r, that is not in F(i-21. Since q is 
in F(i-21, by lemma 4.1, it must have failed and halted at T, T < T(i-31. 
Assume that q has sent a decision message to r, before halting, that is 
before T(i-3). That message will be received by r before T+d, T+d < T(i-21. 
If r had been functioning until T(i-2), p should receive r's message and decide 
by T(i-l); but p is undecided at T(i-t). If, on the other hand, r had failed 
before T(i-2l, then it would not have sent msg('X', i-I) in reply to p's msg('?', 
i-2); this means that r must have been counted in p's F,. But Fi = F(i-21. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that q sent a message to r before T(i-31 cannot be 
true. 
So, no processor in F(i-2) could have sent any message containing either 
V or the default value to any processor in P-F(i-21 at any time before T(i-3) 
and, by lemma 4.2, all processors in P-F(i-2), P-F(i-21 = P-Fi, must have 
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remained undecided at T(i-4) and until T(i-2). An undecided receiver proces-
sor can decide on V only by receiving a message containing V. Therefore, 
no processor in p's P-Fi can ever decide on V. A non-faulty receiver proces-
sor could not have decided on V before T(i-4), since p was undecided at T(i-3). 
Hence the Lemma. 
Lemma 4.4 
If a non-faulty undecided processor p finds IFd :5 (i-2) at its clock T" for 
some i, i ~ 3, then no non-faulty processor could have decided, and can ever 
decide, on V. 
Proof 
When a receiver processor receives a message msg(V, j), j ~ 1, that mes-
sage must have been sequentially relayed by j distinct receiver processors 
after being sent by the sender. Under permanent omission (also omission) 
fault assumptions, faulty processors do not introduce any undue delay in 
relaying a received message. Therefore, by Al and A2, when the clock of 
any non-faulty processor reads a value greater than or equal to T(j+l), j ~ 1, 
no undecided processor can receive a message msg(V, j). By lemma 4.2, all 
processors in P-Fi must have remained undecided at p's clock time T, T :5 
T(i-2). These processors can decide on V only by receiving a message con-
taining V. If any processor in P-Fi is to receive msg(V, j), then that message 
has to come through processors in Fi (which also includes the sender) such 
that j :5 IFd -1. But p finds IFd :5 (i-2). This means j :5 i-3. Therefore, no 
processor in P-F, can receive msg(V, j:5i-3), and can therefore decide on V, 
after p's clock time T(i-2). Hence the Lemma. 
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Lemma 4.5 
When a non"-faulty processor decides on the default value, no other 
non-faulty processor could have decided, and can ever decide, on V. 
Proof 
If a non-faulty processor can decide on the default value because either 
of the following conditions IF.! s (i-2) or IFd = IF(i-2ll has come true for some 
appropriate i, then, by lemma 4.3 or by lemma 4.4, the above lemma is true. 
Alternatively, a non-faulty processor can decide on the default value by 
receiving a message containing the default value from another receiver pro-
cessor. Under permanent omission (also omission) fault assumptions, any 
response of a processor will be correct. Hence the other processor, while 
deciding on the default value, must have functioned like a non-faulty pro-
cessor, correctly making, and broadcasting, the decision on the default 
value. Hence the lemma. 
Theorem 4.1 
In any execution of the algorithm, every non-faulty receiver processor 
reaches agreement on the sender's value in the presence of m, mSf, distinct 
processors out of n processors suffering permanent omission faults, and stops 
the execution not later than To + min{(m +2)d +e, (f+l)d +e} according to its 
clock after transmitting a total of O(nm) messages, where To is the sender's 
clock time of the broadcast. 
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Proof 
Consider an execution of the algorithm. If the sender is non-faulty, 
every non-faulty receiver processor would receive the sender's message by 
To+d +e according to its clock, due to assumptions Al and A2. Hence the 
validity condition is realised. If the sender is faulty, it is impossible, by 
lemma 4.5, to have one non-faulty receiver processor deciding on V and 
another one deciding on the default value. Hence all non-faulty processors 
eventually decide either on V or on the default value. Thus the unanimity 
condition is met. 
Suppose that the sender is faulty and that all non-faulty receiver pro-
cessors decide on V. When a non-faulty receiver processor decides on V by 
receiving msg(V,i2:I), at least i distinct processors (including the sender) 
must have failed. Therefore, all non-faulty receiver processors decide on V 
before their clock time To + (m + l)d +e. 
Suppose that all non-faulty receiver processors decide on the default 
value. Consider a non-faulty receiver processor that has IFd :s; (i-2) at its 
clock time To + id+e, 3 :s; i :s; f. When i=3, the sender is faulty; if i>3, 
the processor must have had IF(i-ol > (i-I) - 2, at its clock time To + (i-
I)d+e; thus it stops the execution at its clock time To + id+e, i :s; IF(,-ol + 
2 :s; m + 2. Thus, when a non-faulty receiver processor has IFd :s; (i-2), it 
stops the execution not later than its clock time To+(m+2)d+e. If it ever has 
IFi-21 = !Pd, it will stop the execution earlier than the time it would have 
stopped the execution, if it were to stop only by having !Pd :s; (i-2). 
Consider a non-faulty receiver processor that decides by receiving a message 
containing the default value before its clock time To +id+e, i :s; f+l. If 
i2:4, the processor must have had IF(i-ui > (i-I) - 2 at its clock time To + (i-
I)d +e; thus, it decides before its clock time To + id +e, i :s; IF(i-ol + 2 :s; 
m + 2; if i:s; 3, then some receiver processor must have had F3 containing only 
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the sender and therefore the sender must be faulty. Thus, when a non-
faulty receiver processor receives a message containing the default value, it 
stops the execution not later than its clock time To + (m +2)d +e. 
When a non-faulty receiver processor decides on the default value at its 
clock time To + (f+l)d+e, it must have had IFrl>f-2. This implies that 
m > f-2, and the processor stops the execution at its clock time 
To + (f+l)d+e. Therefore, every non-faulty processor reaches agreement not 
later than its clock time To+min{(m+2)d+e, (f+l)d+e}. 
During an execution of the algorithm, a receiver processor is to broad-
cast either msg('?',i) or msg(V or default, i) to all other receiver processors at 
its clock reading To+id+e, i;:::l, until a decision for agreement is reached. 
By this way, it broadcasts at most (n -2)(min{m +2,f}) messages. Also, it has 
to reply at most i(n-2) messages of the form msg('X',i) before Ti, i;:::l, until 
it stops. Hence it broadcasts a total of O(nm) messages. Hence the theorem. 
In the following, we make two observations about the algorithm. The first 
one concerns early stopping conditions used and the second one illustrates 
that this algorithm will not work in the presence of omission faults. 
Observations 
1. Early stopping conditions. 
The above algorithm employs two early stopping rules: (i) IF" S (i-2) 
and, (ii) IFd = IF(i-2>1. Satisfying either condition leads to stopping the exe-
cution early. The first stopping rule verifies whether the size of F computed 
for every given i, i ;::: 3, is sufficiently small to decide on the default value. 
Therefore, during an execution, the smaller is the number of failed proces-
sors, the more quickly it is to be satisfied. 
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The second rule works by relating the size of F computed for a given 
value of i to that for (i-2), i ~ 3. Hence, satisfying the second rule in an exe-
cution would require the number of failed processors to remain constant 
over a period of time i.e. no functioning processor should be observed to 
have failed during a given period of time. Therefore, during an execution, 
the sooner the faulty processors fail, the more quickly the second rule 
remains to be satisfied. In other words, if all faulty processors fail before 
To + id +e, i > 0, according to a nonfaulty processor's clock, then the proces-
sor will stop the execution, by the second rule, not later than To+ (i+4)d+e, 
irrespective of the actual number of failed processors. To illustrate this, 
consider an execution with the following characteristics: exactly five proces-
sors (including the sender), named s, w, x, y, and z, fail; p is a non-faulty 
receiver processor and f> >6. 
Let the time be measured according to p's clock and Ti = To+id+e, 
i > O. In the execution, let s fail before To without broadcasting its value 
and the other four receiver processors fail before Tl. The processor p will 
now compute all the five faulty processors in F3, F4, and Fs respectively at 
T3, T4, and Ts. Hence, by the second rule, it stops the execution at Ts. If it 
were to stop by the first rule only, it should have stopped at T7. If some of 
the faulty receiver processors, say, y and z, fail after Tl and before T2, then, 
by the second rule, p will stop the execution not later than Ts with all the 
five faulty ones guaranteed to be computed in F4, Fs, and Fs respectively at 
T4, Ts, and Ts. 
Under permanent omission assumptions, a failed processor halts func-
tioning for ever. In practical systems, it may often be the case that some 
processors have failed before the execution and no processor fails during the 
execution of the algorithm. In such cases, when n > f> >4, the effect of the 
second stopping rule is more significant in bringing the execution to an 
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earlier stop (at Ts of respective non-faulty processor's clock), irrespective of 
the number of processors that have halted functioning before the execution 
started. 
2. The algorithm and omission faults. 
In an execution of the above algorithm, processors are not guaranteed 
to reach agreement in the presence of omission faults. 
Let us consider an execution in which q is another non-faulty processor 
in the context characterised in the previous observation. Let the five faulty 
processors, in this execution, fail before To, suffering omission faults and not 
reply to messages msg('?' ,i) of p and q at all. Let the sender's message be 
transmitted from s only to w, from w only to x, from x only to y, from yonly 
to Z, and from Z only to q. Let q receive the message before its clock is to 
read Ts. If p does not receive q's message before its clock reads T5, it will 
decide on the default value. So the agreement is not reached. 
4.4. Omission Fault Tolerant Algorithm 
It has been observed that the previous algorithm cannot be guaranteed 
to work in the presence of omission faults. A closer look into the early stop-
ping conditions employed in the previous algorithm will reveal that only the 
early stopping condition, !Fd = !Fu-zll, makes use of the permanent omission 
feature. The other one, IFd s (i-2), works by recognising the situation in 
which the number of processors that did not respond at some time Ti, i2! 1, 
during the execution, becomes so small and Ti is so late that no undecided 
processor will ever be able to receive a message from the failed ones. Thus, 
it can work in the presence of omission faults in processors. So the agree-
ment algorithm for the omission fault type can be derived from the previous 
algorithm by simply removing the early stopping condition IFi 1= IF(i-2ll· But 
for this, the omission fault tolerant algorithm is no different from the 
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previous one; in the following, the part of the algorithm containing the only 
appropriate early· condition is presented: 
2a) 
2b) 
if (3 :5 i:5 f) then 
begin N; = {processors whose msg(,X',(i-l» in receive-buffer}; 
F,;= P-N; 
end; 
if ( IFd :5 (i-2» 
begin decide(default); 
broadcast(msg(default,i»; stop 
end 
if (i :5 2 and i :5 (f-2» then Ft = {s}; 
4.4.1. Correctness of the Algorithm 
Theorem 4.2 
In any execution of the algorithm, every non-faulty receiver processor 
reaches agreement on the sender's value in the presence of m, m :5f, distinct 
processors out of n processors suffering omission faults, and stops the execu-
tion not later than To + min{(m+2)d+e, (f+l)d+e} time according to its 
clock after transmitting a total of O(nm) messages, where To is the sender's 
clock time of the broadcast. 
Proof 
It has been observed that lemma 4.2 and lemma 4.4 are true under 
omission fault type as well. When "IF" :5 (i-2)" is the only early stopping 
condition in the algorithm, Lemma 4.5 will also be true for the omission 
fault tolerant algorithm. In the proof of theorem 4.1, only the early stop-
ping condition "1Ft! :5 (i-2)" is used to establish that a non-faulty receiver 
processor decides on the default value not later than its clock time To + 
min{(m+2)d+e, (f+l)d+e}. Thus, by theorem 4.1, the above theorem will be 
true. 
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In the following, we make two observations about the above algorithm. 
Observations 
3. Fastness of the algorithm. 
For the same m failures of respective types, the permanent omission 
fault tolerant algorithm will be either as fast as or faster than the above 
algorithm. 
Given the same m failures of respective types, the executions of both 
the algorithms are to stop as early as min{(m+2)d+e,(f+lld+e} after the 
start of the execution. The observation 1 illustrates that it is sometimes 
possible for the execution of the permanent omission fault tolerant algo-
rithm to be stopped, due to the condition IF.! = lFu-2>1 becoming true, earlier 
than it would have stopped, if it were to stop by the other condition. Thus, 
in some execution scenarios, the previous algorithm can be faster than the 
above one, for the same m failures of respective types. 
Remark: 
From the above observation, it can be noted that the permanent omis-
sion fault tolerant algorithm has been developed by making use of the spe-
cial features of permanent omission faults over omission faults. 
4. The algorithm and timing faults. 
The above algorithm is not tolerant of timing faults. 
The correctness of the above algorithm is based on the results of the 
lemma 4.4 in which it is stated that no processor can receive msg(v, j~O) 
when, or after, the clock of any non-faulty processor has read To + 
(j + l)d +e. Under the assumptions of timing faults, a faulty processor can be 
untimely in transmitting/relaying its messages. Therefore, the above state-
ment, hence the lemma 4.4, will no longer hold true under timing fault 
- 120 -
assumptions for processors. 
4.5. Timing Fault Tolerant Algorithm 
Since a faulty processor can fail by sending untimely messages, the 
messages received during an execution of the algorithm should be checked 
for timeliness and only the timely messages should be accepted by proces-
sors. Unlike in previous algorithms, a receiver processor will decide on the 
default value to stop the execution early, only by having the early stopping 
condition becoming true and not by receiving a message containing default 
decision of another processor. Upon receiving a timely message with the 
default value, a processor will only conclude that the processor that sent the 
message has stopped the execution of the algorithm. The reasons for this 
are as follows: a faulty processor may not have its clock in bounded syn-
chronism as required by AI; therefore, during an execution, when a faulty 
receiver processor has its early stopping condition satisfied, a non-faulty 
receiver processor may be deciding on V. Due to this, any receiver processor 
should not decide on the default value just by receiving a message with the 
default value; however, it can conclude that the processor that has sent the 
message with the default value has stopped the execution. The algorithm 
is described below: 
The receiver processors, while executing the algorithm, exchange mes-
sages in synchronised phases that are of uniform length (d +e). With the 
sender processor broadcasting its message msg(V,O) at its clock time To, 
each receiver processor looks for a message, msg(V,i-L::O) or msg(default, i-
1>0) to be received between To+(i-l)(d+e)-e and To + i(d+e) according to 
its clock. On having received a msg(V,i-l), it decides on V at its clock time 
To+i(d +e) and stops after broadcasting msg(V, i) if i ::; f. If the processor is 
undecided at its clock time To + i(d +e), then, it continues to execute the 
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algorithm by broadcasting msg('X', i) when i = 1 or by carrying out the fol-
lowing steps when i > 1. 
81: if i=f+l, it decides on the default value and stops the execution; 
otherwise it executes 82 to 85. 
82: it puts those processors, if any, from which msg(default, i-I) has 
been received at clock time T, To + (i-l)(d+e)-e s T < To + i(d+e), into the 
set 8 which will contain the set of all processors that are known to have 
stopped the execution; 
83: it collects those processors whose msg('X', i-I) has been received at 
clock time T, To + (i-l)(d+e)-e s T < To + i(d+e), into the set N and com-
putes Ft, F. = P-N-8; 
84: if IF.! is less than i, then a default decision is made, a msg(default, i) 
is broadcast if i < f, and the execution is stopped; 
85: if IF.! is not less than i and if i <f, a message msg('X',i) is broadcast. 
In the following presentation of the algorithm, a non-faulty processor is 
assumed to be capable of establishing the time of reception for every mes-
sage that is in its receive-buffer. 
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sender: 
begin 
wait clock. get = To; 
broadcast(msg(V,O)) 
end. 
receiver-processor: 
i: integer; 
M: set-of-messages; S: set-of-processors; 
begin 
i:=I;S:={}; 
la) 
Ib) 
2a) 
2b) 
3a) 
3b) 
wait clock.get = To - e; 
flush receive-buffer; 
cycle 
wait clock. get = To + i(d +e); 
M: ={msg(v,(i-l» in receive-buffer and received at T, 
To+(i-l)(d+e)-e S T < To+i(d+e)}; 
if (msg(v = V,i-l) in M) then 
begin decide(V); 
if (i s f) then broadcast(msg(V,i»; stop 
end; 
if (2 sis f) then 
begin 
S: = S U {processors from which msg(default,(i-l» in M was received}; 
N: = {processors from which msg('X',(i-l» in M was received}; 
Fi:= P-N-S; 
if ClFd < i) then 
begin decide(default); 
if (i < f) then broadcast(msg(default,i»; stop 
end 
end; 
if (i = (f + 1) then 
begin decide(default); stop 
end; 
if (i < f) then broadcast(msg('X',i»; 
i:=i+ 1; 
endcycle 
end. 
Figure 4.2. The Timing Fault Tolerant Algorithm. 
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Explanation 
A receiver processor collects all timely messages in M at its clock time 
To + i(d+e), for i, 1 sis (f+l). In the first block of statements (1a to 1b), it 
attempts to decide on V and stop the execution. It executes the steps 82, 83, 
and 84 in the second block of statements. The processors whose messages 
containing the default value are in M, are added into, by "U" operator, the 
set 8 which is initially null. Thus the set 8 will contain all receiver proces-
sors that are known to have stopped the execution. 
If the receiver processor remains undecided until its clock time 
To+(f+l)(d+e), it decides on the default value and stops the execution in the 
third block of statements (step 81). A processor that could not decide at its 
clock time To + i(d +e), i s f, continues the execution by incrementing the 
value of i; it also broadcasts msg('X', i), if i < f. 
4.5.1. Correctness of the Algorithm 
In establishing the correctness of the algorithm, we let T, To + 
i(d+e), for i2:0. 
Theorem 4.3 
In any execution of the above algorithm, every non-faulty receiver pro-
cessor reaches agreement on the sender's value in the presence of m, m Sf, 
distinct processors out of n processors suffering timing faults, and stops the 
execution not later than To+(m+l)(d+e) according to its clock after 
transmitting a total of O(nm) messages, where To is the sender's clock time 
of the broadcast. 
- 124 -
Proof 
Consider an execution of the above algorithm. When the sender is non-
faulty, all non-faulty receiver processors receive msg(V,O) from the sender 
and stop the execution at Tl after taking, and broadcasting, the decision on 
V. Hence, the validity condition is met. 
Suppose that the sender is faulty. The unanimity condition is shown to 
be met by showing that in any execution of tile algorithm, it is not possible 
for one non-faulty processor to decide on the default value and another one 
on V. Consider an execution in which p is a non-faulty processor that 
decides on the default value. When p decides at its clock time T({+l), no 
other non-faulty processor can decide, or could have decided, on V, as there 
can be at most f faulty processors. Suppose that p decides on the default 
value at its clock time Ti, i < (f + 1), by having IFd < i where Fi = peN -So Fi 
contains processors that have failed to send either a timely message to indi-
cate their having stopped the execution or a timely message msg('X',i-l) 
indicating their undecidedness. The processors in S that have stopped the 
execution by broadcasting msg(default, j::::i-l) could not have, and will not, 
broadcast a message containing V. Faulty processors, under timing fault 
assumptions, do not fail by producing messages of incorrect information and 
will execute the algorithm correctly in value aspects. Therefore, any faulty 
processor in N must be undecided at the time of sending its msg('X', (i-I)) 
and will not accept any message msg(V, j <i-I) from that time onwards. As 
IFd is less than i, a processor in Fi cannot broadcast msg(V, j ~ i-I) and can, if 
at all, broadcast messages msg(V, j) only for j <i-l which will be ignored by 
processors in N. Therefore, no non-faulty processor in N can decide on V. 
The set S cannot contain any non-faulty processor that had decided on V, 
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otherwise p would not be computing Fi at its clock time T,. Thus, no non-
faulty processor could have decided, and can decide, on V, when p decides on 
the default value. 
Suppose that all non-faulty processors decide on V in an execution. 
When a non-faulty processor decides by accepting msg(V,i > 0), there must 
be at least i faulty processors and therefore it decides at or before its clock 
time T(rn+l). Suppose that a non-faulty processor decides in an execution on 
the default value at its clock time Ti, 2Sis(f+1). If i=2, the sender must 
have failed. If i is greater than 2, it must have had IF(i-d ~ (i-I) at its clock 
time Ti-l; otherwise it would have stopped the execution at T(i-ll itself. This 
means that i S (m +1). Thus, all non-faulty receiver processors reach agree-
ment no later than their clock time T(m+ll. 
It can be seen that a non-faulty receiver processor, during any execu-
tion, has to broadcast, until it stops, msg('X',lsi<f} or msg(v=default, 
2si<f) or msg(v=V, Isisf) to all other receiver processors at its clock time 
Ti, for every i, i>O. Hence the number of messages broadcast will be no 
more than (n - 2)(m + 1). Thus the theorem is proved. 
Observation 
For the same m, m >3, failures of respective types, the permanent omis-
sion fault tolerant, and omission fault tolerant, algorithms are faster than 
the above algorithm. 
Any execution of the above algorithm will be stopped as early as 
To+(m+1)(d+e) according to a non-faulty processor's clock. Whereas the 
execution of the previous two algorithms can be expected to stop by To + 
- 126 -
min{(m +2)d +e,(f+ l)d +e}. Dolev and Halpern [Dolev841 established that e 
would be at least as large as d/2. Assuming that e =d/2, the first two algo-
rithms can be seen to be faster than the third one, when m > 3. 
Remark 
The design of early stopping algorithms presented in [Lamp084, 
Hadzi841 is not effectively influenced by the no-untimely-response nature of 
permanent omission and omission failures. As a result, the permanent 
omission fault tolerant, and omission fault tolerant algorithms presented 
there turn out to be as slow as the timing fault tolerant algorithm presented 
here. 
4.6. Consistently Late Timing Fault Tolerant Algorithm 
This algorithm is developed by considering faulty processors to be over-
loaded processors which fail in consistently late timing manner. The 
assumptions A1 and A2 are modified to a1 and a2 respectively. 
4.6.1. Assumptions 
Assumption al,' 
At any given instant of real time, the observable difference between 
the clock readings of any two processors will be at most e. 
Assumption a1 requires the following: overloaded processors have non-
faulty clocks; and, the periodic execution of clock synchronisation algorithm 
in processors be carried out at a sufficiently low level using high priority 
messages so that the higher level processing loads have little impact on the 
execution of the algorithm. 
Assumption a2: 
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In A2, only non-faulty processors are assumed to be reliably connected. 
Here, we assume all processors are reliably connected by the communication 
network. The message communication delay between two non-faulty proces-
sors is assumed, as in A2, to be bounded by d: 
If, at time T, an event occurs in a non-faulty processor p and causes a 
message to be formed and broadcast, then a non-faulty processor q will 
receive it at time Tr, T :::; Tr < T + d - where time is measured according to 
any processor's clock. 
The message communication delay includes the skew interval (specified 
for replicated responses in section 2.3) and the bound d can be measured 
according to any processor's clock due to al. 
4.6.2. Development of the Algorithm 
The algorithm is developed by exploiting the fact that an overloaded 
processor's late timing failures are consistent and therefore the processor's 
broadcast messages will be skewed within the specified interval. Suppose 
that the sender suffers a late timing failure in broadcasting a message at its 
clock time To and that a non-faulty receiver processor, say, p receives the 
message at its clock time Tp. Since the sender's failure is consistent, any 
other receiver processor, say, q can potentially receive the sender's message 
at p's clock time T, such that ITp - TI < d. If q is non-faulty, it will receive 
the message at T; if it is overloaded, it may suffer an unduly long delay in 
receiving the message, thus T represents the earliest time q could ever 
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receive the message. 
Assuming, for a moment, that e = 0, we will refer to the diagram below. 
The three shaded bands represent three of many possible time intervals in 
which messages from an overloaded sender can be potentially received by 
receiver processors. They are of length at most d. The left window [To, To + 
d) is referred to as the acceptable time window during which the sender's 
message should be received to be regarded as timely. The interval [To, 
To + 2d) will be called the two-window time interval. 
left right 
I ////1//// 
I 
////11211 
11///3/// 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-----x--------x----------x------------ > time 
To To+d To+2d 
Referring to the above diagram, the following two properties can be 
stated: 
Property prj: 
If a non-faulty processor does not receive the sender's message during 
the two-window time interval, then no other processor will receive it during 
the acceptable time window. 
The first shaded interval (numbered 1 in the diagram) represents, and 
the second shaded interval can represent, a scenario where a non-faulty 
receiver processor does not receive the sender's message within the two-
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window time interval. 
Property pr2: 
If a non-faulty receiver processor receives the sender's message during 
the two-window time interval, [To, To+ 2d), then some receiver processor 
may well have received it during the acceptable time window. 
In the diagram, the third shaded interval represents, and the second 
shaded interval can represent, a scenario where a non-faulty receiver pro-
cessor receives the sender's message during the two-window time interval. 
When processors receive the message during the second shaded interval, no 
processor will have received the message during the acceptable time win-
dow. 
Accounting for non-zero e, the acceptable time window and the two-
window time interval in prl and pr2 can be redefined according to any 
processor's clock as [To - e,To + (d +e)) and [To - e,To + 2(d +e)) respectively. 
An execution of the algorithm presented here proceeds in rounds of 
message exchange between processors and at most f + 1 such rounds can take 
place. The sender's message initiates the first round. Any receiver processor 
that received the sender's message during the acceptable time window will 
relay the message at its clock time To+(d +e) and the relayed message will 
initiate the second round. For the message of the second round, properties 
prj and pr2 will be valid, with acceptable time window and two-window 
time interval defined by replacing To by To+(d +e). In general, if a receiver 
processor receives a timely message during the ith round, 1 s i Sf, and ini-
tiates the (i + l)th round at its clock time To + i(d +e), its message will 
satisfy the two properties, for all i < f, when acceptable time window and 
two-window time interval are defined respectively as [To + i(d +e) - e, 
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To+(i+1)(d+e» and [To+i(d+e)-e, To + (i+2)(d+e». Based on this, the 
algorithm is developed here to ensure that, in the presence of at most f dis-
tinct processor failures, all non-faulty receiver processors 
(i) decide on the default value, when all or some of them do not receive the 
sender's message during the two-window time interval; and 
(ii) decide either on the sender's value or on the default value, when all of 
them receive the sender's message during the two-window time interval. 
In (i), by prl, no receiver processor can receive a timely message from 
the sender and therefore every non-faulty receiver processor's decision has 
to be on the default value. In (ii), if, as implied by pr2, there is a receiver 
processor that has received the sender's message during the acceptable time 
window, then that receiver processor will be considered to play the role of 
the sender in the second round; thus, an execution of the algorithm can 
unfold until at most (f + 1) rounds are carried out. At the end of each round, 
attempts will be made by receiver processors, using property prJ, to decide 
on the default value: a processor's clock time reaching To + i(d+e), 2 sis 
f, marks the end of the acceptable time window for the ith round and the 
end of the two-window time interval for the (i-1)th round; a processor 
decides on the default value at its clock time Ti, if it has received neither an 
ith round message nor an (i-1)th round message. 
4.6.3. The Algorithm 
The sender processor broadcasts its message, msg(V,i=O), at its clock 
time To. The algorithm to be executed by a receiver processor can be under-
stood in three parts. In the first part, if a receiver processor receives 
msg(V,O) at its clock time T, To - esT < To + (d +e), it accepts the 
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message, decides on V, and stops after broadcasting msg(V,i = 1). If it does 
not receive msg(V,O) until its clock time To + (d +e), it continues to execute 
the algorithm. The second part of the algorithm describes the activities of 
such an undecided receiver processor from clock time To + (d +e) upto 
To + f(d +e). 
For all i, 2 :s i s (, an undecided receiver processor waits for either 
msg(V,i-1) (a timely message in the ith round) or msg(V,i-2) (a late broad-
cast which could have been timely for other processors in the (i-1)th round) 
to be received until its clock reads To + i(d +e). If rnsg(V,i-1) is received 
before To + i(d +e), then the processor decides on V and stops the execution 
after broadcasting msg(V,i). If it has not received any msg(V,i-1) until its 
clock time To + i(d +e), it can decide either to continue or to stop the execu-
tion: if it has ever received msg(V,i-2) at any time T, To + (i-
l)(d +e) s T < To + i(d +e), then it continues the execution; otherwise, it 
decides on the default value and stops the execution. 
When a receiver processor remains undecided by its clock time 
To + f(d+e), it executes the third part of the algorithm: if it receives 
msg(V,f) at clock time T, T < To + (f+l)(d+e), it decides on V and stops the 
execution; else it decides on the default value and stops the execution. 
The three parts of the algorithm executed by a receiver processor are 
effectively combined and presented in figure 4.3. 
sender: 
begin 
wait clock. get = To; 
broadcast(m s g( V, 0) ) 
end. 
receiver-processor: 
i: integer; 
begin 
i:= 1; 
wait clock.get = To - e; 
flush receive-buffer; 
cycle 
wait clock.get = To + i(d +e); 
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if (msg(V,i-1) in receive-buffer) then 
begin decide(V); 
if (i :5 f) then broadcast(msg(V,i)); 
stop 
end; 
if (2 :5 i :5 f) then 
if (msg(V,i-2) not in receive-buffer) then 
begin decide(default); stop 
end; 
if (i = f + 1) then 
begin decide(default); stop 
end; 
i:= i+l 
endcycle 
end. 
Figure 4.3. The Consistently Late Timing Fault Tolerant Algorithm. 
4.6.4. Correctness of the Algorithm 
Lemma 4.6 
In any execution of the algorithm, if the sender fails during its broad-
cast, then it is not possible for one non-faulty processor to decide on the 
default value and another non-faulty processor to decide on V. 
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Proof 
Throughout this proof, the clock time To+i(d +e) will be denoted as Ti, 
for 0 sis(f+l). Let p and q be any two non-faulty receiver processors in an 
execution of the algorithm in which the sender is overloaded. Let p decide 
on the default value at its clock time T, and i=(f+l). Since there can be at 
most f overloaded processors, q could not have decided on V during the exe-
cution by accepting a msg(V,isf). 
Suppose that p decides on the default value at Ti, 2 5 i 5 f. The 
lemma is shown to be correct by showing that it is not possible for q to 
decide on V during the execution. Processor p decides on the default value, 
if it does not receive either msg(V,i-2) or msg(V,i-l) at any time T < Ti for 
i, 2 5 i 5 f. Since p did not receive msg(V,i-l) until its clock time Ti, q 
could not have decided on V by its clock time Ti-l. The fact that p did not 
receive msg(V, i-2) until its clock time Ti implies that no processor could 
have received msg(V,i-2) before its clock time Ti-l. (This implication was 
stated as property prl). Assume, to the contrary, that a receiver processor, 
say, r, r ~ p, receives msg(V,i-2) at its clock time T, T < Ti-L. Since over-
loaded processors' timing failures are consistent, p must receive msg(V,i-2) 
before T + d according to r's clock. By aI, p should receive msg(V,i.2) before 
its clock time T+d+e, T+d+e < Ti. But P did not. Therefore, no receiver 
processor that was undecided at its clock time Ti-2 would receive a timely 
msg(V,i-2). Any overloaded processor that receives msg(V,i-2) after its clock 
time Ti-l will identify the message to be late, due to aI, and will subse-
quently ignore the message. Thus, no receiver processor that was undecided 
at its clock time Ti-2 will accept a msg(V,i-2) and therefore a message 
msg(V, j >i-2) will not be broadcast during the execution. So, if q is 
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undecided at its clock time Ti-2, it cannot decide on V later in the execution. 
Thus, it is not possible for q to decide, or to have decided, on V during the 
execution, when p decides on the default value at its clock time Ti, 2 :s; i :s; 
(f + 1). Hence the lemma. 
Theorem 4.4 
In any execution of the algorithm, every non-faulty receiver processor 
reaches agreement on the sender's value in the presence of m, m :S;f, 
distinct processors out of n processors suffering consistently late timing 
failures, and stops the execution by no later than 
To + min{(m + 2),(f + l)}<d +e) according to its clock after carrying out no 
more than one message broadcast, where To is the sender's clock time of 
the broadcast. 
Proof 
Consider an execution of the algorithm. If the sender is non-faulty, all 
non-faulty receiver processors receive the sender's message before clock time 
To + (d +e), due to assumptions a1 and a2. According to the algorithm, all of 
them decide on V and stop the execution after broadcasting a message to 
every other receiver processor. 
If the sender is overloaded, it is impossible, by lemma 4.6, to have one 
non-faulty receiver processor to decide on V and another one to decide on 
the default value. Hence all non-faulty processors eventually decide either 
on V or on the default value and thus reach agreement. 
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Suppose that all non-faulty processors decide on V. When a non-faulty 
processor decides on V by accepting a timely message msg(V,i::d), there 
must be at least i overloaded processors that have failed during the execu-
tion. Therefore, it decides on V no later than its clock time To + (m +l)(d +e). 
Suppose that all non-faulty processors decide on the default value in an 
execution. Let p be any non-faulty processor that decides at its clock time 
To + i(d+e), 2 s; i s; (f+l). When i=2, the sender must have failed. When 2 
< i s; (f+l), it must have received a late msg(V,i-3) before its clock time To 
+ (i-1)(d +e) (otherwise, it would have stopped the execution at its clock 
time To + (i-1)(d+e». A receiver processor broadcasts a message containing 
V only after receiving a message with V from another processor; it stops the 
execution after broadcasting a message with V. Therefore, (i-2) distinct pro-
cessors (including the sender) must have failed during the execution, for p to 
have received a late msg(V,i-3). Thus, p decides on the default value no 
later than its clock time To + min{(m+2)(d+e),(f+l)(d+e)}. 
When a non-faulty processor decides on V by accepting a message, 
msg(V,Os;i<f), it stops the execution after broadcasting a message contain-
ing V; when it decides on the default value, it simply stops the execution. 
Thus every non-faulty processor carries out no more than one message 
broadcast during an execution. Hence the theorem. 
Remark 
The total number of messages sent by processors in an execution of the 
algorithm is zero if the sender does not broadcast, and at most n(n -2) other-
wise; it is the smallest compared with the other three algorithms. Due to 
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this low number of messages exchanged, the message traffic in the network 
may be light resulting in a smaller value of d - the bound on message com-
munication delay between two non-faulty processors. If d is sufficiently 
small, for a given set of processors failing in an execution, the consistently 
late timing fault tolerant algorithm may turn out to be faster than the tim-
ing fault tolerant algorithm. When Byzantine faults were considered in 
[Dolev82al, O(m(t6 +nf2)+nf2) was the message complexity of the algorithm. 
4.7. Concluding Remarks 
Early stopping algorithms for reaching agreement in the presence of 
permanent omission, omission, timing, and consistently late timing faults 
have been presented. In the consistently late timing fault model, faulty pro-
cessors were considered to fail only due to processing loads and were 
assumed to have their clocks in bounded synchronism with non-faulty pro-
cessor clocks. We observed that the algorithm tolerant of permanent omis-
sion faults can sometimes be faster than the omission fault tolerant algo-
rithm, for the same number of failures of respective types. Since a per-
manent omission faulty processor fails by halting for ever, the earlier all 
faulty processors fail, the earlier the execution of the algorithm tends to 
stop. With omission fault assumptions, a processor, once failed, can later 
produce correct responses. So, stopping the execution of the omission fault 
tolerant algorithm gets delayed in direct proportion to the number of pro-
cessors that failed. We also observed that the omission fault tolerant algo-
rithm is faster than the algorithms tolerant of consistently late timing, and 
timing faults due to a timing faulty processor's failure of producing 
untimely responses. When failures are consistent, receiver processors need 
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to carry out no more than one message broadcast to reach agreement. The 
early stopping capabilities and message requirements of these algorithms 
reveal the fact that each algorithm has been designed by exploiting the dis-
tinct features that characterise the respective type of faults to be tolerated. 
This has been made possible by the fault classification developed in chapter 
2. We believe that the algorithms presented here make a significant contri-
bution to the area of early stopping algorithms for reaching agreement in 
distributed systems. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
5.1. Introduction 
The agreement algorithms presented in the previous two chapters have 
been designed with one processor in a distributed system being designated 
as the sender. Extending these algorithms into agreement protocols where 
every processor in the system can be a sender is a straightforward task. 
Agreement protocols can provide a fundamental service in systems with 
replicated processing. In this chapter we consider the problem of evaluating 
the performance of systems with replicated processing and majority voting. 
Performance evaluation of such systems taking into account of failure pro-
babilities, failure modes, overheads of agreement and order protocols, etc., is 
a challenging task. We present some initial steps in this direction by consid-
ering a special case - that of a pipeline system. This architecture consider-
ably simplifies the development of analytical models. We believe our tech-
niques can be extended to more general architectures. 
Replicated processing with majority voting - N modular redundant 
(NMR) processing - provides a powerful means of constructing highly reli-
able computing systems. A given computational task will be carried out con-
currently in N, N ~ 3, processing modules which fail independently of each 
other. The results produced by these modules will be subject to a majority 
vote to obtain the final result. A majority vote is possible and the final 
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result obtained will be correct, if at least majority of the processing modules 
are functioning correctly and if correctly functioning modules produce ident-
ical results. NMR processing is of particular relevance to real time systems 
requiring a very high degree of reliability for two reasons: (i) the capability 
of masking the effects of failures of processing modules by majority voting 
means that there need not be a sudden degradation in response times due to 
failures; and (ii) majority voters are capable of tolerating arbitrary 
behaviour of failed modules. 
A common form of NMR processing in practical systems is triple modu-
lar redundant processing (TMR processing) where three processors will be 
used to process the computational tasks concurrently. In this chapter we 
consider a distributed replicated system that is made up of a collection of 
TMR processing nodes connected in tandem. We present an analytical and 
simulation study of the performance of such a pipeline TMR system. In par-
ticular we examine the influence of majority voting times and processor 
failure rates on the response times of jobs processed by nodes in the system. 
No performance evaluations of distributed replicated systems have been 
reported in the literature, although single node systems have been 
evaluated [York83, Pitte89]. In [York83], the authors evaluate the impact 
of voting on throughput, both analytically and experimentally. In [Pitte89]' 
a TMR database system has been evaluated experimentally to examine its 
throughput. An algorithm is presented in [Abrah74] to evaluate the reliabil-
ity of a distributed system of TMR nodes connected in any arbitrary 
manner. An empirical study of the performance of such a system will be the 
topic of our future work and the work presented here for a pipeline TMR 
system will, we hope, serve as a step towards that. 
- 140 -
The type of system we are studying here is of practical interest. Special 
purpose multiple processor fault tolerant architectures with processors con-
nected in the form of pipelines, rings, two and multidimensional arrays are 
finding widespread applications in avionics, image processing and process 
control fields (e.g. [Theur86, Harpe88, Iacop89, NapoI89]). Thus there is 
every reason to evaluate the performance of such systems, examining in 
particular the impact of critical system parameters on the response times of 
jobs. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Some interesting features of repli-
cated processing systems are discussed in general terms in section 5.2. The 
factors which influence performance are mentioned there. The particular 
pipeline models that are considered for the purpose of performance evalua-
tion are described in section 5.3. Two evaluation methods are employed: 
analytical approximations and computer simulations. The analysis, which 
is quite simple but nevertheless effective, is presented in section 5.4. Section 
5.5 reports on a number of experiments where the models are simulated for 
different values of the parameters and the simulation results are compared 
to the analytical approximations. The latter are shown to be capable of 
predicting performance with sufficient degree of accuracy. Conclusions from 
this work are drawn in section 5.6. 
5.2. Distributed Replicated Processing Systems 
We start by considering a pipeline distributed processing system 
without replication. We assume that such a simplex system consists of a 
number of processors connected by a communication subsystem. Each pro-
cessor is capable of performing one or more system functions (for example, 
in an avionics system, such functions could be sensor related processing, 
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flight path related processing and so forth). The environment of the system 
consists of a set of initiators (the entities that demand services from the sys-
tem at arbitrary times). A service request from an initiator gives rise to a 
job which requires processing at the processors in sequence; at any time 
there could be several such requests being processed by the system. Suppose 
that a job requires processing at processors P l , P 2, .•• ,PN , in that order, 
before it completes. Then the end-to-end delay for that job - its sojourn time 
in the system - is composed of waiting and service at Plo followed by a 
transmission delay from P l to P 2 , etc., until service is completed at PN • A 
message passed from Pi to Pi+lo containing the relevant state information 
necessary for processing a job at Pi+lo will be termed a 'task message'. 
The replicated version of the above system is assumed to work as fol-
lows. Each system function will be performed by an ensemble of 3 proces-
sors. This ensemble of processors will become a triple modular redundant 
node, or TMR node for short. If at least two processors of a TMR node are 
functioning correctly and are producing identical results, then their results 
would constitute a majority. Subsequently, at most one processor failure 
can be tolerated within a node. 
Consider now the processing of a job in a replicated system where the 
nodes 1 to N are visited in that order. Each of the 3 processors in the first 
node receives a separate version of the job and works on it independently of 
the others. Those versions will be referred to as 'siblings'. When a sibling is 
completed by a processor, 3 copies of the resulting task message are sent to 
node 2. Thus, each processor in node i, Ci > 1), receives 3 messages from node 
i -1. These messages are majority voted by the voter process of the proces-
sor; if a majority can be formed, then the voted sibling is processed and 3 
copies of the task message are sent to node i + 1 (except in the case of the 
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last node, where a single task message is sent by each processor to a final 
voter). The structure of each processor within a node is shown in figure 5.1. 
voter process 
r--__ se.r~vi,e P'0=-f 
message pool voted msg pool 
Figure 5.1. Voting andjob processing at a processor ofa TMR node. 
Both the voter process and the service process of the processor maintain 
pools of buffers for storing incoming messages. The voter process performs 
voting as soon as it can form a majority on a given set of messages received 
from a sending node. The voted messages are stored in the voted message 
pool. The service process picks up a voted message from the pool and 
processes the request associated with it; if further processing at a subse-
quent node is required, then 3 copies of the task message are sent on, as 
stated earlier. 
In general, it should be assumed that processors maintain states which 
affect the execution of jobs, and that the execution of a job by a processor 
can modify its state. Job processing is assumed to be deterministic, in the 
following sense: if processes of non-faulty processors have identical states 
and then process copies of a task message, then the final states of the 
processes will be identical. Assuming that service processes of all non-
faulty processors of a node have identical initial states before any job 
- 143 -
processing begins, we require that all these processes process voted mes-
sages In an identical order. This sequencing requirement is necessary in 
order to ensure that non-faulty processors of a node produce identical 
results. It is relatively easy to meet in specialised pipelined systems. How-
ever, when more general replicated systems are considered, some form of 
protocol is required to meet this requirement. For example, the processors of 
a node could execute an agreement protocol for selecting messages from the 
voted message pool in an identical order. Such agreement protocols can be 
easily developed from the agreement algorithms presented in chapter 3. 
From the above discussion, we can identify a number of factors which 
may have an impact on the sojourn time of a job within a replicated system: 
(i) Voting times: Voting consumes processing resources. If the time taken 
to reach a majority decision is relatively large compared to the actual 
processing time, then the sojourn time for a task is likely to be substan-
tially larger than the corresponding time for the simplex system. 
(ii) Processor failure rates: In a simplex system, a processor failure cannot 
be masked (the affected job will not complete). Whilst a replicated sys-
tem can tolerate a bounded number of failures, such failures can affect 
sojourn times. Consider, for example, the progress of a job through two 
consecutive nodes, i and i +1. Moreover, suppose that the loads on the 
processors in these nodes are not identical (e.g., in addition to replicated 
processing, each processor in node i may have other, unreplicated pro-
cessing functions to perform). Thus, the delay times of the job's siblings 
in node i may well be different. As a consequence, the task messages 
associated with those siblings arrive at a given voter in node i+l at 
different times (these differences may be exacerbated by variations in 
message transmission delays). If there are no failures in node i, a voter 
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in node i + 1 can form a majority as soon as 2 copies of the task message 
arrive. On the other hand, processor failures in node i can delay a voter 
in node i + 1 by obliging it to wait for the slowest processor of node i to 
respond. Thus, even if failures are masked, this can be at the expense of 
increases in sojourn times. 
(iii) Extra message traffic: A replicated system can generate more messages 
than its unreplicated counterpart. The impact of this increase will 
depend upon the network bandwidth, topology and architecture. For 
example, if nodes are connected by 3-redundant busses, a processor need 
only send a single task message on each of the 3 busses - thus a given 
bus will experience the same message traffic as in the simplex system, 
so the extra message traffic will have little impact on the sojourn time 
in this particular case. 
(iv) Sequencing overheads: As stated earlier, processors of a node must be 
kept in step to prevent sequence failures. If a sequencing protocol is 
required, it can consume both processing and communication resources, 
thereby contributing to the sojourn time of tasks. 
In this chapter we investigate the impact of first two factors on average 
sojourn time of a successfully completed job (also referred to as the system 
response time). 
We shall assume that there is enough communication bandwidth avail-
able, so that factor three is of little significance. By making the following 
assumptions, the impact of factor four on system performance will also be 
removed: the system will be assumed to receive service requests from only 
one initiator; the initiator will be assumed to be reliable and its service 
requests will be assumed to arrive at the processors of the first TMR node in 
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zero time. Moreover, the task messages will be assumed to arrive at a desti-
nation node in the order in which they are sent by the source processor. 
These assumptions, together with the fact that we will assume our distri-
buted processing system to be a pipeline, with a unique route followed by all 
jobs, implies that there is no need for special sequencing protocols. 
In practical applications, the system can receive service requests from 
several replicated initiators. Under these circumstances, processors of the 
first TMR node can execute protocols to agree on, and order the requests. 
Execution of these protocols will provide an abstraction of a single "logical" 
initiator that delivers identical requests in an identical order to the non-
faulty processors of the first node. 
With assumptions to eliminate the need for the use of sequencing proto-
cols, the message pools in figure 5.1 will be treated as FIFO queues. The 
voters will be assumed to have mechanisms to identify the siblings of a job, 
so that the siblings can be matched for voting. 
5.3. Model Definition 
We study pipeline systems consisting of N nodes, 1,2, ... , N. These 
nodes are visited by every job, in the order in which they are numbered. In 
the case of a simplex, unreplicated system, each node contains a single pro-
cessor and an unbounded queue where jobs wait in order of arrival. In the 
replicated case, all nodes have degree of replication 3. The structure of a 
TMR node is illustrated in figure 5.2. 
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VQ2 V2 
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VQr Voter Queue j 
Vj : Voter j 
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SQr Service Queue j 
Sj : Service Processor j 
Figure 5.2. Model of a TMR node. 
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The voting and computational functions of each replicate are separated 
and are carried out by two independent servers. The latter are referred to as 
the 'voter' and 'service processor', respectively. There is an unbounded queue 
for each voter and each service processor. A voter queue in node i (i > 1), 
receives job siblings (or, rather, task messages corresponding to job siblings) 
from each service processor in node i -1. As soon as 2 siblings of a job are 
present in the queue, the voter may attempt to vote on them. If that vote 
results in an agreement, then the job is passed on to the service queue; oth-
erwise, the third sibling is awaited and the procedure is repeated. If, after 
all 3 siblings are present, there is still no agreement, then the job is 
effectively discarded. 
Each service processor services the jobs in its queue in FIFO order. 
After a service completion, the processor sends 3 siblings (task messages) to 
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the 3 voter queues in node i + 1. If the processor is non-faulty, those siblings 
will agree with others produced by non-faulty processors in node i; other-
wise they will not. 
There are two exceptions to the model in figure 5.2, namely nodes 1 and 
N. In node 1, there are no voters and voter queues; jobs coming into the sys-
tem from the outside are replicated on arrival into 3 siblings which immedi-
ately join the 3 service queues there. On the other hand, the service proces-
sors in node N produce a single result after each service completion (rather 
than 3). There is a single final voter, with its queue, which arbitrates over 
the output of node N. 
Jobs arrive into the system in a Poisson stream with rate a. Service 
times at the voters and service processors in node i are exponentially distri-
buted with means lIUi (Ui is the average voting rate) and lis, (Si is the aver-
age service rate), respectively (the Poisson and exponential assumptions are 
of course not necessary when the system is simulated, but are needed for the 
analysis). The average transit time between nodes i and i + 1 (for i <N) is 
lit,; it is independent of how many messages are being transferred in paral-
lel. The distributions of the transit times are immaterial (but see the simpli-
fying approximations in section 5.4). The transit times of service requests 
from the initiator to the processors of the first node, and of messages from 
the processors of the Nth node to the final majority voter are taken to be 
zero. 
Fault assumptions. 
The system reliability assumptions are as follows. Communication sub-
system, the initiator, and the final majority voter are fault free; faults occur 
only in processors (where the term 'processor' is interpreted in the sense of 
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figure 5.1). Permanent and consistent value faults are the types of faults 
suffered by processors. The fault assumption on processors can be justified 
as follows: if processors are connected by (triplicated) busses, then processor 
failures can be consistent (see section 2.4). Since processors are assumed to 
maintain states, once a processor fails, its state gets corrupted, and the pro-
bability of the processor with corrupted state producing correct results is 
assumed to be negligibly small. 
Faults occur in different processors - whether in the same node or in 
different ones - independently of each other. The intervals of non-faulty 
operation of processors in node i, called 'up-times', are exponentially distri-
buted with mean l/ui (Ui represents the average processor failure rate). 
With respect to repairing faulty processors, two types of systems will be 
examined: 
(i) Having once failed, a processor remains so until the end of the observa-
tion period. 
(ii) A failed processor in node i is repaired, or is replaced by a new non-
faulty one, after a delay, called 'down-time', whose average length is 
lId i • 
The models resulting from these two assumptions correspond to systems 
without repair and systems with repair (cf. [Carte71, Avizi71]); they will be 
referred to as 'model 0' and 'model 1', respectively. In both the cases, it 
should be emphasised, the behaviour of a faulty processor differs from that 
of a non-faulty one only in that the former produces either no or con-
sistently incorrect results. 
One immediate consequence of the above assumptions is that the condi-
tion for stability, i.e. for the existence of a steady-state, does not involve the 
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up-time and down-time parameters. The transit parameters are not involved 
either, because there is no queueing for transmissions. Thus, the system is 
stable if 
a < Vi and a < Si, i = 1,2, ... , N. 
These conditions are assumed to hold. 
The performance measures in which we are interested are: (a) The aver-
age sojourn time, W (interval between arrival into and departure from the 
system), for jobs that are completed successfully; and, (b) the distribution of 
the system operative state. The latter has a different interpretation in 
models 0 and 1, which will be clarified in section 5.4. 
5.4. Analytical Approximations 
To represent completely the state of a system employing N-modular 
redundancy, one would have to specify not only the numbers of jobs in each 
service and voting queues, and in transit between nodes, but also the indivi-
dual identities of the jobs in all waiting, service and transit positions. This 
is necessary in order to keep track of the siblings of any given job, so as to 
account for matching delays at the voters. A representation of this type is of 
course possible. Given a suitable set of assumptions, it would lead to a 
vector-valued Markov process which could, in principle, be solved numeri-
cally. However, the size and complexity of the problem are such that, in 
practice, an exact solution is generally unattainable. The equations do not 
exhibit any 'nice' structure, such as local balance, that can be exploited in 
solving them. Simulations, on the other hand, while perfectly feasible, may 
be very expensive in both computer utilisation and elapsed time. 
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It is desirable, therefore, to devise an approximate solution method 
whereby estimates of performance measures can be obtained cheaply and 
quickly, albeit with some loss of accuracy. This is our objective in the 
present section. Certain simplifying steps are taken in the approximation. 
The first of these is to assume that all siblings of a job arrive at the service 
queues in a node at the same time. This is of course true in node 1, but not 
necessarily in subsequent nodes. However, since the voters act as synchroni-
sation points for siblings, and since voting times and transit times between 
nodes are usually small compared to the service times, the assumption is 
not unreasonable. In fact, we shall see that even when voting and transit 
times are not small, the accuracy of the approximation is acceptable. 
The second simplifying step concerns the distribution of the interval 
between the arrival of a sibling at a service queue, and its arrival at the fol-
lowing voter. That interval, which includes waiting, service and transit 
(excepting the latter in the case of node N), will be referred to as the 'pas-
sage time' for the given node. Now, it is well known (e.g., see [Mitra87]) 
that if jobs arrive into a single-server queue in a Poisson stream with rate 
a, and have exponentially distributed service times with mean 1/5, then in 
the steady-state their response times are exponentially distributed with 
mean 11(8 -a). We shall assume that the addition of the subsequent transit 
time does not destroy that exponentiality (which it does, in general). The 
passage times for node i will be treated as exponentially distributed random 
variables with mean 
1 1 Pi = -- + -, S,-a tj 
(5.4.1) 
where 8j is the service rate at node i, a is the (common) job arrival rate and 
Uti is the average transit time from node i to node i + 1. Note that 1ltN = 0 by 
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definition. 
Assuming that at least 2 of the processors in a node are operating 
correctly, the following voter will be able to carry out a successful voting on 
a job when the first 2 of the job's correctly executed siblings complete their 
passage times through the node. To estimate the average time until the 
occurrence of that event, we shall use the following known result: 
Let Xl! X 2, ••. , Xn be a sample of n i.i.d. (independent and identically 
distributed) random variables distributed exponentially with parameter j.L. 
Consider the order statistics of that sample, Y 1> Y 2, ... , Y n' In other words, 
Y 1 is the smallest of the X's, Y 2 is the second smallest, etc. Then the expec-
tation of Y/e is given by E(Yk ) = (lIj.L)Hn ,k, where 
k -1 1 
Hn,k = l: --. ,k=l, 2, ... , n. 
)=0 n - J 
(5.4.2) 
Suppose that node i has c operative processors (c=2,3). Denote by Wi(cl 
the average associated delay time, i.e. the average period between the 
arrival of a job's siblings at the service queues of node i and their arrival at 
the service queues of node i + 1 (or the departure of the job from the system 
if i =N). Since the delay time consists of the second smallest passage time of 
the job's correctly executed siblings, plus the subsequent queueing and vot-
ing time, we can use the approximation 
1 
w,(c) = P,Hc2 + ---, 
, Vi+1- a 
(5.4.3) 
where Pi and HC •2 are given by (5.4.1) and (5.4.2) respectively, and Vi+l is the 
service rate of the voters in node i + 1 (or of the final voter, if i =N). 
Note that in the case of a TMR node with all three processors operating 
correctly, we have H 3.2= 5/6, so that the first term in (5.4.3) is actually 
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smaller than the corresponding average passage time in an unreplicated 
system. If voting times are small compared to service and/or transit times , 
then the TMR system will perform better than the unreplicated one. This is 
a reflection of the fact which (5.4.2) quantifies for the exponential distribu-
tion, namely that the second best out of three realisations of a random vari-
able tends to be better than a single realisation. On the other hand, if only 
two out of the three processors are operative, then H 2,2=3/2, and the repli-
cated system has a worse performance than the unreplicated one. These 
phenomena will be illustrated by the experimental results in section 5.5. 
Thus, the average delay time associated with a replicated node depends 
on the operative state of that node, i.e. on how many of its processors pro-
duce correct results. A node is said to be 'fully operative' if all three of its 
processors operate correctly. If only two of them do so, then the node is said 
to be 'partially operative'. The entire system is said to be 'operative' if every 
node is either fully or partially operative. 
Let Q = {1,2, ... , N} be the set of all nodes, qJ be an arbitrary subset of Q 
and Q-cp be the complement of cp with respect to Q. We shall say that the 
'working state' of the system is cp, if the nodes in cp are fully operative and 
those in Q-qJ are partially operative. Denote by q(cp) the conditional proba-
bility that the system is in working state qJ, given that it is operative. 
If the probabilities q(cp) are known, then the average response time of a 
successfully completed job, W, which is the interval between the job's arrival 
into and departure from the system, can be approximated by 
W = l: q(cp)[ l: wi(3) + l: w/2)] , 
",cO IE", IEO-", 
(5.4.4) 
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where Wi(C) is given by (5.4.3). The first summation extends over all subsets 
of n. An alternative form of this expression is obtained by exchanging the 
order of summations: 
N 
W = l: [wi(3) l: q(q>i) + w,(2) l: q(q>')] (5.4.5) 
i = 1 'icll ,iCIl 
Here, q>i and q>i vary over all subsets of n which do, and do not, contain node 
i, res pecti ve ly . 
Note, that expressions (5.4.4) and (5.4.5) rely on equilibrium being 
reached within each operative state of the system, i.e. on intervals between 
server breakdowns being much larger than the job interarrival, service, 
transit and voting times. This is usually true in practice. 
Our object now is to determine the probabilities q(q». To simplify the 
development, we shall assume that the breakdown (and repair) rates for all 
processors are equal: Ui=U; di=d, i=1,2, ... ,N. This implies that q(q» depends 
only on the size of q>, and not on its membership. Such an assumption is 
usually justifiable in practice, since the same (or similar type of) hardware 
is likely to be used at all nodes. Moreover, we shall see that it can be gen-
eralised, at the expense of considerably increasing the computational com-
plexity of the solution. 
With the assumption of equal breakdown (and repair) rates, it is 
sufficient to find the conditional probabilities, qj, that there are j fully 
operative and N - j partially operative nodes, given that the system is opera-
tive (j=O,l, ... ,N). In terms of those probabilities, and denoting by 1q>1 the 
number of nodes in q>, we can write 
(5.4.6) 
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Next, substituting (5.4.6) into (5.4.5) and counting the number of subsets of 
a given size which do, and do not contain node i, we obtain, after some alge-
bra, 
m N N-m N 
W = N~Wi(3) + ~~wt(2) , 
t=l i=1 
(5.4.7) 
where m is the conditional average number of fully operative nodes, given 
that the svstem is operative: 
.v 
m = ~jqj 
J =1 
We are thus left with the problem of finding the distribution qj and 
hence the mean m. In solving that problem, models 0 and 1 will be con-
sidered separately, since they require different treatment. 
5.4.1. Operative State Distribution for Model 0 
Recall that in model 0 the system starts in working state n (all nodes 
fully operative), and whenever a processor breaks down, it remains broken 
for ever. Eventually, a processor breakdown occurs in a node which is only 
partially operative; at the first such instant, the entire system becomes ino-
perative. However, we are interested in the conditional distribution of the 
working state, given that the system is operative. It is appropriate, there-
fore, to consider a 'modified' system which is equivalent to the original, but 
is never inoperative. That is, whenever the original system would become 
inoperative, the modified one re-enters working state n. 
Clearly, the instants when the modified system enters working state n 
are regenerative points for the working state of that system. The operative 
period of the original system corresponds to one regenerative period of the 
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modified system. Therefore, the conditional probability q(IP) in the original 
system is equal to the steady-state probability that the modified system is in 
working state IP. 
With the above in mind, we define a Markov process which is in state) 
when, in the modified system, there are) fully operative and N -) partially 
operative nodes, )=O,l, ... ,N. From state), the process moves to state )-1 with 
rate 3)u (if one of the processors in the fully operative nodes breaks down), 
and to state N with rate 2(N - ))u (if a breakdown occurs in a partially opera-
tive node, triggering a regeneration). The corresponding state diagram is 
shown in figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3. The State Diagram. 
The probabilities qj satisfy the balance equations 
3)qj = (2N -1 + ))qj-l , ) = 1,2,oo.,N , (5.4.8) 
together with the normalising equation 
N 
Iqj = 1. (5.4.9) 
j=O 
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The solution of the recurrences (5.4.8) is of the form 
(5.4.10) 
while qo is obtained by substituting (5.4.10) into (5.4.9). 
Another quantity of interest is the average operative period, A, of the 
original system. This is equal to the average first passage time from state N 
to state N of our Markov process. Since the average holding time in state N 
is 1I(3Nu), we can write 
A = _::=-1_ 
3NuqN (5.4.11) 
The approach described here clearly generalises to the case where the 
processor breakdown rates are different for different nodes (but the same 
within a node). One would then have to consider a vector-valued Markov 
process (b 1,b 2, ... ,bN ), where bi is 1 if node i is fully operative, 0 if partially 
operative. It would be easy to write a set of equations for the steady-state 
distribution of this process. However, solving those equations numerically 
would be a non-trivial matter, due to the large (2N) number of states. 
It should be emphasised that, in order to be able to apply the above 
results, the observation period, T (the mission time), should be large com-
pared to A. When that is not true, it is necessary to estimate the transient 
performance of the Markov process. This can be done by employing the fol-
lowing approximation. 
Let Aj be the average holding time in state j, i.e. the average uninter-
rupted interval during which there are j fully operative and N - j partially 
operative nodes. These intervals can be found by noting that qj=A/A, and 
therefore A} = qjA, j = O,1, ... ,N. 
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Now, remember that during an operative period, the process passes 
through the holding times AN, AN-t. ... , A o, in that order. In order to account 
for the possibility that the mission time, T, expires during one of those hold-
ing times, define the quantities, 
j 
Bj = min(T, l: AN -II) , j = O,l, ... ,N . (5.4.12) 
k=O 
Then the probability <ij' interpreted as the fraction of the mission time dur-
ing which there are j fully operative and N - j partially operative nodes, can 
be estimated from 
_ Bj - Bj - 1 
qN-j = BN ' j=O,l, ... ,N , (5.4.13) 
where B-1 = ° by definition. 
5.4.2. Operative State Distribution for Model 1 
In model 1, when a processor breaks down, it is repaired (or replaced by 
a new identical one), after a delay called the 'down-time'. Down-times are 
i.i.d. random variables with mean lid. In this model, neither the up-times 
nor the down-times need to be exponentially distributed. However, we still 
assume that equilibrium is reached between consecutive changes in the sys-
tem operative state. 
In the long run, any given processor is operative for a fraction of time, 
a, given by 
lIu 
a=----= 
lIu + lid 
d 
u + d 
(5.4.14) 
Hence, the probability that a given node is fully operative, Po, is given by 
Po = a 3 • The probability that the node is partially operative, Plo is 
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The probability that the system is operative, q, is obviously equal to 
(5.4.15) 
Finally, the conditional probability that there are j fully operative 
nodes and N - j partially operative ones, given that the system is operative, 
is of the Binomial type: 
= 1. [Nt i N-j . -0 1 N % q j J PlJ P 1 , J - , , ... , . (5.4.16) 
This analysis generalises easily to the case when the breakdown and 
repair rates are different at different nodes. 
It is perhaps worth emphasising again that these are long-run results. 
They are valid only when the observation period, T, is large compared to the 
up-times and down-times. To analyse the performance of the system in the 
short run, under assumptions of exponentially distributed up-times and 
down-times, one would have to study the transient behaviour of the Markov 
process {Jt; t~O}, where Jt=j if at time t there are j fully operative nodes and 
N-j partially operative ones (j=O, 1, ... , N). Another (absorbing) state, say 
'-1', would be added to represent an inoperative system. Then, for instance, 
the first passage time from state N to state -1 would correspond to the inter-
val during which the system is operative. While not really difficult, such an 
analysis is not considered here. 
Despite their simplicity and roughness, the approximations described 
here give quite accurate estimates of system performance measures. This 
will be illustrated in the following section. 
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5.5. Experimental Results 
Experiments' are carried out to assess the accuracy of the approxima-
tions involved in analytically estimating the system sojourn times. Both 
model 0 and model 1 are examined and the results are presented here. In an 
experiment, sojourn times obtained by simulations are compared with those 
obtained through analytical approximations. Comparisons between the per-
formance of TMR and simplex (unreplicated) systems are also made at the 
same time. 
An experiment normally involves fixing all parameters except the aver-
age voting time, and then simulating the simplex and the TMR systems for 
that set of parameters. Simulations of TMR system are repeated for 
different values of average voting time. These simulations do not assume 
any of the approximations described in the previous section but will 
correspond to the simplex or TMR system whose model is described in sec-
tion 5.3. For model 0, a 'simulation' consists of 10 independent runs which 
differ only by the random number streams. In model 1, a single long run is 
made, divided into 10 portions with equal number of jobs completed in each 
portion. These samples of observations are used to obtain point estimates 
and confidence intervals for the average sojourn time, and point estimates 
for the fraction of time that the system is operative. The confidence inter-
vals are not shown in the figures; their half-width is always less than 5% of 
the point estimate. 
When the system simulated is a TMR one, the sojourn time for the con-
cerned set of parameters can be estimated analytically using approximations 
described in section 5.4. The simplex system is of course a special case, with 
voting times equal to O. In fact, the 'approximation' is then the exact 
steady-state result for queues in tandem: 
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W=~+N-1 
s - at' (5,5,1) 
The relative error of the approximation, expressed as a percentage, IS 
denoted bye: 
e = 
W' - W 
W' 100 I (5,5,2) 
where W' is the point estimate by simulation and W IS the approximated 
one. 
For r = 1 (simplex system), e::::: 0 indicates that the system has reached 
steady-state during the simulation run. When e < 0, the analytical approxi-
mation overestimates the average response time; otherwise it underesti-
mates. In the following, unless specified, the value of e will be for r = 3 (TMR 
systems). 
In order to avoid having to deal with too many parameters, we have 
examined systems where all nodes are statistically identical: 
Si = s, lSiSN; ti = t, lSi<N; Vi = V, l<isN+l. (5.5.3) 
The actual choice of these parameters was influenced by the form of the 
expression for the passage times in (5.4.1). We considered cases where 
transfer times dominate queueing delays (lI(s - a) < lit), where the two are 
equal (l/(s -a) = lit), and where queueing delays dominate transfer times 
(lI(s -a) > lit). This is done by choosing different values of lis such that 
1/s<lIa. In all simulations performed here, lIa is fixed at 2 and lis is 
varied from 1.5, 1.0, and 0.5 to represent heavy, medium, and light process-
ing loads at service processors respectively. 
In each experiment, simulations of TMR system are carried out for at 
most eight values of average voting time. Thus an experiment will contain 
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at most nine simulations - one for the simplex system and the rest for the 
TMR system. 
5.5.1. Results for Model 0 
Two groups of results are presented for model O. In the first group, the 
simulation time (or observation time in the simulations) is chosen to be 
longer than the operative periods of the system. Thus, these results are for a 
system which breaks down before the end of the simulation time. The 
second group of results is for a simulation period during which a TMR sys-
tem generally remains operational, i.e., every node in the system is fully or 
partially operative. In the following, results of group 1 are presented. 
5.5.1.1. Group 1 
The results for a 5-node system are summarised in table 1. Simulation 
experiments are carried out with 1/u taking 20000, 15000, and 10000 and 
with simulation time being fixed at 20000. In all simulations, the system 
breaks down before the mission time of 20000 time units elapses. For this 
simulation time and for the range of values chosen for lIu and N, the TMR 
system operates long enough for its steady state behaviour to be observed. 
In each experiment, simulations of TMR system are carried out for eight 
different values of mean voting time which vary from 0 to at least 50% of 
the average service time considered. 
It can be observed in table 5.1 that the magnitude of e becomes smaller, 
when lis gets smaller in each of the cases for lI(s -a) being less than, equal 
to, and greater than, lit; it also decreases, as lit increases for a given lis. 
This is explained in the following manner: 
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Model 0 (group 1): Va = 2; Simulation Time = 20000; ~ = 5. 
~ 20000 15000 10000 {1/s,1/t} 
1I(s-a) < 11t: 
{1.S,10} 
-8.0% S e S -2.0% -8.0% SeS-5.0% -8.8% S e S -4.7% 
{1.0A-0} 
-4_S% S e S -3.3% -4.9% SeS-3_7% -S.2% S e S -3.7% 
{0.S,2.0} +1.8%SeS+2.S% +1.9%seS+2.3% + 1.8% SeS +2.4% 
11(s-a) = 1 It: 
{1.S,6.0} 
-9.S% S e S -6_6% -12.2% SeS-3.0% -12.3% SeS-3.4% 
{1.0,2.0} 
-S.2% S e S -4.3% -S.9% SeS-4.6% -6.4% S e S -4.7% 
{0.S,0.67} -4.1% SeS-3.S% -S.1%SeS-2_9% -4.S% S e S -3.0% 
11(s-a) > 11t: 
{1.S,0.S} 
-183% SeS-7.2% -19.9% SeS-12.0% -17.3% SeS-8.7% 
{1.0,1.2S} 
-7.6% SeS-S.3% -7.S% S e S -S.2% -8.1% SeS-4.6% 
{O.S,O.O} 
-S.6% S e S -2.3% -6.8% SeS-2.S% -4.4% S e S -2.S% 
Table 5.1. Accuracy of Approximations in Model 0 (Group 1). 
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In analytically estimating the TMR sojourn times, it is assumed that the 
passage times of task siblings at a TMR node are independent of each other. 
While the transfer times of task siblings are indeed independent of each 
other, their queueing times at the servers are not. However, that depen-
dence is reduced when the load on the servers becomes lighter. Also its 
effect becomes less noticeable when the transfer times begin to dominate. 
The results of those experiments with parameters {lis = 0.5, lit = 2, 
lIu = 15000}, {lis = 1.0, lit = 2, lIu = 15000}, {lis = 0.5, lit = 0.67, lIu = 15000}, 
and {lis = 1.5, lit = 0.5, l/u = 15000} are shown in figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 
5.7 respectively. The graphs indicated by r=3 represent TMR average 
sojourn times for different values of average voting time. The value of e for 
simplex system was so small in some experiments that both the estimates 
are shown by a single line (indicated by r = 1). 
In figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, the simulation estimates of TMR sojourn 
time for zero voting time are larger than those of the simplex sojourn time. 
Recall that the average task completion time (the service time + transfer 
time) in one TMR node is analytically estimated to be 16.6% less, and 50% 
more, than the average task completion time in a simplex node, when that 
node is fully, and partially, operative respectively. When the simulation is 
run until the system breaks down, the value of miN in equation (5.4.7) is 
0.654 which is also the probability that a TMR node is fully operative given 
that the system is operative. Thus, when there is no voting in TMR system, 
the sojourn time can be expected to exceed the simplex sojourn time by 
(1 - 0.654) '* 50 - 0.654 '* 16.6 = 6.44%, (5.5.4) 
where the % difference is expressed with respect to the simplex sojourn 
time. In figure 5.4, the simulation estimate of TMR sojourn time is 8.8% 
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Model·O: lIs = 0.5; l/a = 2; lIt = 2; up-time = 15000; Simulation Time = 20000; N = S. 
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Figure 5.4. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) < lIt. 
Model·O: lIs = 1.0; 1/a = 2; lIt = 2.0; up-time = 15000; Simulation Time = 20000; N = 5. 
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Figure 5.5. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) = lIt. 
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Model-O: 1/s=0.5;1/a =2;1/t=0.67; up-time= 15000;Simulation Time = 20000;N = 5. 
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Figure 5.6. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) = lit. 
Model·O: lis = 1.5; l/a = 2; lit = 0.5; up-time = 15000; Simulation Time = 20000; N = 5. 
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Figure 5.7. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) > lit .. 
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more than the simplex sojourn time. This percentage difference between the 
simulation estimates of TMR and simplex sojourn times becomes smaller in 
figures 5.5 and 5.6, and becomes less than zero in figure 5.7. 
To observe the accuracy of approximations for different values of N 
, 
experiments were carried out for N = 10 and 3, and with the following sets 
of parameters: {lIs=0.5, lIt=2, lIu=15000}, {lIs=l.O, lIt=2, lIu=15000}, 
{lis = 0.5, lit =0.67, lIu = 15000}, and {lis = 1.5, lit =0.5, lIu = 15000}. When 
lis = 0.5, e was positive and less than 2.8% for N = 10 and less than 4.5% 
for N = 3, and when lis = 1.0, it was near zero (varying between -0.6% and 
1.5%) for both values of N. For lis = 1.5, the magnitude of e became larger: 
-15.4% :5 e :5 -8.7% and -7.5 :5 e :5 +2.6 for N = 10 and 3 respectively, but 
still it is less than that for N = 5. This observation, that the accuracy of the 
approximations improves for large and small number of nodes, is not intui-
tively obvious and we have no satisfactory explanation for it. 
5.5.1.2. Group 2 
In all simulation experiments in this group, simulation time is fixed at 
2000. The values of lIu considered for a 5-node system are 100000, 50000, 
and 25000. For lIu = 100000 and 50000, the TMR system suffered no 
failures, and tolerated failures, until the end of simulation, respectively. 
When lIu was 25000, it broke down before the end of simulation period in 
only 2 out of 10 'simulation runs' of a simulation. Table 5.2 summarises the 
results of simulation experiments for a 5-node system. 
The values of e in table 5.2 are largely positive implying that the 
approximations underestimate the TMR sojourn times. When it is assumed 
that all siblings of a job arrive at the service queues in a node at the same 
time, the approximation is optimistic in ignoring the variabilities in passage 
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Model 0 (group 2): 1/a = 2; Simulation Time = 2000; N = 5. 
~ 100000 50000 25000 {1/s,1/t} 
1I(s-a) < 7 It: 
{1.S,10} +4.5% ~ e ~ + 7.0% +4.5%~eS +9.5% + 5.8% ~e S + 8.6% 
{1.0,4.0} +6.6% SeS +8.9% +8.2% Ses +9.9% +7.8% Se~ +9.4% 
{0.5,2.0} +7.0%Ses +8.1% +8.5% SeS +9.6% +8.3% Se S +9.3% 
71(s-a) = 7/t: 
{1.S/6.0} +3.4% SeS + 7.3% + 1.0% S e S + 7.0% +2.3% Se S +9.0% 
{1.0,2.0} +S.6% ~e~ +9.0% +6.2% ~eS +9.9% +6.1% ~e~ +8.6% 
{0.S,0.67} +9.3% ~eS +6.9% + 10.4% SeS +8.1% +9.7% ~e~ +8.3% 
1I(s-a) > 7/t: 
{1.S,O.S} 
-2.2% ~ e ~ + 3.4% -4.1% ~ e ~ + 1.8% -8.0% ~ e ~ + 5.6% 
{1.0,1.2S} +3.8% ~e~ +6.8% +3.8%~eS+7.3% +4.9% ~e~ + 7.2% 
{0.5/0.0} -1.3% Se~-0.1% +0.3% ~e~ +2.3% +0.08%~e~+1.7% 
Table 5.2. Accuracy of Approximations in Model 0 (Group 2). 
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Model-O: lIs = 0.5; l/a = 2; lIt = 2; up-time = 50000; Simulation Time = 2000;N = 5. 
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Figure 5.8. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) < lIt. 
Model-O: lIs = 1.0; l/a = 2; lIt = 2.0; up-time = 50000; Simulation Time = 2000; N = 5. 
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Figure 5.9. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) = lIt. 
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Model-O: 1fs = 0.5; 1fa = 2; 1ft = 0.67; up-time = 50000; Simulation Time = 2000;N = 5. 
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Figure 5.10. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1f(s-a) = 1ft. 
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Figure 5.11. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1f(s-a) > 1ft. 
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times of task siblings. On the other hand, the approximation becomes pes-
simistic, when the system is considered to reach steady state instantane-
ously following a failure. These optimistic and pessimistic trends in approxi-
mations counteract each other in reality. In these experiments, no failures 
occur or a few failures occur less frequently and the approximations turn 
out to underestimate the TMR sojourn times. In the experiments for the pre-
vious group, system is observed till it breaks down and the approximations 
are seen to overestimate the sojourn times. 
The assumption that the sum of exponentially distributed queueing 
delays and transfer delays is also exponentially distributed tends to be more 
accurate when one delay is larger than the other. The worst cases of e are 
seen for lI(s - a) = lit. The assumption becomes real, when one of the delays 
is zero. Consequently, when lit is zero, the magnitude of e is the least. 
For lIu = 50000, the results of experiments for {lis = 0.5, lit = 2}, 
{lis = 1.0, lit = 2}, {lis = 0.5, lit = 0.67}, and {lis = 1.5, lit = 0.5} are shown in 
figures 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 respectively. In these figures, the TMR sojourn 
times for zero voting time are less than the simplex sojourn times. Since a 
few failures occur in TMR system for lIu = 50000, the simplex system is 
outperformed by the TMR system for small values of lIu. 
We also carried out experiments to study the accuracy of analytical 
approximations for different values of N which was taken to be 10 and 3. 
When the accuracy of approximations for N = 10 (N = 3 respectively) was as 
good as that for N = 5, it was worse for N = 3 (N= 10 respectively). 
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5.5.2. Results for Modell 
For all simulation experiments in this model, the values of lid were 
chosen to be 1%, 5%, and 10% of the average uptime l/u which is fixed at 
1000. A batch of 2000 jobs are successfully completed during each of the 10 
portions of a simulation run. The results for a 5-node system are summar-
ised in table 5.3. 
In most of the experiments, e is positive implying that the approxima-
tion underestimates the TMR sojourn time. When e is negative, its magni-
tude increases for a larger value of lis. The magnitude of e for lid = 100, is 
less than that for lid = 10 and 50 in respective experiments. This is 
because, as lid becomes larger, there is more time for the system to reach 
steady state following a failure. 
The results of selected experiments are presented in figures 5.12 to 
5.15. In all of these figures, the TMR sojourn time for zero voting time is 
less than the simplex sojourn time. Analytical approximations show that the 
TMR sojourn time with no voting is 85.3%, 92.0%, and 98.7% of simplex 
sojourn time, when lid is 10, 50, and 100 respectively. In almost all experi-
ments carried out, the TMR system was observed to be no slower than the 
simplex system at zero voting time. 
In the experiments carried out with N = 10 and 3, e was almost in the 
same range as that obtained for N=5, except for {lIs=1.5, lIt=0.5} in 
which case e was negative and greater than -13.3% and -5.2% for N = 10 and 
N = 3 respectively. 
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Modell: lIa = 2; lIu = 1 000; ~ umber of jobs completed = 20000; N = 5. 
~ 10 50 100 {1/s,1/t} 
TI(s-a) < lIt: 
{1.5,10} +3.8%SeS+7.6% +4.8% Ses +7.4% +2.4%SeS +4.7% 
{1.0,4.0} +5.2% SeS +6.7% +5.6% SeS +6.1% +4.1%SeS+5.2% 
{0.5,2.0} +5.2% SeS +6.2% +5.5% SeS +6.4% +4.9% SeS +5.6% 
lI(s-a) = 1 It: 
{1.5,6.0} +3.8% Se S + 7.5% + 4.1 % S e S + 7.3% + 1.3% SeS +4.3% 
{1.0,2.0} + 5. 1 % S e S + 6.7% +3.S%SeS+7.1% +3.1%SeS+4.0% 
{0.5,0.67} +4.5% SeS +6.6% + 5.0% SeS +6.3% +3.3% SeS +4.5% 
TI(s-a) > 11t: 
{1.S,0.5} -3.9% SeS +4.S% -8.4% S e S + 0.6% -8.5% SeS + 1.9% 
{1.0,1.0} +2.2% SeS +3.8% +2.0% SeS +3.2% +0.3% SeS +2.3% 
{O.S,O.O} 
-2.4% SeS-1.7% -2.4% SeS-0.7% 
-2.3% S e S -0.6% 
Table 5.3. Accuracy of Approximations in Modell. 
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Model·1: lIs = 0.5; l/a = 2; lIt = 2; up-time = 1000; lId = 50;N = 5. 
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Figure 5.12. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) < l/t. 
Model·1: lIs = 1.0; l/a = 2; lIt = 2.0; up-time = 1000; lId = 50; N = 5. 
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Figure 5.13. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) = lIt. 
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Model·': lIs = 0.5; l/a = 2; l/t = 0.67; up-time = 1000; lid = sO;N = 5. 
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Figure 5.14. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) = lit 
Model·': lIs = 1.5; l/a = 2; lit = 0.5; up-time = 1000; lId = 50; N = 5. 
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Figure 5.15. Sojourn Time Vs. Voting Time For 1/(s-a) > lIt. 
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5.5.3. Computer Time for Simulations and Analytical Estimations 
The CPU time needed for simulations and analytical estimations were 
also measured (the CPU was an Amdahl 5860). The CPU time to run a 
simulation for a given set of parameters increased with queueing delays, 
transit times, voting times and the number of nodes in the system. In model 
o and group 1, it increased for large values of lIu, since the system was 
operati ve for longer periods. An increase in lid for a gi ven 11 u increased the 
CPU time in model 1. The CPU time for analytical estimations did not show 
much variations in the respective models and was less than 60 milliseconds 
for the replicated system in both models. It should be recalled that a simu-
lation for a given set of parameters was made up of 10 'simulation runs'. In 
the following, CPU times per simulation run for the replicated system are 
given for some selected sets of parameters used in the experiments of the 
previous subsections. (lla and simulation time in respective cases are the 
same as in the experiments.) The values of e are also given in an attempt to 
indicate the loss of accuracy against saving in computer time and hence the 
cost in using analytical approximations instead of simulations. 
When lIu = 10000 and N = 5 in model 0 and group 1, the CPU time per 
simulation run was 13 and 10 seconds for {lis = 1.5, lIv = 0.0, lit = 10} (for 
which e was -6.5%) and {lis = 0.5, lIv = 0.0, lit = 2.0} (for which e was 1.8%) 
respectively; for the second case, when 1/u was increased to 20000, the CPU 
time increased to 18.5 seconds and e was 1.9%. When lis = 0.5, lit = 0.0, 
1/u = 50000 in group 2, a simulation run required 6.5 and 6.6 seconds of 
CPU time for lIv = 0.0 and 0.25 respectively. For these cases, e was respec-
tively 0.8% and 0.3%. With lIv = 0.0, when N was increased to 10, the CPU 
time requirement became 14 seconds and e was -21.5%. In modell, when 
lis = 0.5, 1/v = 0.0, lit = 0.0, N = 5, and lIu = 1000, the CPU time per run was 
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13 and 17 seconds when lid = 10 and 100 respectively; e was -2.4% and 
-1.6% respectively. The CPU time was 37 seconds and e was -4.7% when 
lid = 10 and N = 10. The CPU time for simulations can be reduced drasti-
cally by employing powerful multiprocessors and advanced concurrent simu-
lation techniques. 
5.6. Concluding Remarks 
The factors capable of affecting the performance of a TMR system in 
relation to the simplex system were discussed in section 5.2 and were 
identified to be (i) voting times, (ii) processor failure rates, (iii) extra mes-
sage traffic, and (iv) sequencing overheads. In this study, we have assumed 
a specialised pipeline architecture with high bandwidth communication 
which enables us to ignore the effects of extra message traffic and of 
sequencing overheads. The model of such a system was presented in section 
5.3. The performance of such a system was then evaluated both by com-
puter simulations and by analytical approximations. Despite their simplicity 
and roughness, the approximations developed here have been shown to esti-
mate the system performance measures fairly accurately - the analytical 
estimates are within 10% of simulation estimates in 90% of the simulation 
experiments carried out. Thus, when simulation experiments are time con-
suming and expensive to carry out, analytical approximations can provide 
an attractive alternative. 
We have compared the mean sojourn times of jobs in replicated and 
unreplicated systems. A rather surprising result has been that when voting 
times are small and processor failures are less likely, a replicated system 
can provide better response times. This is because when redundant proces-
sors in each node are considered to be unevenly loaded, the presence of extra 
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processors brings performance benefits by exploiting the earliest service 
completions of siblings. These performance measures have been discussed in 
section 5.5. 
The particular assumptions that we have made are not the only ones 
that can be handled by our approximation approach. For example, rather 
than assigning the voting and computational functions to separate (process-
ing) units within a processor, one could use a single processor, with 
appropriately modified service times, to carry out both voting and process-
ing. It is also possible to consider a system configuration in which there is a 
single voter for all three processors of a TMR node. If the voters in such a 
system are reliable, the system will be more - cost-effective than 
a system of the type considered here (cf. [Carte79]). In such a 
configuration, it is no more an approximation to consider that voters act as 
synchronisation points for messages. Also, the assumption that congestion 
has no effect on transit times can be relaxed. These generalisations of the 
models would provide a relevant topic of further research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Design and development of algorithms for fault tolerant distributed sys-
tems has been our chosen topic. Under this topic, this thesis has presented 
the following: A classification of faults in systems was presented and fault 
tolerant algorithms for a particular system function were developed. Reach-
ing agreement was the system function considered and agreement algo-
rithms tolerant to processor faults of different classes were presented. The 
problem of evaluating the performance of fault tolerant distributed systems 
that require the use of agreement algorithms was considered. Analytical 
methods (algorithms) were developed to evaluate the performance of a par-
ticular type of distributed replicated systems. These methods were derived 
based on some approximations, the accuracy of which was examined using 
computer simulations. 
Given that a component can have many failure modes, the design of a 
fault tolerant algorithm for any given system function requires making 
fault models of components and specifying precisely the assumed behaviour 
of faulty components. This requirement led us to investigate the two types 
of faults often considered in the literature: omission and Byzantine faults. It 
was observed that these two fault types represent the two extreme cases of 
the most restricted and the unrestricted types. Fault types of intermediate 
restrictions were identified and defined using "expected-value" and "timeli-
ness" as the two specified properties of a component's response. These fault 
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types are value, timing and emission. A value (timing) fault causes a 
component's response to be incorrect only in the value (time) domain. An 
emission fault causes a response to be incorrect in either domain or in both 
the domains. 
This classification has been extended to apply to components that are 
required to produce replicated responses. For such components, nine fault 
types have been identified based on the notion of consistent failures in pro-
ducing a replicated response. A transitive relationship, "a proper subset of' 
or "more restricted than", between fault types has been established. These 
fault classifications for components with replicated or unreplicated 
responses, have been applied to specify the behaviour of selfchecking com-
ponents and to analyse the faulty behaviour of a composite component in 
terms of the fault types of constituent components. One such composite 
component considered was a processor with a clock and the subsequent fault 
analysis led to some interesting observations: for a clock that responds sim-
ply in response to the passage of real time, value failures and timing 
failures cannot occur independently of each other; a clock that faik in a 
manner other omission can seriously affect the failure modes of the proces-
sor; a fast clock, for example, can make the processor fail both in the value 
and the timing domains. A distributed system was subject to fault analysis 
by considering it to be made up of processors connected by a communication 
subsystem. It was observed in the analysis that when a processor fails in a 
manner other than Byzantine, a communication subsystem capable of pro-
viding a reliable broadcast service is necessary for considering a consistent 
fault model for the processor. 
The fault classifications presented in chapter 2 provide a convenient 
means for the development of increasingly more sophisticated algorithms to 
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solve a given problem tolerating faults of increasingly general types. We 
have chosen to solve the agreement problem. The problem was defined with 
one processor in a distributed system being designated as the sender. The 
sender can be faulty or non-faulty. Extending a solution to this problem in 
a general context where every processor in the system can be a sender is a 
straightforward task. The agreement problem has been solved by consider-
ing processors of a distributed system to be synchronous and by assuming a 
known bound on message communication delays between processors. An 
upper bound on the number of processors that can possibly fail is also 
assumed. The assumptions made in solving the problem are stated and they 
are essential for reaching agreement in a bounded and known time interva1. 
In the context where processors will not know a priori the sender's 
broadcast time, deterministic agreement algorithms have been developed for 
each of the fault types defined for components with replicated responses. For 
some fault types, special cases have also been considered to develop algo-
rithms. The resulting agreement algorithms constitute a family of algo-
rithms which is presented in chapter 3. A generic algorithm is also 
presented in that chapter to represent the family of algorithms collectively. 
Based on the generic algorithm, the complexities of algorithms tolerant to 
faults of different types are compared. With some exceptions, an algorithm 
is found to be less complex than another one, if the faults for which the first 
algorithm is developed are a proper subset of the faults considered in the 
development of the second algorithm. In the exceptional cases, no change in 
complexity is observed. These algorithms can be further developed into 
broadcast protocols that are essential in systems with replicated processing. 
Agreement algorithms developed under different fault types and an illustra-
tion of their relative complexity are the main contributions of chapter 3. 
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In chapter 4, the agreement problem is solved in the context where pro-
cessors are assumed to know a priori the sender's broadcast time. Only a 
few selected fault types are considered. Agreement algorithms tolerant to 
permanent omission faults, omission faults, timing faults, and consistently 
late timing faults have been developed and presented. These algorithms are 
early stopping algorithms which attempt to reach agreement faster, when 
the number of actually failed processors is less than the upper bound 
assumed. Applications of early stopping algorithms in distributed transac-
tion commit are cited. The early stopping conditions in the permanent 
omission fault tolerant algorithm take into account of the fact that some 
faulty processors may have failed and stopped functioning before the execu-
tion of the algorithm starts. Consequently, this algorithm can be faster 
than the omission fault tolerant algorithm for the same number of failed 
processors in an execution. The omission fault tolerant algorithm can be 
faster than, and the consistently late timing fault tolerant algorithm has 
less message complexity than, the timing fault tolerant algorithm. Under 
consistently late timing fault model, faulty processors were considered to be 
overloaded processors and the agreement algorithm has been developed 
using assumptions that are weaker than, but similar to, assumptions made 
in the development of the other three algorithms. 
The algorithms of chapter 4 are substantially different from the 
corresponding ones presented in chapter 3. The reason is that they are 
developed with different assumptions about the processors' a priori 
knowledge of the sender's broadcast time. When processors do not have a 
prior knowledge of the sender's broadcast time (as is the case in chapter 3), 
they can skip reaching a unanimous decision on the sender's value, if the 
sender is faulty. However, when they know the sender's broadcast time a 
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priori, they have to reach some decision unanimously for every broadcast of 
the sender. One of the most difficult scenarios to cope with is the sender not 
carrying out any broadcast at all. Thus, when the sender does not carry out 
a broadcast that it should have performed, the processors executing an algo-
rithm of chapter 4 have to exchange more number of messages and take 
longer time to reach agreement (on the default value). On the other hand, 
the processors executing an algorithm of chapter 5 will not exchange any 
messages and will not decide on any value. 
A pipeline TMR system has been considered in chapter 5 for perfor-
mance evaluation of a distributed replicated system. Faulty processors in 
the system are assumed to fail in a permanent and consistent value manner. 
Two system models with respect to recovery of faulty processors are con-
sidered. In model 0, no mechanism for recovery was assumed and a faulty 
processor remained faulty till the end of the mission period. In modell, 
failed processors were assumed to be repaired within a finite and random 
delay. Analytical methods have been derived to evaluate system response 
times. Derivation of these methods involve simplifying approximations and, 
as a result, these methods are simple to use. 
The accuracy of analytical approximations was examined by computer 
simulations. The performance estimates obtained by analytical estimation 
and by simulation were compared for different values of system parameters. 
The differences between these two estimates for every given set of system 
parameters considered were tabulated for both models. For the first model, 
two cases were considered: the TMR system is operative, and inoperative at 
the end of the mission period of given length. For the simulation experi-
ments carried out, the analytical estimates were within 20% of the simula-
tion estimates in the worst cases, and were within 10% in ninety percent of 
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the experiments conducted. Analytical methods derived in chapter 5 make 
two important contributions: they can provide an alternative to simula-
tions, in particular, when simulations are expensive; they can be a step 
towards an empirical study of the performance of systems with more com-
plex architectures. 
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarised to be: the 
fault and failure classification, the use of the classification in the develop-
ment of a family of fault tolerant agreement algorithms and a collection of 
early stopping agreement algorithms, and development of analytical tech-
niques for evaluating the performance of distributed replicated systems. 
6.1. Directions For Further Research 
A fault analysis of a composite component in terms of fault types of con-
stituent components has been presented in chapter 2. A fault analysis in the 
reverse direction can be carried out in a particular system context. Con-
sider, for example, a distributed system where processors maintain their 
clocks in synchronism. Let a processor be considered to be made up of three 
components: clock, computational unit and network interface. For a given 
fault assumption for such a processor, the fault assumptions required on the 
processor's components can be analysed. Such an analysis will reveal the 
requirements on components' behaviour so that the processor can fail only 
in a particular manner. Suppose that the processor is assumed to fail in an 
omission manner. This means that the network interface can omit sending 
any number of messages; however, it cannot omit receiving more than cer-
tain number of messages when a clock synchronisation algorithm is being 
executed; otherwise, the clock may not be synchronised and consequently 
the processor can fail in a timing manner. Similarly, when the processor 
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maintains some state information, its computational unit should not omit 
processing a message which would result in changes in the state informa-
tion; otherwise, in subsequent message processing, the processor can produce 
incorrect values. It should be noted that the results of such an analysis will 
vary with the system context in which a particular fault assumption is con-
sidered. If a processor does not maintain a synchronised clock and all its 
processings are considered to be stateless, then assuming the omission fault 
type for the processor would mean that the network interface can omit 
receiving any number of messages and the computational unit can omit pro-
cessing any message. 
Only one type of processor fault has been considered in developing each 
of the agreement algorithms presented here. A faulty processor was 
assumed to fail in the "worst" possible manner that is permitted within the 
chosen fault model. One can consider the possibilities of developing algo-
rithms to reach agreement in the presence of faults of different types and 
with a bound on the number of faults of each type. Two such algorithms 
have been developed in the literature: timing and Byzantine faults were 
considered in [Meyer87]; in [Thamb88], Byzantine faults, consistent omis-
sion faults and malicious symmetric faults that come closely under our 
definition of consistent value faults were considered. We have considered 
consistent omission faults and omission faults in section 3.7. When it is 
given that at most (f - f'), out of at most f, omission faulty processors fail in 
a consistent manner, the algorithm has been observed to require just (f' + 1) 
rounds instead of (f+1) rounds. In fact, every algorithm in chapter 3 which 
requires (f + 1) rounds in the presence of at most f faults of the type, say A, 
considered will require just (f' + 1) rounds, if (f - f') and f' are assumed to be 
the new bounds on the number of processors that have faults of consistent 
omission and type A respectively. The family of algorithms and their 
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complexity analysis can provide useful insights into developing efficient 
algorithms tolerant of faults of multiple types. 
The development of the permanent omission fault tolerant algorithm in 
chapter 4 leaves us with an impression that it may not be possible to 
develop a faster algorithm. A permanent omission fault is a special case of 
an omission fault that is a proper subset of faults of every other type that is 
not consistent. If our impression can be formally proved, then it will estab-
lish a lower bound on the execution time of any early stopping algorithm 
that is tolerant to faults that are not consistent. 
Our work on performance evaluation is just an initial step and can be 
extended for systems with more general architectures and processor faults of 
more serious types. 
We are currently building a TMR pipeline system using transputers. 
The architecture of the system has been presented in [Ezhil89]. The tran-
sputers of a TMR node execute agreement protocols to meet ordering and 
agreement requirements. Using this system, we plan to study the perfor-
mance of agreement algorithms of chapter 3. The accuracy of analytical 
approximations of chapter 5 will also be examined. It is also our plan to 
construct a fail-silent node (a node whose failure mode is restricted to per-
manent omission) out of two transputers. Its performance will be compared 
with the fail-silent node being built by Ferranti Computer Systems Ltd., 
using special purpose hardware to achieve clock synchronisation, agreement 
and order. Our fail-silent nodes are intended to support the object oriented 
distributed systems (ARJUNA) [Shriv89] developed at Newcastle. Thus the 
theoretical work reported here will be complemented by extensive experi-
mental work concerned with the building of real systems. 
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